1. Hydraulic Generation Refurbishment and Modernization (2019-2020)

	Electrical
STO PROFESSIONAL PL	Mechanical
Newfoundland and Labyedon	Civil
DAVE ROYLE	Protection & Control
14. 17/10/2018 S	Transmission & Distribution
DATE DATE LABE	Telecontrol
	System Planning

Hydraulic Generation Refurbishment and Modernization

July 2018



1 Summary

Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro (Hydro) aims to replace or refurbish failing or failed
hydraulic generation assets to ensure the delivery of safe, reliable, least-cost electricity in an
environmentally responsible manner.

5

6 Starting in 2017 and continuing in 2018 with the 2019 Capital Budget Application, Hydro has consolidated much of its hydraulic generation capital work into one Hydraulic Generation 7 8 Refurbishment and Modernization Project. Hydro's philosophies for the assessment of 9 equipment and the selection of capital work for the Hydraulic Generation Refurbishment and 10 Modernization Project are outlined in the "Hydraulic Generation Asset Management Overview" (please see 2019 Capital Budget Application, Volume II, Tab 1).¹ In the 2019 Capital Budget 11 Application (CBA), Hydro proposes the following program-based activities under the Hydraulic 12 13 Generation Refurbishment and Modernization Project:

14

15 Hydraulic Generating Units Program

- 16 1. Turbine and Generator Six-Year Overhauls;
- 17 2. Turbine Major Refurbishment;
- 18 3. Upgrade Units 1-6 Generator Bearing Cover Seals;
- 19 4. Refurbish Generator Rotor; and
- 20 5. Replace/Improve Unit Metering, Monitoring, Protection, and Control Assets.
- 21
- 22 Hydraulic Structures Program
- 23 1. Refurbish Hydraulic Structure.
- 24
- 25 Reservoirs Program
- 26 1. Upgrade Public Safety Around Dams.

¹ Originally submitted as part of the 2018 Capital Budget Application.

1 Site Buildings and Services Program

2 1. Refurbish Draft Tube Deck (Phase 1)

3

4 Common Auxiliary Equipment Program

- 5 1. Replace cooling water pump and strainer;
- 6 2. replace drainage pump; and
- 7 3. refurbish sump level system.
- 8

9 Six activities are scheduled for a one-year execution period and five activities are scheduled for

10 two-year execution periods. The estimated project cost for all activities in 2019 and 2020 for

11 the proposed 2019 Hydraulic Generation Refurbishment and Modernization Project is

12 \$15,838,900².

² \$9,093,700 in 2019 and \$6,745,200 in 2020.

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1 1 Hydraulic Generation Refurbishment and Modernization Program

Hydro has 10 hydraulic electric generating stations. There are over 3,000 assets involved in the
functioning of these stations. To aid asset management, the assets have been categorized
based on the asset hierarchy. This grouping of the assets makes up the individual programs
within this proposal. The assets have been grouped into the following categories:

- 6 Hydraulic Generating Units;
- 7 Hydraulic Structures;

8 • Reservoirs;

9 • Site Buildings and Services; and

- 10 Common Auxiliary Equipment.
- 11

Hydro executes a robust capital program to ensure the generation of safe, reliable, least-cost electricity in an environmentally responsible manner. Hydro's capital program sees the replacement and refurbishment of equipment based on Hydro's long-term asset management strategy.

16

2 2019 Hydraulic Generation Refurbishment and Modernization Projects

With the 2019 Capital Budget Application, Hydro also submits a document titled "Hydraulic 18 Generation Asset Management Overview", Version 2 (the Overview), which outlines Hydro's 19 20 asset management programs as they relate to Hydraulic Generation equipment. The assets 21 designated for replacement, refurbishment, or modernization herein have been selected by 22 Hydro's Asset Management staff, to align with Hydro's commitment to the delivery of safe, 23 reliable, least-cost electricity in an environmentally responsible manner. The philosophies for 24 assessment and selection of these projects are found in Appendix C and D of the Overview. 25 With this combined approach, for ease of presentation, Hydraulic Generation infrastructure has 26 been divided into five programs. Asset management philosophies relating to each program are 27 detailed in Section 4 of the Overview.

28 The programs include:

• Hydraulic Generating Units (Section 2.1);

- Hydraulic Structures (Section 2.2); 1
- 2 Reservoirs (Section 2.3);
- 3 Site Buildings and Services (Section 2.4); and
- Common Auxiliary Equipment (Section 2.5). 4
- 5
- 6

2.1 Hydraulic Generating Units Program

7 The following equipment upgrades and/or refurbishments for Hydraulic Generating Units are 8 proposed for 2019/2020:

- 9 • Turbine and generator six-year overhauls;
- 10 turbine major refurbishment;
- upgrade Units 1 to 6 generator bearing cover seals; 11
- refurbish generator rotor; and 12
- 13 replace/improve unit metering, monitoring, protection, and control assets.
- 14
- 15 2.1.1 Turbine and Generator Six-Year Overhauls

16 Description of Equipment

17 The turbine and generator are the two major components that comprise a hydroelectric 18 generating unit. Water is used to rotate the turbine, which is connected to the generator to 19 convert the mechanical energy into electricity. For further information on the equipment, refer 20 to Appendix A in the "Hydraulic Generation Asset Management Overview".

21

22 The Granite Canal unit is a 40.0 MW Kaplan Hydraulic Generating Unit commissioned in August 23 2003. Bay d'Espoir Unit 1 is a 76.5 MW Francis Hydraulic Generating Unit that was 24 commissioned in June 1967.

25

26 A preventive maintenance (PM) 9, Six-Year Overhaul, is performed on the units with more 27 detailed inspections than those in a PM 6 Annual Inspection. The PM 9 inspections incorporate 28 the PM 6 items with additional recommendations from the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) to ensure the long-term reliability of the unit. Inspection of all major components 29

(testing and/or repairs as may be required) on a six-year frequency will help avoid forced
outages, forced deratings and unplanned maintenance outages. For further information on
preventive maintenance timing, refer to Appendix C in the *"Hydraulic Generation Asset Management Overview."*

5

6 Existing State

Granite Canal and Bay d'Espoir Unit 1 are scheduled for PM 9 overhauls in 2019. Both Units are
currently in an operational condition and available for service except during maintenance or
forced outages. In comparison to annual maintenance inspections (PM6), an overhaul includes
activities that determine the possibility of failure between overhauls and activities to refurbish
the condition of the unit to allow it to continue to operate reliably.

- 13 A list of major works or upgrades is listed in Table 1 for the Granite Canal unit and a list of major
- 14 works or upgrades for Bay d'Espoir Unit 1 are listed in Table 2.

Table 1: Major Work or Upgrades – Granite Canal Unit

Year	Major Work/Overhaul	Comments
2008	Right Hand Servo Motor Shaft Replacement	
2003	Installed Frazil Ice Monitoring System	

Table 2: Major Work and Upgrades – Bay d'Espoir

Year	Major Work/Overhaul	Comments
2015	Auto Grease System Replaced	
2015	Excitation Transformer Replaced	
2015	Thrust/Guide Bearing Coolers Replaced	
2015	Replaced Thrust Bearing and Spring Bed	
2015	Turbine Bearing Replaced	
2015	Carbon Seal Replaced	
2013	Air Gap Monitoring & Continuous PDA Installed	Part of Rewind Project.
2013	Relay Protection Replaced	
2013	Generator Rotor Poles Refurbished	Part of Rewind Project.
2013	Generator Stator Rewind	

Year	Major Work/Overhaul	Comments
2008	Cooling Water Piping Replaced	
2002	Unit Dismantled to Repair Primary Seals (Grouting)	
2003	Spherical Valve No. 2 controls upgrade to include	
	automated control	
2000	Generator Bearing Cooling coil installation	
1999	Replace Generator Bearing oil level system	
1999	Unit Removed to Replace Head-cover and Bottom	
	Ring Bushings	
1999	Turbine Bearing Cooling coil installation	
1998	Exciter Replacement	Existing equipment at end of its
		useful life.
1997	Unit Removed Due to the Loss of Thrust Bearing.	
	Bearing was Replaced.	
1996	Runner Replacement, Voith	Increased turbine efficiency;
		Increased maximum plant
		output; Reduced vibration and
		power swings caused by draft
		tube surges; and Reduced
		maintenance downtime caused
		by cavitation and corrosion.
1979	Trabon greasing modified to make the wicket gate	
	intermediate and bottom bushings independent of	
	the rest of the system; they can now receive	
	required amount of lubrication without causing	
	excess grease in the pit.	

1 Justification

- 2 This work is required to maintain reliable operation of the Granite Canal and Bay d'Espoir Unit 1
- 3 turbine and generator.
- 4

5 Project Description

- 6 The project has a planned execution in 2019 and has an estimated cost of \$764,200. Refer to
- 7 Table 3 and Table 4 for the project estimate breakdown for each location. This project involves
- 8 the partial dismantling of the Granite Canal and Bay d'Espoir Unit 1 turbine/generator unit to

- 1 inspect, test, clean, refurbish, and replace defective components. This work includes the normal
- 2 PM 9 testing activities related to but not limited to the following:
- 3

4 <u>Mechanical</u>

- 5 Generator breaks;
- 6 generator thrust and guide bearing;
- 7 surface air coolers;
- 8 rotor
- 9 governor oil pumps;
- 10 distributor valve;
- sump and accumulator
- turbine guide bearing;
- wicket gates;
- spiral case door;
- 15 servomotors
- bottom ring; and
- headcover.
- 18

19 <u>Electrical</u>

- Exciter field breaker;
- exciter components
- rotor;
- stator;
- slip ring and brushes;
- generator;
- high pressure pump;
- permanent magnetic generator;
- winding slot wedges;
- hypot test;

- air gap readings;
- 2 main leads;
- neutral leads;
- 4 oil pump unloader;
- 5 air charging solenoid;
- 6 governor oil pump;
- break solenoid;
- 8 pressure switches;
- oil pressure system;
- 10 speed signal generator;
- neutral grounding cubical;
- ground and surge protection cubicle;
- 13 potential transformer cubical;
- unit isolating disconnect;
- rectifying transformer;
- shear pin circuit;
- unit breaker;
- 18 annunciator alarms;
- 19 temperature meters;
- 20 relays;
- chart recorders;
- turbine and generator panels;
- shaft seal flowmeter; and,
- vibration pickups.
- 25

26 Aside from the testing activities noted above, this overhaul/PM inspection involves cleaning

and inspection of the rotor and stator assembly, electrical testing on the rotor/stator assembly,

28 calibration and testing of turbine and generator protection devices, verification of bearing and

29 seal clearances, and a thorough inspection of turbine, draft tube, and penstock.

1 **Project Estimates**

- 2 Table 3 and Table 4 show the project estimates for the Turbine and Generator Six-Year
- 3 Overhauls for Granite Canal and Bay d'Espoir Unit 1 respectively.

Project Cost	2019	2020	Beyond	Total
Material Supply	50.0	0.0	0.0	50.0
Labour	308.3	0.0	0.0	308.3
Consultant	50.0	0.0	0.0	50.0
Contract Work	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other Direct Costs	38.8	0.0	0.0	38.8
Interest and Escalation	25.7	0.0	0.0	25.7
Contingency	89.4	0.0	0.0	89.4
Total	562.2	0.0	0.0	562.2

Table 3: Granite Canal - Project Estimate (\$000s)

Table 4: Bay d'Espoir Unit 1 - Project Estimate (\$000s)

Project Cost	2019	2020	Beyond	Total
Material Supply	34.0	0.0	0.0	34.0
Labour	123.9	0.0	0.0	123.9
Consultant	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Contract Work	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other Direct Costs	2.6	0.0	0.0	2.6
Interest and Escalation	9.4	0.0	0.0	9.4
Contingency	32.1	0.0	0.0	32.1
Total	202.0	0.0	0.0	202.0

4 Project Schedule

5 The anticipated project schedules are shown in Table 5 and Table 6.

Activity		Start Date	End Date
Planning	Detail plan for the overhaul outage	Feb 2019	May 2019
Procurement	Special material requirements	Mar 2019	May 2019
Construction Perform the Major		Jun 2019	Jun 2019
	Inspection/Overhauls		
Commissioning	Return Unit to Service	Jul 2019	Jul 2019
Closeout	Closeout the project	Jul 2019	Jul 2019

Table 5: Granite Canal - Project Schedule

Table 6: Bay d'Espoir Unit 1 - Project Schedule

Activity		Start Date	End Date
Planning	Detail plan for the overhaul outage	Feb 2019	Jun 2019
Procurement	Special material requirements	Mar 2019	Jun 2019
Construction	Perform the Major	Jul 2019	Jul 2019
	Inspection/Overhauls		
Commissioning	Return Unit to Service	Aug 2019	Aug 2019
Closeout	Closeout the project	Aug 2019	Aug 2019

1 **2.1.2** Turbine Major Refurbishment

2 **Description of Equipment**

A turbine is a rotary machine that converts kinetic energy and potential energy of water into mechanical work. Major components of the turbine include a runner, draft tube, guide bearings, auto-greasing system, turbine shaft and coupling, scroll case, headcover assembly, and wicket gates and linkages. Together, these components along with the concrete substructure are necessary for the operation of the hydraulic generating units' turbine.

8

9 Bay d'Espoir Unit 7 is a 154 Megawatt vertical Francis turbine unit, commissioned in 1977. The 10 runner of a Francis turbine is designed to rotate in the scrollcase. Water passes through the 11 vanes that are directed in a way that hits the blades of the runner causing it to turn. Seals 12 (primary) on the top and bottom of the runner prevent water loss and maintain efficiency. The 13 top seal is mounted in the turbine head cover and inhibits full scroll case pressure being applied 14 on the turbine shaft main seal. The lower seal is located in the draft tube to prevent water losses entering the discharge of the unit without going through the runner. Both seals have a clearance (gap) between moving and stationary parts. The clearance has maximum and minimum tolerances to prevent water loss for machine efficiency and to prevent contact between the parts that could result in serious damage and a forced outage. For further information on the equipment, refer to Appendix A in the *"Hydraulic Generation Asset Management Overview."*

7

8 Background

9 One of the tasks in Hydro's Asset Management Program for hydraulic turbines is the 10 measurement of the upper and lower primary seal clearances. The seal clearances are designed to ensure turbine efficiency and hydraulic balance, prevent rubbing due to misalignment and 11 12 imbalance, and allow for cooling between the runner and stationary wear rings. The actual 13 design clearance depends on both the size and speed of the unit. Clearances can change 14 because the wear rings deteriorate due to cavitation, corrosion, erosion, distortion, or the 15 runner incurs axial movement due to bearing wear or misalignment. A failure of the turbine due to contact between the stationary and rotating seals would result in the generating unit being 16 17 unavailable for six to eight months depending on the extent of the damage. During preventive 18 maintenance, measurements, including the seal clearances, are compared against previous 19 measurements and the design clearances. Depending on the results of the measurements, 20 Hydro may consult with external turbine experts to determine if intervention is required to 21 correct seal clearances. Therefore, the actual timing of turbine overhauls is not at a set 22 chronological frequency, rather the overhauls are performed when conditions necessitate 23 them.

24

In 2016, the lower primary seal clearance measurements taken on Bay d'Espoir Unit 4 revealed an unacceptable reduction in the amount of clearance between the stationary and rotating parts. As outlined in the June 2016 Supplemental Capital Budget Application *"Turbine Rehabilitation of Bay d'Espoir Unit 4"* the Turbine Major Overhaul for Unit 4 was advanced by three years. Upon disassembly of the turbine, it was discovered the wicket gate bushings, 1 discharge ring, and grouting had to be replaced. Based upon the state of deterioration of 2 various components of Unit 4 and the fact that Bay d'Espoir Units 1 to 6 have the same design 3 and manufacturer and have been subjected to the similar operating conditions, a decision was 4 made to advance the Turbine Major Overhaul for the other units, and to include Unit 7 in 5 Powerhouse 2. Hydro completed the Unit 3 Turbine Major Overhaul in 2017, as outlined in the 6 Supplemental Capital Budget Application "Refurbishment of Bay d'Espoir Penstock 2 and Bay 7 d'Espoir Unit 3 Turbine Major Overhaul". In 2018, Unit 2 is scheduled for the Turbine Overhaul 8 as outlined in the Capital Budget Application "Hydraulic Generation Refurbishment and 9 Modernization (2018-2019)."

10

11 Existing State

Bay d'Espoir Unit 7 has been identified as the next unit in the Bay d'Espoir Hydroelectric Generating Facility to be rehabilitated, based on the condition of the unit. Unit 7 is located in Powerhouse 2 and is experiencing similar conditions to Units 1 to 6 in Powerhouse 1 for seal clearance readings.

16

17 Trending of Bay d'Espoir Unit 7 turbine lower primary seal clearance readings between rotating 18 and stationary parts shows that the clearance has reduced to the level where a planned intervention is required. Design clearance is .090" to .104" diametrically between the runner 19 20 and seal. Currently, Bay d'Espoir Unit 7 has .106" clearance on the lower primary seal at Axis 1-21 Axis-2 and .039" at the Upstream Downstream diameter. The turbine bearing clearance (i.e. the 22 amount the runner can move) is .023" leaving just .008" clearance at each axis. This clearance 23 has been worsening each year. It is critical that the rotating components of a hydraulic unit are 24 free to turn and have clearance. For the bearings to perform properly the shaft needs to be free 25 to rotate in its preferred axis.

26

Hydro is a participant with the Center for Energy Advancement through Technological
Innovation (CEATI). This group is a conglomerate of hydro owners that collaborate on technical
issues within the hydro industry. A study performed by CEATI, in which Hydro was a participant,

- 1 determined that if the discharge ring has a doubling or a reduction of 50% of the nominal
- 2 design value of the radial clearance this should be considered as the critical value.³
- 3
- 4 Table 7 lists the major works or upgrades on Unit 7 since commissioning of the unit in 1977.

Year	Major Work/Upgrade
2015	BDE #7 Carbon Seal
2015	BDE #7 Turbine Base Plate
2009	Service Water Upgrades
2014	Excitation Transformer Unit 7
2004	Generator Field Breaker
2004	Exciter Replacement
1998	Replace Sync. Condense Compressor
1998	Install air gap monitoring system
1991	Blower, Unit #7 Sync Condenser
1990	PDA Partial Discharge Monitor
1982	New Set of Rotor Brake Plates Installed
1982	All Guide Bearing Segments Replaced

Table 7: Major Work and Upgrades – Bay d'Espoir Unit 7

5 Justification

- 6 This work is required to maintain the reliable operation of Bay d'Espoir Unit 7 turbine.
- 7

8 **Project Description**

- 9 Hydro is proposing to complete a Turbine Major Overhaul on Bay d'Espoir Unit 7 in 2019 at an
- 10 estimated cost of \$4,179,000. The scope of work in the turbine refurbishment project to
- 11 address the reduced seal clearances include:
- Dismantling of Unit 7;
- grouting and machining of the lower primary seals to design clearance; and

³ Critical Value as defined by CEATI: Machines with a key parameter that exceeds the critical value are considered to be at risk of damage if the operation is continued in that condition. An intervention is recommended.

- inspection of the upper primary seal to be machined if required.
- 2
- 3 The remaining turbine refurbishment tasks include:
- Inspection of the head cover and bottom ring/bushings and the replacement or
 refurbishment of worn components;
- inspection of the operating ring bearings and linkage bushings. Worn components will
 be replaced where practical, and refurbished otherwise;
- replacement of all wicket gate stem "V" packing;
- refurbishment of runner cavitation as close to its original condition as practical;
- inspection of the concrete behind the scroll case and draft tube, with concrete
 refurbishment where required;
- machining of other unit surfaces as required based on condition assessment;
- 13 replacement of the Turbine main shaft seal;
- reassembly of the unit;
- 15 realignment; and
- commissioning.
- 17
- 18 **Project Estimate**

19 Table 8 presents the project estimate for Turbine Major Refurbishment project for Bay d'Espoir

20 Unit 7.

Project Cost	2019	2020	Beyond	Total
Material Supply	550.0	0.0	0.0	550.0
Labour	1053.7	0.0	0.0	1053.7
Consultant	350.0	0.0	0.0	350.0
Contract Work	1250.0	0.0	0.0	1250.0
Other Direct Costs	68.6	0.0	0.0	68.6
Interest and Escalation	252.2	0.0	0.0	252.2
Contingency	654.5	0.0	0.0	654.5
Total	4,179.0	0.0	0.0	4,179.0

1 Project Schedule

- 2 The execution of the work on-site for Unit 7 will take approximately 16 weeks to complete. The
- 3 anticipated project schedule is shown in Table 9.

Activity		Start Date	End Date
Planning	Contract development and Award	Feb 2019	Mar2019
Procurement	Engineering and Material Procurement	Feb 2019	Apr 2019
Mobilization	Contractor Mobilize	May 2019	May 2019
Construction	Seal refurbishment	May 2019	Aug 2019
Commissioning	Unit reassembly, and start-up	Jul 2019	Aug 2019
Closeout	Project Closeout	Oct 2019	Oct 2019

Table 9: Turbine Major Refurbishment Bay d'Espoir Unit 7 – Project Schedule

4 2.1.3 Upgrade Units 1 to 6 Generator Bearing Cover Seals

5 **Description of Equipment**

6 For a bearing to work properly, the shaft surface must be moving at a sufficient speed to draw 7 in the cool lubricant, pressurize it to form a hydrodynamic layer and expel it with any debris 8 formed during the process. When a generator thrust/guide bearing assembly reaches normal 9 operating temperature the bearing discharge oil creates an oil mist inside the bearing oil sump 10 just below the generator top covers. The cooling air that flows throughout the generator 11 housing and ventilation slots in the rotor and stator contains other contaminants such as 12 carbon dust, brake dust, and insects. These contaminants mix with the oil producing a partially 13 conductive coating that is distributed throughout the unit by the cooling air.

14

The generator bearing felt seal is designed to prevent vaporized oil emissions from escaping the bearing oil sump. It is a double layer seal located in the generator top bearing covers. These covers are stationary and the shaft rotates in the center of them. A 0.020" clearance between shaft and seal is required to keep the two from making contact. Due to turbine/generator design and the requirement to keep the shaft as short as possible, the generator bearing is located three inches below the felt seal that should prevent the mist from escaping the bearing oil sump. For further information on the equipment, refer to Appendix A in the *"Hydraulic Generation Asset Management Overview."*

3

4 Existing State

5 Oil mist created from the operation of the bearing escapes through the clearance between the 6 seal and shaft on Bay d'Espoir nits 1 to 6. It contaminates the unit's main bracket, brake 7 assembly, rotor and stator. Attempts have been made to reduce the oil emissions; however, it 8 has been an issue since the units were installed. The first attempt in 1970 involved the 9 installation of air baffles and oil mist catchment containers. This was a major modification of 10 the generator covers and it did not solve the emissions problem. Other attempts have been made that involved adjustments of the felt seal that have resulted in making contact with the 11 12 shaft and causing vibration issues. If the felt seal prevents the generator shaft from revolving in 13 its preferred axis it generates heat on the journal and causes vibration. The latest attempt on Unit 2 in 2014 resulted in a 10 degree increase in the bearing operating temperature. It 14 15 involved a modification of the generator guide bearing, installation of baffles, and changing the way that oil was discharged from the bearing. Some of internal ports that were used to supply 16 17 the bearing with oil were plugged to reduce flow. This change in oil flow caused a temperature 18 increase that was unexpected by the Original Equipment Manufacturer and the plan to 19 continue on with other units was cancelled. The bearings are required to maintain as cool a 20 temperature as possible to allow for reliable operation.

21

22 Any mist that escapes through the required clearance eventually ends up contaminating the 23 generator components. Oil is one of the most damaging chemical exposures that can affect the 24 life and performance of electrical insulation. It can inflict molecular damage on the components 25 used for coil insulation and cable jacketing. This oil contamination will etch stator windings and 26 dissolve the ground-wall insulation, reducing the strength of insulation, and lead to partial discharge. Insulation failures begin with and are characterized by small releases of electrical 27 energy called Partial Discharge. Contamination also leads to accelerated thermal aging of the 28 29 generator windings due to blocked ventilation slots. When the rotor is removed to perform a

1 manual cleaning on both the rotor and stator every six years, only the surface contaminants are

2 removed, a great deal of the oil contamination remains embedded in stator and rotor.

3

This oil also coats the floors located inside the unit creating a hazard for personnel completing
maintenance on the unit internal components. In the event of a stator fault, this oil increases
the possibility of having a fire.

7

8 Justification

9 This project is necessary to eliminate oil emissions and leaks from the generators on Units 1 to 10 6 at Bay d'Espoir to ensure reliable operation of the generators. As well, with Hydro's commitment to the environment, this project is justified environmentally. Hydro strives to be 11 12 an environmental leader and is committed to continuously improving equipment operation. Any oil that is released from Units 1 to 6 in Bay d'Espoir is channeled into the sumps in 13 Powerhouse 1 where it is captured. However, there is potential to release this oil to the 14 15 environment so the only way to ensure no release to the environment is to eliminate the 16 misting.

17

This project involves the modification of the existing felt seals design on Unit 3 in 2019 with construction on Unit 3 planned for 2020. The project will incorporate a newly designed felt seal that has been used at another utility and has proven to reduce both oil emissions and the possibility of the seal causing vibration issues. This seal is designed to lie on the generator shaft without disturbing the rotating axis and does not require clearance between shaft and seal (see Figure 1).



Franklin Flip



Double Reverse Franklin Flip

Figure 1: New Seal Types

1 **Project Description**

This is a two-year project with engineering and design to be completed in the first year and
installation of the new seal on Unit 3 to be completed in the following year to align with the

4 major six-year inspection, PM 9, of the unit.

- 5
- 6 The scope of this project consists of:
- 7 Completion of the engineering and design of the new seal;
- 8 fabrication of the new seal;
- 9 removal of existing seal and generator covers;
- 10 modification of the covers to accommodate the new seals; and
- installation of the new seals.
- 12

13 **Project Estimate**

- 14 Table 10 presents the project estimate for Upgrade Generator Bearing project for Bay d'Espoir
- 15 Units 1 to 6, with Unit 3 the first unit to be upgraded.

Project Cost	2019	2020	Beyond	Total
Material Supply	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0
Labour	43.9	67.3	0.0	111.2
Consultant	200.0	0.0	0.0	200.0
Contract Work	0.0	77.1	0.0	77.1
Other Direct Costs	3.3	5.0	0.0	8.3
Interest and Escalation	16.4	44.4	0.0	60.8
Contingency	0.0	99.3	0.0	99.3
Total	263.6	393.1	0.0	656.7

Table 10: Upgrade Bay d'Espoir Units 1 to 6 Generator Bearing Cover Seals Project Estimate (\$000s)

1 Project Schedule

- 2 The first year of this project is the engineering design of the seal with the installation on Unit 3
- 3 to be in the second year, 2020. The anticipated schedule for the project is in Table 11.

Table 11: Upgrade Bay d'Espoir Units 1 to 6 Generator Bearing Cover Seals
Project Schedule

Activity		Start Date	End Date
Planning	Contract development and Award for	Feb 2019	Mar 2019
	engineering design services and field services.		
Design	Consultant will require a site visit to design the	May 2019	Oct 2019
	new seals for Units 1 to 6, once complete the		
	design will be reviewed by Hydro engineering		
	services.		
Construction	Seal refurbishment	May 2020	Jun 2020
Commissioning	Unit reassembly, and start-up	Jun 2020	Jun 2020
Closeout	Project Closeout	Oct 2020	Oct 2020

4 2.1.4 Refurbish Generator Rotor

5 **Description of Equipment**

The Hinds Lake unit is a 75 MW Hitachi vertical generating unit with a Francis turbine. The
generator of this hydroelectric unit converts the mechanical energy of the turbine into
electrical energy. The two major components of the generator are the rotor and the stator. The

rotor is the rotating assembly to which the mechanical torque of the turbine shaft is applied. By
magnetizing or "exciting" the rotor, a voltage is induced in the stationary component, the
stator. For further information on the equipment, refer to Appendix A in the "*Hydraulic Generation Asset Management Overview.*"

5

This unit has three guide bearings. Above the rotor there is an upper generator guide bearing,
below the rotor there is a lower generator guide bearing, and above the turbine there is a
turbine guide bearing. The unit uses two Rotor fans to circulate air and keep the windings cool
during operation (see Figure 2).



Figure 2: Hinds Lake Rotor – The rotor fans that circulate air to cool the Rotor and Stator are bolted to the top and bottom of the rotor

10 The rotor is directly bolted to the hydraulic turbine and is energized by the excitation system 11 through slip rings and carbon brushes. Slip rings and carbon brushes enable the transfer of 12 electric power between a rotating and non-rotating surface. Contact is established by 13 stationary brushes that press against a metal rotating ring (See Figure 3).



Figure 3: Slip ring (red arrow); Brushes (yellow arrow). There are 26 brushes and two rings

1 Existing State

Carbon dust is generated by a constant rotation of the rotor slip ring while spring loaded
stationary carbon brushes press against the face of the slip ring. A portion of this carbon dust is
drawn into the unit through the clearance between rotating and non-rotating parts.

5

Any oil leaks or oil misting from the upper guide bearing assembly during operation ultimately
ends up on the rotor. This mixture of oil and carbon dust embeds in the rotor causing
deterioration of the rotor pole winding insulation. Regular cleaning of the rotor and stator
completed during the unit overhauls on the Hinds Lake Unit have proven to be ineffective in
achieving acceptable rotor test readings. Typically the readings should be above 500 Mohms⁴.
When the reading is below 0.1 Mohms it will be unsafe to operate the unit. Table 12 lists test
results that indicate a trend that the unit is approaching a critical operating state.

⁴ Mohms – A unit of resistance equal to one million ohms. An ohm is the SI unit of electrical resistance, expressing the resistance in a circuit transmitting a current of one ampere when subjected to a potential difference of one volt.

Year	Annual Test Results
2017	An inconsistent reading was listed during the outage. A
	work order has been entered to recheck as soon as
	possible.
2016	0.65 Mohms @ 500V
2015	1.28 Mohms @ 500V
2014	2.42 Mohms @ 500V
2013	5.50 Mohms @500V

1 Justification

This project is justified to maintain reliable operation of the Hinks Lake Generating Station. If this unit is not refurbished, failure of pole winding insulation will occur resulting in a rotor ground fault. The unit will have to be removed from service for repairs. This will require a complete dismantle of the top end of the unit, removal of the rotor, removal of the shorted pole from the rotor, repair, and reassembly of the unit, causing an extended unit outage that would take four to six weeks to complete.

8

9 **Project Description**

10 This project is required to refurbish the Hinds Lake generator rotor. In 2019, planning and 11 engineering will be completed and the rotor will be refurbished in conjunction with the PM-9 12 major inspection in 2020.

13

- 14 The scope of work includes:
- Dismantle of the top of the unit to expose rotor;
- 16 removal of rotor;
- removal of poles to transport to refurbishment site;
- 18 refurbishment of poles (rewind/replace insulator);
- testing of poles to ensure quality;
- reassembly of rotor;
- installation of the rotor on the unit;

- 1 reassembly of the top of unit; and
 - commissioning of the rotor.
- 3

2

- 4 **Project Estimate**
- 5 Table 13 presents the project estimate for the Refurbish Generator Rotor project for Hinds Lake
- 6 Generating Station.

Project Cost	2019	2020	Beyond	Total
Material Supply	0.0	12.5	0.0	12.5
Labour	98.0	208.4	0.0	306.4
Consultant	0.0	30.4	0.0	30.4
Contract Work	0.0	595.7	0.0	595.7
Other Direct Costs	15.0	94.2	0.0	109.2
Interest and Escalation	7.4	106.8	0.0	114.2
Contingency	0.0	210.8	0.0	210.8
Total	120.4	1,258.8	0.0	1,379.2

Table 13: Refurbish Generator Rotor for Hinds Lake Generating StationProject Estimate (\$000s)

7 Project Schedule

8 The anticipated schedule for the project is in Table 14.

Table 14: Refurbish Generator Rotor for Hinds Lake Generating StationProject Schedule

Activity		Start Date	End Date
Planning	Open project	Feb 2019	Nov 2019
Construction	Disassemble unit, refurbish roto poles	Jul 2020	Sep 2020
Commissioning	Unit reassembly, and start-up	Sep 2020	Sep 2020
Closeout	Project Closeout	Dec 2020	Dec 2020

9 2.1.5 Replace/Improve Unit Metering, Monitoring, Protection and Control Assets

10 **Replace Condition Monitoring Equipment**

11 <u>Description of Equipment</u>

- 12 The data acquisition system uses various electronic modules to collect generating unit
- 13 parameters such as temperature, vibration, flows and oil levels and displays these parameters

at a monitoring console in the control room. This information is used to monitor the condition
of the generating unit and allow for proactive actions when abnormal conditions arise. For
further information on the equipment, refer to Appendix A in the *"Hydraulic Generation Asset Management Overview."*

5

6 The current system consists of XM121 (vibration), XM361 (temperature), and XM360 (process) 7 electronic modules that take inputs from various instrumentation. The individual modules 8 communicate to the data acquisition database through network communication infrastructure 9 using DeviceNet protocol. The data in each DeviceNet network is converted to Ethernet through 10 an XM500 Gateway. The Gateway is assessed by the data acquisition software in the Control 11 Room.

12

13 Existing State

The data acquisition system has the ability to store and display data for up to six hours, but does not have the capability to store and display long-term, historical data of the units. This system for Bay d'Espoir Units 1 to 5 uses Allen-Bradley equipment that has been discontinued, with spare parts no longer available for some components. Failure of one of the modules will result in a portion of data for the unit associated with the failed module being lost. Units 6 and 7 have up-to-date collecting equipment.

20

The existing communications DeviceNet protocol is obsolete. Should a component of the system fail, it is unlikely that Hydro will be able to obtain a replacement component to work with DeviceNet protocol, which will result in a loss of the ability to track and trend long-term data for a generator or turbine. This data is required for investigating issues and identifying developing problems with the equipment.

26

27 <u>Justification</u>

Replacements of the condition monitoring equipment listed in this project are required tomaintain investigating issues and identifying developing problems with the generating units.

Failure of the modules will result in loss of monitoring capability with resulting in an increase in
the risk of generation equipment failure due to undetected problems. This is the second year of
a three-year program to replace all the condition monitoring equipment listed in this project in
Bay d'Espoir.

5

6 <u>Project Description</u>

7 The project will remove all the XM modules and associated infrastructure. The project will 8 install ControlLogix PLC and PanelView Plus for Units 1 to 5 and Unit 6 will have a local HMI and 9 a processor added to the electrical cabinet on the generating unit. The system will provide 10 capability of measuring vital unit parameters such as the vibration levels, temperature, flows 11 and oil levels for Units 1 to 6.

12

A differential pressure transducer capable of integrating with a PLC based system will be used in all units to collect scroll case pressure data. This configuration will allow the PLC to be used for alarms. A shielded Ethernet cable will be connected from the Ethernet switch in the control room to the electrical cabinets and a dedicated DC feed for each cabinet will be provided from the DC distribution panels. This will help decentralize the power supply for each unit.

18

19 Replace Control Cables

20 <u>Description of Equipment</u>

Control cables are used for carrying signals for generator protection and control purposes. Bay d'Espoir has older control cables that have insulation manufactured with an oil-based compound. For further information on the equipment, refer to Appendix A in the *"Hydraulic Generation Asset Management Overview."*

25

26 Existing State

The control cables have been in service since 1967 and are approaching the end of their useful life. Oily residue has been found to leak from the cables into the junction boxes and onto cable connections. This is an indication of the breakdown of the insulation. Also, mitigation work on

- 1 leaking cables has revealed that associated junction boxes will need to be replaced.
 2
- As leaking continues, the cables will dry out and the insulation will fail. Such a failure may result
 in control equipment malfunction resulting in a forced outage of the generator.
- 5
- 6 <u>Justification</u>

Replacement of control cables is required to maintain reliable operation of the generating
units. This is the second year of a five-year program to replace all the control cables in Bay
d'Espoir.

10

11 <u>Project Description</u>

- 12 The scope of this project includes:
- 13 Replacement of the 600V unit control cables; and
- replacement of associated oil contaminated junction boxes and terminal blocks.
- 15

16 Project Estimates

- 17 Table 15 and Table 16 present the project estimates for the Replace Condition Monitoring
- 18 Equipment and Replace Control Cables, respectively.

Table 15: Replace Condition	Monitoring Equipment	– Project Estimate	(\$000s
-----------------------------	----------------------	--------------------	---------

Project Cost	2019	2020	Beyond	Total
Material Supply	70.0	0.0	0.0	70.0
Labour	139.4	0.0	0.0	139.4
Consultant	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Contract Work	84.0	0.0	0.0	84.0
Other Direct Costs	6.0	0.0	0.0	6.0
Interest and Escalation	23.4	0.0	0.0	23.4
Contingency	59.9	0.0	0.0	59.9
Total	382.7	0.0	0.0	382.7

Project Cost	2019	2020	Beyond	Total
Material Supply	90.2	0.0	0.0	90.2
Labour	224.5	0.0	0.0	224.5
Consultant	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Contract Work	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other Direct Costs	10.0	0.0	0.0	10.0
Interest and Escalation	26.0	0.0	0.0	26.0
Contingency	64.9	0.0	0.0	64.9
Total	415.6	0.0	0.0	415.6

Table 16: Replace Control Cables – Project Estimate (\$000s)

1 Project Schedules

Replacement of the control cables and vibration equipment will be completed during the
annual maintenance of the hydro units. The anticipated project schedule is shown in Table 17
and Table 18 for both activities.

Table 17: Replace Condition Monitoring Equipment – Project Schedule

Activity		Start Date	End Date
Planning	Detail plan for the replacement	Feb 2019	Jun 2019
Procurement	Special material requirements	Mar 2019	Jul 2019
Construction	Perform the Replacements	Aug 2019	Aug 2019
Commissioning	Commission the new equipment	Aug 2019	Aug 2019
Closeout	Closeout the project	Oct 2019	Oct 2019

Table 18: Replace Control Cables – Project Schedule

Activity		Start Date	End Date
Planning	Detail plan for the cable replacement	Feb 2019	Jun 2019
Procurement	Special material requirements	Mar 2019	Jun 2019
Construction	Perform the replacement	Aug 2019	Aug 2019
Commissioning	Commission the new equipment	Aug 2019	Aug 2019
Closeout	Closeout the project	Oct 2019	Oct 2019

2.2 Hydraulic Structures Program 1 2 The following equipment upgrades and/or refurbishment for Hydraulic Structures are proposed for 2019/2020: 3 4 Refurbish Hydraulic Structures 5 6 2.2.1 Control Structure Refurbishments 7 Background This work is a continuation of a program to refurbish all hydraulic structures within Hydro's 8 9 generating system. The program began in 2010 with refurbishment work in Burnt Dam. The last 10 submission for this program to the Board was included in the 2018 Hydraulic Generation 11 Refurbishment and Modernization Proposal in Section 2.3 Hydraulic Structures. 12 13 The structures identified for the 2019 Hydraulic Generation Refurbishment and Modernization 14 Proposal are Bay d'Espoir Intake 2 and the Ebbegunbaeg Control Structure. 15 16 Bay d'Espoir Intake 2 17 Description of Equipment 18 The Bay d'Espoir Intake 2, which was constructed in 1965, supplies water to Bay d'Espoir 19 Penstock 2 which in turn supplies water to Generating Units 3 and 4. The intake gate is made of 20 a welded steel frame with a downstream steel skin plate and concrete ballast. Each gate has 21 four preloaded side rollers and twelve main rollers. The gate is operated with a cable hoist 22 attached to a single central lifting point. Figure 4 is an image of Intake 1 in Bay d'Espoir, which is 23 the same as Intake 2. For further information on the equipment, refer to Appendix A in the

24 *"Hydraulic Generation Asset Management Overview."*



Figure 4: Bay d'Espoir Intake Gate 1

1 Existing State

2 A detailed assessment of Bay d'Espoir Intake 1 was completed in 2016 and it was determined 3 that there were varying levels of deterioration, particularly in the submerged/embedded 4 components. Deterioration consists of concrete erosion and corrosion on embedded parts/ gate components. Critical components that have shown deterioration include main rollers, roll 5 6 paths, side-rollers and seals. It was also noted that the deterioration of these components is 7 creating extra stress on the hoist system. As these intakes are the same vintage, with similar 8 operating conditions and in the same environment, Hydro expects that the state of Intakes 2 9 and 3 are similar to the state of Intake 1 identified in 2016. Also, in 2013 Intake gate 2 failed to 10 close due to issues related to those identified for the Intake 1. Figure 5 and Figure 6 are images of the side and main rollers on Intakes 2 and 1. 11



Figure 5: Bay d'Espoir Intake 2 Side Rollers - 2013



Figure 6: Pitting Corrosion on Main Rollers – Intake 1 2016

1 Ebbegunbaeg Control Structure

- 2 <u>Description of Equipment</u>
- 3 The Ebbegunbaeg Control Structure was built in 1967 as a part of the Bay d'Espoir hydroelectric
- 4 project. The structure is a critical water control structure on the Bay d'Espoir system that

controls water from the Meelpaeg Reservoir and discharges into Crooked Lake and eventually
through the Upper Salmon and Bay d'Espoir powerhouses. The structure consists of three
remotely operated gates (two screw hoists and one wire rope hoist) with a total flow discharge
capacity of 338 cubic meters per second. Figure 7 shows a picture of Ebbegunbaeg Control
Structure. For further information on the equipment, refer to Appendix A in the *"Hydraulic Generation Asset Management Overview."*



Figure 7: Ebbegunbaeg Control Structure

7 Existing State

8 In 2017, a detailed condition assessment of the Ebbegunbaeg control structure was completed. 9 The assessment revealed operational issues with the gates, which include damage to the main 10 rollers, embedded parts and lifting systems. The assessment also identified concrete 11 deterioration on the piers, decking, and around the embedded parts. Figure 8, Figure 9, and 12 Figure 10 show some of the deteriorated conditions.


Figure 8: Roller Corrosion - Ebbegunbaeg



Figure 9: Seized Side Roller - Ebbegunbaeg



Figure 10: Concrete Deterioration - Ebbegunbaeg

1 Justification

2 This project is required to maintain the reliable operation of Bay d'Espoir Intake 2 and the
3 Ebbegunbaeg hydraulic structures.

4

5 <u>Bay d'Espoir Intake #2</u>

6 Deterioration of critical components such as the gate main rollers, roll paths, side-rollers and 7 seals directly affect the gate capacity for proper operation and can be a threat to the reliability 8 of the powerhouse and penstock if not addressed. The impact of gate jams/failures will likely 9 lead to a loss of production and, in the event of catastrophic failure, damage to the penstock 10 and other downstream components is likely to occur.

11

12 Ebbegunbaeg Control Structure

The deterioration of the gates, main rollers, embedded parts and lifting systems heavily impacts the reliable operation of this structure. If left unmitigated, the deficiencies identified will continue to worsen and lead to gate failures. Without properly functioning gates, it will be difficult to control the water being released from the Meelpaeg reservoir which could lead to spilling or potentially dam related issues such as overtopping⁵.

18

19 **Project Description**

20 Bay d'Espoir Intake 2

- 21 The scope of the intake refurbishment project is as follows:
- Replace main and side rollers and J-seals;
- recoat the intake gate and exposed steel surfaces;
- replace Intake hardware;
- replace gate lifting motor; and
- refurbish second stage concrete.

⁵ The overtopping occurs when water flows over the top of a dam. Overtopping may result in failure of the dam.

1 <u>Ebbegunbaeg Control Structure</u>

- 2 The scope of the Ebbegunbaeg refurbishment project is as follows:
- 3 Rehabilitate screw hoist brake systems;
- complete a structural analysis of the structure bracing/connections;
- complete a constructability analysis to determine approach to required repairs;
- 6 fabricate a second master-log;
- 7 refurbish major embedded parts;
- 8 refurbish second stage concrete;
- 9 replace main rollers/side rollers/springs;
- 10 replace seals; and
- 11 replace the wire ropes.
- 12

13 **Project Estimate**

Table 19 and Table 20 present the project estimates for the Bay d'Espoir Intake 2 and
Ebbegunbaeg Control Structure, respectively.

Table 19: Bay d'Espoir Intake 2 Refurbishment – Project Estimate (\$000s)

Project Cost	2019	2020	Beyond	Total
Material Supply	90.2	0.0	0.0	90.2
Labour	224.5	0.0	0.0	224.5
Consultant	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Contract Work	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other Direct Costs	10.0	0.0	0.0	10.0
Interest and Escalation	26.0	0.0	0.0	26.0
Contingency	64.9	0.0	0.0	64.9
Total	415.6	0.0	0.0	415.6

Project Cost	2019	2020	Beyond	Total
Material Supply	0.0	60.0	0.0	60.0
Labour	165.5	189.0	0.0	354.5
Consultant	32.0	32.0	0.0	64.0
Contract Work	300.0	1,385.9	0.0	1,685.9
Other Direct Costs	26.4	58.6	0.0	85.0
Interest and Escalation	30.6	223.0	0.0	253.6
Contingency	0.0	449.9	0.0	449.9
Total	554.5	2,398.4	0.0	2,952.9

Table 20: Ebbegunbaeg Control Structure Refurbishment – Project Estimate (\$000s)

1 **Project Schedule**

- 2 The anticipated project schedule is shown in Table 21 and Table 22 for Bay d'Espoir Intake 2
- 3 Refurbishment and Ebbegunbaeg Control Structure Refurbishment, respectively.

Table 21: Bay d'Espoir Intake 2 Refurbishment – Project Schedule

Activity		Start Date	End Date
Planning	Detail plan for the refurbishment	Feb 2019	May 2019
Procurement	Special material requirements	Mar 2019	Jun 2019
Construction	Perform the refurbishment	Jun 2019	Aug 2019
Construction	Perform the refurbishment	May 2020	Aug 2020
Commissioning	Commission the new equipment	Aug 2020	Aug 2020
Closeout	Closeout the project	Oct 2020	Nov 2020

Table 22: Ebbegunbaeg Control Structure Refurbishment – Project Schedule

Activity		Start Date	End Date
Planning	Detail plan for the refurbishment	Feb 2019	May 2019
Procurement	Special material requirements	Mar 2019	Jun 2019
Construction	Perform the refurbishment	Jun 2019	Aug 2019
Construction	Perform the refurbishment	May 2020	Aug 2020
Commissioning	Commission the new equipment	Aug 2020	Aug 2020
Closeout	Closeout the project	Oct 2020	Nov 2020

1 2.3 Reservoirs

2 The following equipment upgrades and/or refurbishment for Reservoirs are proposed for 20193 2020:

- 4 Upgrade Public Safety around Dams
- 5

6 2.3.1 Upgrade Public Safety around Dams

7 Description of Equipment

8 Dams and waterways are critical assets for the generation of hydroelectric electricity. A dam is 9 a barrier that stops or restricts the flow of water, and waterways are structures that direct the 10 flow of water. These assets require control measures to keep the public safe and informed of 11 the impact these assets have on the surrounding area. For further information on the 12 equipment, refer to Appendix A in the *"Hydraulic Generation Asset Management Overview."*

13

14 In the past decade, an increase in noted public interactions with hydroelectric structures 15 including access by recreational vehicles and boating near spilling gates has prompted the 16 development of this program in accordance with Canadian Dam Association Public Safety 17 around Dams Guidelines issued in 2011. Canadian Dam Association Public Safety around Dams 18 Guidelines are considered industry practice in Canada to increase public safety around dams 19 and associated waterways.

20

Public safety risks are determined by completing risk assessments in accordance with the Canadian Dam Association's Dam Safety Guidelines. Appropriate control measures are then installed to reduce the safety risk to the public. These measures include such items as signage, fencing, audible or visual alarms, booms and buoys, operational changes, and public education.

25 Areas included in this proposal include the following locations:

- The Paradise River system consists of a reservoir, dams, and an intake structure;
- the Upper Salmon reservoir consists of dams, spillway structures, a power canal and an
 intake; and
- the Cat Arm reservoir also consists of dams, a spillway structure and an intake.

1	For further information on the equipment, refer to Appendix A in the "Hydraulic Generation
2	Asset Management Overview."
3	
4	Existing State
5	The Paradise River system has some minor public control measures installed; however, a public
6	safety risk assessment has not been completed.
7	
8	The Upper Salmon reservoir has few public safety control measures installed. The risk
9	assessment and action plan completed in 2017 outlines areas that need to be addressed.
10	
11	The Cat Arm reservoir has few public safety control measures. The risk assessment and action
12	plan was completed in 2016 and Year 1 items are to be implemented in 2018.
13	
14	Justification
15	This project is justified to increase public safety for Paradise River, Upper Salmon and Cat Arm
16	facilities around dams and associated waterways.
17	
18	Project Description
19	The scope of this project includes:
20	Paradise River Public Safety Risk Assessment;
21	• Upper Salmon Year 1 implementation - Year 1 will consist of fencing, boom anchor
22	design and the installation of half of the required signage; and
23	• Cat Arm Year 2 implementation - Year 2 work will consist of fencing, gate installation,
24	anchor boom design and remaining signage.
25	
26	Project Estimate
27	The project estimate for the Upgrade Public Safety around Dams project in 2019 is presented

28 Table 23.

Project Cost	2019	2020	Beyond	Total
Material Supply	129.5	0.0	0.0	129.5
Labour	159.7	0.0	0.0	159.7
Consultant	70.0	0.0	0.0	70.0
Contract Work	200.0	0.0	0.0	200.0
Other Direct Costs	20.6	0.0	0.0	20.6
Interest and Escalation	40.7	0.0	0.0	40.7
Contingency	58.0	0.0	0.0	58.0
Total	678.5	0.0	0.0	678.5

Table 23: Upgrade Public Safety around Dams Project Estimate (\$000s)

1 **Project Schedule**

- 2 The anticipated project schedule for the Upgrade Public Safety around Dams project in 2019 is
- 3 presented Table 24.

Table 24: Upgrade Public Safety around Dams Project Schedule

Activity		Start Date	End Date
Planning	Detail plan for each location; open projects in	Feb 2019	May 2019
	JDE; review schedule.		
Procurement	Special material requirements	Mar 2019	Jun 2019
Construction	Installation of public safety devices and	May 2019	Sep 2019
	assessment of Paradise River.		
Closeout	Closeout the project	Oct 2019	Nov 2019

4 2.4 Site Buildings and Services

- 5 The following equipment upgrades and/or refurbishment for Site Buildings and Services are
- 6 proposed for 2019-2020:
- 7 Refurbish Draft Tube Deck (Phase 1)

1 2.4.1 Refurbish Draft Tube Deck (Phase 1)

2 **Description of Equipment**

The draft tube deck⁶ is located on the discharge side of the Bay d'Espoir Hydro Generating 3 Station and spans between shore lines along the Powerhouse 1 wall (see Figure 11). The 97 m 4 long draft tube deck is made up of reinforced concrete columns, pre-cast deck beams and pre-5 6 cast deck slabs, topped with a 15 cm concrete distribution slab and finished with 50 mm of 7 asphalt. The deck was constructed in two stages. The first stage, which consisted of Units 1 to 4, 8 was completed in 1966. The second stage, which consisted of Unit 5 and 6, was completed in 9 1968. The draft tube deck also provides vehicular access to BDE Unit 7 in Powerhouse 2 and the 10 north end of Bay d'Espoir Powerhouse 1. For further information on the equipment, refer to Appendix A in the "Hydraulic Generation Asset Management Overview". 11



Figure 11: Bay d'Espoir Draft Tube Deck

12 Existing State

13 The draft tube deck has not received any major refurbishment since it was originally

- 14 constructed. In recent years, problems have been experienced when installing draft tube gates.
- 15 The gates often stick in the guides and are not always able to seal properly. An improper seal

⁶ The draft tube deck includes the substructure underneath the deck leading to the draft tube of the hydro unit. The substructure includes columns, beams, and structural slabs which are used to support the deck and channel the water from the hydro unit to the tailrace.

will not allow dewatering of the units draft tubes and prevents access to the draft tube andscroll case, refer to the Overview for asset descriptions.

3

In 2012, a condition assessment determined that if deterioration progresses much further it may impact the load carrying capacity of the structure, which could impact access as well as operation of the draft tube gates. The assessment also determined the proposed repairs are required to prevent continued deterioration of the structure, and failure to complete the repairs may result in increased life cycle cost. The structure will continue to deteriorate beyond prepair and may require a pre-mature structure replacement which would be much more costly.

10 Figure 12 to Figure 15 highlight some of the concrete deterioration.



Figure 12: Deterioration on the Draft Tube Deck



Figure 13: Deterioration on the Draft Tube Deck



Figure 14: Deterioration on the Draft Tube Deck



Figure 15: Deterioration on the Draft Tube Deck

1 Justification

2 This project is justified to maintain reliable operation of the draft tube gate system for Bay

3 d'Espoir Units 1 to 6 in Powerhouse 1. Not undertaking this project will result in continued

- 4 deterioration of the draft tube deck and the possible pre-mature structure replacement
- 5

6 Project Description

7 This is the first of a three phases to address the deterioration of the draft tube deck gates. The8 scope includes:

- 9 Removal of existing asphalt wear surface and concrete topping;
- removal and reinstatement of steel railing, as required to facilitate the work;

- removal and replacement of concrete fascia for exterior deck slabs along southern
 portion of the structure;
- 3 supply and installation of new deck drains;
- installation of new concrete topping and curbs;
- 5 supply and installation of deck waterproofing membrane; and
- supply, placement and compaction of new asphalt wear surface.
- 7
- 8 Hydro currently plans to complete Phase 2 in 2020 and Phase 3 in 2022 and will seek separate
- 9 Board approvals for these phases.
- 10

11 **Project Estimate**

- 12 The project estimate for the Refurbish Draft Tube Deck (Phase 1) project in 2019 is presented
- 13 Table 25.

Project Cost	2019	2020	Beyond	Total
Material Supply	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Labour	113.7	0.0	0.0	113.7
Consultant	125.0	0.0	0.0	125.0
Contract Work	568.2	0.0	0.0	568.2
Other Direct Costs	6.7	0.0	0.0	6.7
Interest and Escalation	56.1	0.0	0.0	56.1
Contingency	162.7	0.0	0.0	162.7
Total	1,032.4	0.0	0.0	1,032.4

Table 25: Refurbish Draft Tube Deck (Phase 1) – Project Estimate (\$000s)

14 **Project Schedule**

- 15 The anticipated project schedule for the Refurbish Draft Tube Deck (Phase 1) project in 2019 is
- 16 presented in Table 26.

Activity		Start Date	End Date
Planning	Open project in JDE; review schedule. Prepare tender	Feb 2019	Jun 2019
	documents for consultant and contract work.		
Procurement	Special material requirements.	May 2019	Jun 2019
Construction	Refurbish phase one items.	Aug 2019	Sep 2019
Closeout	Closeout the project	Oct 2019	Nov 2019

Table 26: Refurbish Draft Tube Deck (Phase 1) – Project Schedule

1 **2.5 Common Auxiliary Equipment**

- 2 The following equipment upgrades and/or refurbishment for Common Auxiliary Equipment are
- 3 proposed for 2019-2020:
- Replace cooling water pump and strainer at Hinks Lake Generating Station;
- replace drainage pump at Hinds lake and Paradise River Generating Stations; and
 - refurbish sump level system at Bay d'Espoir Powerhouse 1.
- 7

6

8 2.5.1 Replace Cooling Water Pump and Strainer at Hinks Lake Generating Station

9 **Description of Equipment**

10 The cooling water pump and strainer supplies tail race water to the various cooling water and 11 water lubricating systems used on the turbine/generator. The pump is a 600 V centrifugal twin 12 volute and the strainer is 600 V rotary type with automatic backwash. The emergency "Y" 13 strainer is a basket type manual strainer (See Figure 16 and Figure 17). For further information 14 on the equipment, refer to Appendix A in the "*Hydraulic Generation Asset Management* 15 *Overview*."



Figure 16: Rotary Strainer



Figure 17: Cooling Water Pumps

1 Existing State

- 2 The cooling water pump, rotary strainer, and emergency Y strainer⁷ are original equipment and
- 3 have been operating throughout the life of the plant since commissioning in 1980.

⁷ Y strainers are devices for mechanically removing unwanted solids from liquid, gas or steam lines by means of a perforated or wire mesh straining element.

1 The pump-motor has experienced bearing temperature issues on several occasions, which have 2 resulted in replacement of the bearings. These bearing failures are a result of excessive axial 3 thrusting caused by the worn components in the pump. A previous failure of this motor caused 4 a forced outage in 2000 when the emergency supply from the fire header also failed. The 5 overloads that protect the motor have tripped off the pump on several occasions (2014 and 6 2016) and this issue has been investigated but not resolved. Corrosion and wear of internal components (wear rings, mechanical seals, and impellor) on the pump have reduced the 7 8 pump's efficiency. Corroded and blocked internal pump passages are causing fluid turbulence 9 that result in cavitation and further inefficiencies.

10

The Hinds Lake plant has a history of pipe and component fouling due to the water conditions at the plant and the inefficient strainers that supply it. Most recently (2016), the piping outside the generator was replaced due to fouling. The piping inside the generator was previously replaced (2007) also due to fouling.

15

16 The rotary strainer backwash system used to clean the strainer elements has failed in-service 17 and has components that are not reliable. The actuator and valves are leaking and the system 18 does not effectively clean the strainer element as it should. The strainer has been dismantled 19 and cleaned on numerous occasions and parts have become worn, corroded, and leaks have 20 developed. Corrosion and build-up on the internal parts of the strainer are adding to the reliability issues. On occasion, both the emergency "Y" and rotary strainer have to be put in 21 22 service at the same time to maintain sufficient supply to the service water system. Sensing 23 lines, used for service water control circuits at the plant, have become blocked from debris are 24 getting through these strainers. This blockage results in dirty cooling water causing piping to 25 foul and reducing cooling capacity.

26

The emergency "Y" strainer element is damaged from repeated cleanings. It is deformed anddoes not seat properly.

Justification 1 2 This project is required to maintain reliable operation of the Hinds Lake Generating Unit. 3 When minimal flows, as defined by the original equipment manufacturer, are not maintained, 4 bearing and stator temperatures increase subjecting the equipment to failure and premature 5 wear. 6 7 Corrosion and build up can reduce cooling water flow to levels which will cause the unit not to start remotely or can trip the generator. Staff must then investigate, which will cause delays in 8 9 getting the unit back on-line. 10 **Project Description** 11 12 The scope of work consists of the replacement of Hinds Lake generating station cooling water 13 pump and rotary strainer which entails: Replacement of the cooling water pump complete with controls and motor; 14 • 15 replacement of the rotary strainer complete with controls and motor; modifications to the existing equipment mounting bases to install equipment; 16 17 replacement of electrical feed from starters to motors; • replacement of the emergency "Y" strainer; and 18 modifications of piping required to install new equipment; 19 20

21 Project Estimate

- 22 The project estimate for the Replace Cooling Water Pump and Strainer project in 2019/2020 is
- 23 presented Table 27.

Project Cost	2019	2020	Beyond	Total
Material Supply	40.0	45.0	0.0	85.0
Labour	54.0	57.4	0.0	111.4
Consultant	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Contract Work	0.0	105.5	0.0	105.5
Other Direct Costs	5.8	3.6	0.0	9.4
Interest and Escalation	6.5	28.4	0.0	34.9
Contingency	0.0	62.3	0.0	62.3
Total	106.3	302.2	0.0	408.5

Table 27: Replace Cooling Water Pump and Strainer at Hinds Lake Generating StationProject Estimate (\$000s)

1 Project Schedule

- 2 The anticipated project schedule for the Replace Cooling Water Pump and Strainer project in
- 3 2019-2020 is presented Table 28.

Table 28: Replace Cooling Water Pump and Strainer at Hinds Lake Generating StationProject Schedule

Activity		Start Date	End Date
Planning	Open project in JDE; review schedule. Prepare	Feb 2019	Jun 2019
	tender documents for contract work.		
Procurement	Special material requirements.	May 2019	Nov 2019
Construction	Replace strainers, and pump	Oct 2020	Oct 2020
Closeout	Closeout the project	Oct 2020	Nov 2020

4 2.5.2 Replace Drainage Pump at Hinds Lake and Paradise River Generating Stations

5 **Description of Equipment**

6 In a hydraulic generating station, water is used to cool bearings and lubricate the turbine shaft 7 seal. The discharge water from these systems then flows through a system of drains to the 8 waste water sump. Any oil or water leaks not captured at the source is also collected by this 9 drain system and directed to the sump. Sump water is then pumped directly to the tailrace with 10 a pump controlled by an automatic water level control system. The automatic level system 11 prevents the discharge of oil to the environment by ensuring the water level in the sump is 12 maintained at acceptable levels so that an overflow does not occur. As there is typically a small amount of oil in the sumps, it is regularly removed to prevent contamination of the
 environment. For further information on the equipment, refer to Appendix A in the *"Hydraulic Generation Asset Management Overview."*

4

5 At Paradise River, pumps, motors, piping and guide rails are submerged and located at the 6 bottom of the sump, see Figure 18. At Hinds Lake, the drainage pump is a vertical turbine 7 pump; the bottom column and pump are submerged in water, see Figure 19.



Figure 18: Corroded Component in the Paradise Sump



Figure 19: The drainage pump, motor, and column at Hinds Lake

1 Existing State

2 These pump systems are in near continuous operation at Paradise River and Hinds Lake. The 3 drainage pump at Hinds Lake is experiencing longer run times indicating that the pump has 4 worn internal parts resulting in the loss of efficiency. The pump has been in service since 1980. 5 The turbine pump impellors and bowls are made of bronze and wear over time. This wear 6 causes the pump to lose efficiency. The impellers on the pump have had to be adjusted closer 7 to the bowls to increase flow on several occasions when the pump has not effectively pumped 8 down the sump. This adjustment adds to the clearance below the impellors and has, over time, 9 further worn the bronze components. The column and pump are located below floor level and 10 submerged in water and are corroded. The line shaft bearings are made of rubber and are worn 11 causing increased vibration when running. Rougher starts are being experienced. All bores and 12 shafts need to be concentric to avoid vibration and failures down the length of the column. This 13 corrosion and wear is severe, therefore replacement is the only option.

14

15 At Paradise River the pumps are experiencing longer run times, which indicate that the 16 discharge flow rate is decreasing due to worn internal parts. Being submerged in water, all 17 components in this sump are corroded and require replacement, including pumps, pump guide 18 rails, and piping. This corrosion is severe and replacement is the only option.

19

The submerged piping at Paradise River was repaired in 2016 due to corrosion. Salt water from the tailrace was entering the sump due to failed piping and a failed check valve. An inspection completed on the piping in 2017 indicated that the corrosion of this piping has worsened since the repairs were completed in 2016. The sump pumps at Paradise River have been in service since the commissioning of the plant in 1989.

25

Also, the starter internal components are worn from numerous daily starts and stops at bothsites.

1 Justification

2 This project is required to maintain reliable operation of the generating units at Hinds Lake and3 Paradise River.

4

5 A failure of these pumps will result in powerhouse flooding if the units are not shut down and 6 thus causing a forced outage. The importance of the reliable operation of these pumps is high 7 considering they are located in remotely operated plants. Response time for personnel to reach 8 the plants is between two and six hours due to the geographic location of the plants. A high 9 sump level alarm will require the unit be shut down from the Energy Control Centre until an 10 operator could investigate. There is also a possibility that during a high sump level alarm event, 11 oil could be discharged into the environment.

12

13 **Project Description**

The scope of work consists of the replacement of the two sump pumps at Paradise River andthe drainage pump at Hinds Lake generating stations, which entails:

- Replacement of the two submerged sump pumps, pump guide rails, and
- 17 controls/starters at Paradise River;
- replacement of the two discharge check valves and any corroded piping and fittings at
 Paradise River;
- addition of a stainless steel check valve on the powerhouse discharge at Paradise River;
- replacement of the drainage pump and controls/starter at Hinds Lake;
- replacement of the discharge check valve at Hinds Lake; and
- base and piping modifications (if required) to install pump at Hinds Lake;
- 24

25 Project Estimate

- 26 The project estimate for the Replacement of Drainage Pump equipment in Hinds Lake and
- 27 Paradise River project in 2019-2020 is presented Table 29.

Project Cost	2019	2020	Beyond	Total
Material Supply	0.0	151.0	0.0	151.0
Labour	33.0	128.0	0.0	161.0
Consultant	33.4	37.0	0.0	70.4
Contract Work	10.0	155.0	0.0	165.0
Other Direct Costs	6.0	36.5	0.0	42.5
Interest and Escalation	5.2	60.9	0.0	66.1
Contingency	0.0	118.0	0.0	118.0
Total	87.6	686.4	0.0	774.0

Table 29: Replace Cooling Water Pump and Strainer at Hinds Lake and Paradise River Generating Stations – Project Estimate (\$000s)

1 **Project Schedule**

- 2 The anticipated project schedule the Replacement of Drainage Pump equipment in Hinds Lake
- 3 and Paradise River project in 2019-2020 is presented Table 30.

Table 30: Replace Cooling Water Pump and Strainer at Hinds Lake and Paradise River Generating Stations – Project Schedule

Activity		Start Date	End Date
Planning	Open project in JDE; review schedule. Prepare	Feb 2019	May 2019
	tender documents for consultant and contract work.		
Procurement	Special material requirements.	Jul 2019	Sept 2019
Construction	Replace drainage pumps and commission.	Jun 2020	Aug 2020
Closeout	Closeout the project	Oct 2020	Nov 2020

4 2.5.3 Refurbish Sump System at Bay d'Espoir Powerhouse 1

5 **Description of Equipment**

For each generating unit in Bay d'Espoir Powerhouse 1, water is used to lubricate the turbine
shaft seal and operate the main inlet valves. Discharge water from these systems and any water
leaking from turbine components flow through a system of drains to waste water sumps.
Sumps are large concrete pits at the lower elevation of the building that act as collection basins
for fluids leaking from plant equipment and consists primarily of water but also may contain

small amounts of lubricating oil. Oil leaks not captured at the source are also collected by the
drain system and directed to the sump.

3

In Powerhouse 1, there are six generating units and three sump pits. Waste water drainage from generating Units 1 and 2 flows into Sump 1. Units 3 and 4 flow into Sump 2 and Units 5 and 6 flow into Sump 3. Sump 1 is connected to Sump 2 at the bottom of each sump by a 12 inch diameter pipe and Sump 2 is similarly connected to Sump 3. Each pipe has a valve installed that is normally open. Fluids can migrate from one sump to others through the 12 inch pipes.

9

A pump is installed in each sump for removing water when it exceeds a specific level. The pumps are controlled such that when fluid elevation reaches a specified level one pump will start and discharge fluid to the tailrace and on to the outside natural waterway. If the fluid continues to rise a second pump will also start and, ultimately, a third pump will start if fluid levels continue to rise. The pumping system is designed so that one or two pumps can maintain required sump fluid levels. An automatic control system starts and stops the pumps as required utilizing a system of floats that operate electric switches.

17

Any oil that drains to a sump floats on water collected in the sumps. The sumps are visually inspected twice weekly and any excessive drainage oil floating on the water is removed manually so that sufficient volume does not collect that would allow it to enter the pumping system and be discharged to the environment.

22

23 In general, each sump system consists of the following (see Figure 20):

- A 6' X 8' X 33' deep interconnected concrete sump pit;
- a 600 V vertical turbine pump and discharge piping;
- sump water level control system floating electrical switches; and
- pump starter and electromechanical relays.



Figure 20: Sump Pump 1 in Bay d'Espoir

Note: Visual representations of the sumps are difficult due to the location and accessibility of the sumps

1 Existing State

2 The level control system has been in operation since commissioning in 1967. Floating switches 3 have become tangled and unanchored and have malfunctioned causing the sump levels to go 4 above or below the pre-set levels. There is no alarm system to indicate that the level is too low, only an extreme low cut off switch to ensure the pump is not damaged by running dry. Sump 5 6 levels are monitored manually and regularly with an aim to ensure proper operation with 7 respect to water level and oil presence. Due to the design of the sump, both the detection of oil 8 in the water and an accurate assessment of the water level visually at the sump opening are 9 impossible. Any oil collected and trapped by this system is manually skimmed from the water 10 surface, approximately three to five meters down, by entering the sump on regular intervals.

11

In February 2018 there was a malfunction of the sump system for Units 1 and 2. The low levelfloat switch failed and the extreme low level switch on the pump did not activate. The pump

continued to operate pumping sump water to the tailrace until the pump was shut down by
 operational staff. If intervention did not occur the pump would have burned out.

3

The sump system to Units 1 and 2 was repaired by replacing the float switches and a new automatic oil skimmer was added to this sump, which allows for only one person to check water levels and check for hydrocarbons from the sump opening. The pump on Sump 1 also needs to be replaced, due to age and condition, and this pump has been ordered and will be installed later in 2018. The pump replacement will be performed under the Hydraulic Generation In-Service Failure project for 2018.

10

11 Currently, workers are entering the Sumps 2 and 3 twice a week to check for hydrocarbons and 12 clean the sumps as required. To enter the sump, confined space permits are required and a 13 stand-by worker is required in case of emergency. The addition of skimmers for Sump 2 and 3 14 would allow for one person check the system visually from the sump opening eliminating the 15 need to enter the sumps.

16

17 Justification

18 This project is required to reduce the risk of discharging prohibited fluids into the environment.

19

20 Project Description

21 This project will refurbish and upgrade current sump level control system with a better stainless 22 anchorage and floats with fixed attachment pivot points. This project will add an alarm that will 23 be annunciated in the control room if the sump water level is too low to allow operations be 24 able to react to low level situations. As well, the addition of an automatic oil skimmer to the 25 sump system will ensure that oil trapped by the system is removed regularly as it enters the 26 sump and workers will no longer have to enter the sump pit on a regular basis. The automatic 27 system will skim the sump pit and workers can then look in the collection drum to determine if 28 there is oil present in the sump.

- 1 The scope of this project for Sumps 1, 2, and 3 includes:
- Installation of a stainless steel anchorage system to anchor the float switches to the
 sides of the sumps;
- replacement of all existing float switches with floats that have fixed attachment pivot
 points;
- installation of low level sump alarm that is annunciated in the control room and shuts
 down the pump;
- modifications of the sumps structural steel to accommodate new components; and
- installation of oil skimmers in Sumps 2, and 3 only.
- 10

11 **Project Estimate**

- 12 The project estimate for the Refurbish Sump System in Bay d'Espoir Project in 2019 is presented
- 13 Table 31.

Project Cost	2019	2020	Beyond	Total
Material Supply	51.0	0	0	51.0
Labour	48.7	0	0	48.7
Consultant	0.0	0	0	0.0
Contract Work	0.0	0	0	0.0
Other Direct Costs	2.9	0	0	2.9
Interest and Escalation	8.5	0	0	8.5
Contingency	20.5	0	0	20.5
Total	131.6	0.0	0.0	131.6

Table 31: Refurbish Sump System at Bay d'Espoir Powerhouse 1 – Project Estimate (\$000s)

14 Project Schedule

- 15 The anticipated project schedule for the Refurbish Sump System project in 2019 is presented
- 16 Table 32.

Activity		Start Date	End Date
Planning	Open project in JDE; review schedule. Prepare tender	Feb 2019	May 2019
	documents for consultant and contract work.		
Procurement	Special material requirements.	May 2019	Jun 2019
Construction	Replace anchorage system, floats, and install	Jun 2019	Aug 2019
	skimmers in all three sumps.		
Closeout	Closeout the project	Oct 2019	Nov 2019

Table 32: Refurbish Sump System at Bay d'Espoir Powerhouse 1 – Project Schedule

1 3 Summary

2 This report in conjunction with the "Hydraulic Generation Asset Management Overview"

3 defines the 2019-2020 capital budget submission for all Hydraulic Generation assets.

4

5 3.1 Project Estimate

Individual project estimates for each activity are provided in Section 2 of this report. The
project estimate for all activities described in the 2019 Hydraulic Generation Refurbishment
and Modernization Project is shown in Table 33.

Table 33: Hydraulic Generation Refurbishment and Modernization – Project Estimate (\$000s)

Project Cost	2019	2020	Beyond	Total
Material Supply	1014.7	428.5	0.0	1443.2
Labour	2729.3	836.0	0.0	3565.3
Consultant	892.4	131.4	0.0	1023.8
Contract Work	2562.2	3247.5	0.0	5809.7
Other Direct Costs	223.6	222.9	0.0	446.5
Interest and Escalation	529.5	621.2	0.0	1150.7
Contingency	1142.0	1257.7	0.0	2399.7
Total	9,093.7	6,745.2	0.0	15,838.9

1 Project Schedule

- 2 The individual schedules for each activity are in Section 2 of this report. Typically a high-level
- 3 schedule for a multi-year project is as follows:
- 4 Year 1: Planning, Design, and Procurement; and
 - Year 2: Construction, Commissioning, and Closeout.
- 6

5

- 7 For one-year projects, all activities will be completed in the first year. Typically, one-year
- 8 projects have short material lead times and shorter construction requirements.
- 9
- 10 All activities in this proposal will be completed before December 2020.

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	Electrical	<u>.</u>
	Mechanical	
	Civil	
	Protection & Control	
	Transmission & Distribution	
	Telecontrol	
	System Planning	

Hydraulic Generation Asset Management Overview

July 2018



1 Summary

Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro (Hydro) has developed an ongoing capital program to
replace or refurbish assets as they reach the end of their design life or require attention due to
obsolescence or anticipated failure.

5

Historically, Hydro's Hydraulic Generation projects were divided into two categories: standalone and programs. Programs include projects that are proposed year after year to address the
need to upgrade or replace deteriorated equipment, such as control cables, and have similar
justification each year. Stand-alone projects included those that do not meet the definition of a
program. Hydro had as many as 80 separate program-type projects in its Capital Budget
Applications over the past five years, with each stand-alone project tailored to a specific asset.

12

Starting with the 2018 Capital Budget Application, Hydro implemented a change to the hydraulic generation programs submissions and consolidated the programs into the *"Hydraulic Generation Refurbishment and Modernization Project"* thereby improving regulatory efficiency and easing the administrative effort for both the Board and Hydro. This change allows for opportunities to realize efficiencies by improving the coordination of capital and maintenance work on the Hydraulic Generation assets.

19

20 With the 2019 Capital Budget Application, Hydro submits this revised Hydraulic Generation 21 Asset Management Overview (Overview) to provide an update of Hydro's hydraulic generation 22 asset maintenance philosophies. The annual proposed projects reflect the philosophies 23 contained within.

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Appendices

Appendix A	Full Asset Description
Appendix B	Operational Hour and Time-Based Activity Background
Appendix C	Overhaul Timing Background

1 1 Introduction

Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro (Hydro) has 10 hydraulic electric generating stations. There
are over 3,000 assets involved in the operation of these stations.

4

5 Hydro's Asset Management Program governs the life cycle of its hydraulic generation assets. 6 This program monitors, maintains, refurbishes, replaces and disposes of assets with the 7 objective of providing safe, reliable electrical power in an environmentally responsible manner 8 at least-cost. Within this program, assets are grouped at each location by five asset 9 classifications, including hydraulic generating units, hydraulic structures, reservoirs, site 10 buildings and services, and auxiliary equipment. This allows asset management personnel to 11 establish, where possible, consistent practices as it applies to equipment specification, 12 placement, maintenance, refurbishment, replacement and disposal. These practices ensure 13 that monitoring, assessing, justifying for capital refurbishment, and replacing for asset 14 sustaining purposes are consistently executed. Hydro has established programs which enact 15 these practices for assets or sub-grouping of assets (e.g. turbine overhauls are performed on 16 each hydraulic generating unit).

17

Part of Hydro's Annual Capital Program is a sustaining effort to ensure the safety and reliability
of generation assets. Combining these projects into Hydraulic Generation Asset Management
Project provides an opportunity to increase regulatory efficiency and provide a more focused
presentation of Hydro's sustaining efforts for hydraulic generation.

22

This document, Hydraulic Generation Asset Management Overview (Overview), serves as a reference for annual projects. It provides supporting information on the assets involved, a description of each asset, and how this document will be updated in the event of changes to Hydro's asset management philosophies.

27

Hydro will revise and resubmit the Overview, where appropriate, as changes are implementedto asset management practices.

1 **1.1 Changes in Version 2**

- 2 This document reflects Version 2 of the Overview and is being submitted with the 2019 Capital
- 3 Budget Application. All material changes in this revision are shaded in grey and are summarized
- 4 in Section 4.7, updated to include the Draft Tube Deck refurbishment program.
- 5
- 6 Minor changes to syntax have been made to improve reading and to reflect that this document
 7 has been previously submitted and is no longer a newly established approach. These minor
- 9

8

10 2 Hydraulic Generation Background

changes have not been highlighted.

11 **2.1** Hydraulic Generating Stations

12 The location, number of generators at each location, and the total rated generating capacity of

- 13 Hydro's 10 generating stations is as follows:
- 14 1. Bay d'Espoir (BDE), seven units in two powerhouses outputting 613.4 MW;
- 15 2. Cat Arm (CAT), two units outputting 134 MW;
- 16 3. Upper Salmon (USL), one unit outputting 84 MW;
- 17 4. Hinds Lake (HLK), one unit outputting 75 MW;
- 18 5. Granite Canal (GCL), one unit outputting 40 MW;
- 19 6. Paradise River (PRV), one unit outputting 8 MW;
- 20 7. Snook's Arm (SAM), one unit outputting 560 kW
- 21 8. Venams Bight (VBT), one unit outputting 340 kW; and
- 22 9. Roddickton (RMH), one unit outputting 440 kW.
- 23
- 24 Table 1 provides the in-service dates for each turbine generating unit.

#	Location	In-Service Date
1a	Bay d'Espoir Powerhouse 1	Unit 1 - March, 1967
		Unit 2 - June 1967
		Unit 3 - October 1967
		Unit 4 - September 1968
		Unit 5 - February 1970
		Unit 6 - March 1970
1b	Bay d'Espoir Powerhouse 2	Unit 7 - December 1977
2	Cat Arm	Unit 1 - February 1985
		Unit 2 - February 1985
3	Upper Salmon	January 1983
4	Hinds Lake	December 1980
5	Granite Canal	August 2003
6	Paradise River	February 26, 1989
7	Snook's Arm	September 1957 (Acquired in 1968)
8	Venams Bight	April 1957 (Acquired in 1968)
9	Roddickton	December 1980

Table 1: Turbine Generating Unit In-Service Dates



- 1. Bay d'Espoir Powerhouses #1 & #2
- 2. Burnt Dam Spillway Structure
- 3. Cat Arm Powerhouse
- 4. Ebbegunbaeg Control Structure
- 5. Granite Canal Powerhouse
- 6. Hinds Lake Powerhouse
- 7. Paradise River Powerhouse
- 8. Star Lake Powerhouse
- 9. Upper Salmon Powerhouse

Figure 1: Hydraulic Generation and Structures Locations

1 2.2 Infrastructure Classifications

2 The approximately 3,000 hydraulic generating assets are functionally grouped into hydraulic

3 generating units (Section 4.4), hydraulic structures (Section 4.5), reservoirs (Section 4.6), site

buildings and services (Section 4.7), and auxiliary equipment classifications (Section 4.8). A
 functional description and further sub-classification of the infrastructure, equipment and

- 3 systems within these five asset classifications is provided in Appendix A: Full Asset Description.
- 4

5 3 Hydraulic Generation Capital Projects

6 **3.1** Historical Hydraulic Generation Capital Projects

7 In the 2017 Capital Budget Application, there were 14 individual Hydraulic Generation projects, 8 which accounted for \$13.1 million, or 5% of the Capital Budget. Historically, Hydro's generating 9 station projects were divided into two categories: stand-alone, and programs. Programs include 10 projects that are proposed year after year to address the required refurbishment or 11 replacement of assets, such as control cables, and have similar justification presented each 12 year. Of the 14 individual Hydraulic Generation projects proposed in 2017, two were program-13 related and the 12 stand-alone projects were similar to projects submitted in previous Capital 14 Budget Applications and as such were continuing efforts to sustain hydraulic generating assets.

15

16 **3.2** Hydro's Approach to Hydraulic Generation Capital Projects

17 The programs now included in the Project are:

- 18 Hydraulic Generating Units Program;
- 19 Hydraulic Structures Program;
- Reservoirs Program;
- Site Buildings and Services Program; and
- Common Auxiliary Equipment Program.
- 23

Items which will be excluded from the *"Hydraulic Generation Refurbishment and Modernization Project"* and will be proposed separately include:

Activities that cannot be scheduled for inclusion in the annual Capital Budget
 Application - these projects will be submitted as either a supplementary capital budget
 application or executed in the *"Hydraulic Generating Stations In-Service Failures Project";*

Activities in response to additional load or reliability requirements - these projects
 generally have unique justifications and will be proposed separately; and

Activities in response to significant isolated issues in a particular station (e.g.
 replacement of a damaged turbine) - these projects generally have unique justification
 and will be proposed separately.

Hydro will continue to maintain individual records with regards to asset capital, maintenance
and retirement expenditures and performance, which will be queried to support the
development of the annual capital plan.

9

10 **3.3 Benefits of the Approach**

Supporting information, such as asset descriptions change infrequently, referencing the Overview in the Project documentation will eliminate the preparation and review of repetitious information. Hydro estimates that this approach could save up to \$130,000¹ annually, not including time and costs for review by the Board and Intervenors.

15

Hydro has a proactive Asset Management Program to anticipate future failures so that 16 17 refurbishment or replacement can be incorporated into an Application. However, there are 18 situations were immediate refurbishment or replacement, which has not been included in an 19 Application, has to be undertaken due to the occurrence of an unanticipated failure or the 20 recognition of an incipient failure, so as to maintain the delivery of safe, reliable electricity at 21 least cost. These situations seldom include extenuating or abnormal circumstances and costs. 22 With aging assets, unanticipated failures are expected to increase. This increase will require 23 additional future efforts to provide and review regulatory documentation. By introducing a 24 "Hydraulic Generation In-Service Failures Project", there will be a reduced need for that 25 documentation and change management processes. Each year, Hydro will provide a concise 26 summary of the previous year's work.

¹ If the work undertaken in the 2017 "*Hydraulic Generation Refurbishment and Modernization Project*" had been submitted as 13 individual projects, it is estimated preparation would be approximately \$10,000 per project.
Hydro expects the *"Hydraulic Generation Refurbishment and Modernization Project"* will
provide opportunities whereby Hydro can further optimize the coordination of opportunities to
optimize capital and maintenance work to minimize outages on equipment as personnel look to
further coordinate work by location.

5

6 4 Asset Management Programs

7 4.1 Condition Assessment Practices

Hydraulic generation asset management personnel primarily obtain information to assess the
condition of hydraulic generation assets through calendar-based or equipment operating timebased activities. Calendar-based activities include, but are not limited to, daily, weekly,
monthly, quarterly, annual and three-year preventive maintenance procedures. Operating
time-based activities include 500, 1,000 or 2,000-hour preventive maintenance procedures.
More information on calendar-based or equipment operating time-based activities is presented
in Appendix B.

15

Capital overhauls and refurbishments are conducted on differing timeframes depending upon the asset and range from approximately 6 to 25 year time frames. The actual timing of this work is determined by asset management personnel after considering various factors such as reliability, safety, frequency of operation, asset criticality, condition, operating constraints and geographic location. More information on the determination of timing is presented in Appendix C.

22

The more frequent calendar-based and equipment operating time-based maintenance procedures consist of visual inspection of the equipment for abnormalities, such as noticeable cracks, rust, corrosion, electrical tracking, and component malfunction, as well as minor maintenance such as oil and filter changes, as required. The remaining preventive maintenance procedures and capital program activities require outages to the equipment and entail progressive levels of disassembly, checking, testing and adjustments of systems and components allowing for the identification of abnormalities which cannot otherwise be identified. These activities require greater or complete disassembly, specialized inspections and
 testing of equipment and, if required based upon condition assessment, unforeseen
 refurbishment or replacement activities completed within the approved budget for the
 program.

5

6 The condition assessment information, documented by the personnel executing these 7 activities, is reviewed by Long-Term Asset Planning personnel who determine if corrective 8 action, either expensed as operating or included as capital, is required.

9

10 Additionally, Long-Term Asset Planning personnel may initiate condition assessments of existing equipment and determine whether corrective action is required when information is obtained 11 12 through different sources than those outlined above. These sources may include operating 13 personnel, vendors, industry related groups and literature. This information may relate to such situations as changes to safety practices, reports of performance indicating that an asset is 14 15 approaching end of service life, industry experience identifying new equipment issues, and manufacturers withdrawing product support (obsolete equipment) resulting in Hydro being 16 17 unable to obtain spare parts and obtain technical expertise to maintain the equipment. Corrective actions may be required immediately, or may be executed at a future time. 18 19 Condition assessment and practices specific to an asset classification are outlined in the 20 corresponding program described later in the Overview.

21

22 4.2 Program Types and Timing

The programs in this Overview are primarily focused on the capital overhauls and the execution of corrective actions required by each asset classification. As the implementation of corrective action increases or is projected to increase, a program will be added to this Overview. Due to the volume and complexity of hydraulic generation assets, capital corrective actions are required that do not warrant the establishment of a long-term capital program. For each asset classification, these activities are captured under the section titled "Other Sustaining Activities". Capital corrective actions that are aligned with the Overview philosophies and practises, as well as capital work which will result in economic savings but do not reside within an established
capital program will be included in this program. Examples of capital work that could be
included under Other Sustaining Activities are:

- Deteriorated systems, equipment, components or material approaching the end of their
 service life;
- Systems, equipment, and components for which manufacturers have withdrawn
 product support or industry experience has identified new performance issues;
- 8 3. Changes to safety practices on existing infrastructure; and
 - 4. Replacement of existing assets with economically justified replacements.
- 10

9

In the *"Hydraulic Generation Refurbishment and Modernization Project"* submitted with each
Capital Budget Application, the "Other Sustaining Activities" items, with associated costs and a
brief explanation of the work, will be provided for the Board's review.

14

15 The timing of capital overhauls is determined by Long-Term Asset Planning personnel after considering various factors including asset performance, safety concerns, frequency of 16 17 operation, criticality, condition, corrective actions required, operating constraints and 18 geographic location. More information on the determination of timing is presented in Appendix 19 C. Execution of capital corrective actions which align with philosophies and practises outlined in 20 this Overview will be included in the "Hydraulic Generation Refurbishment and Modernization 21 Project" or in the "Hydraulic Generation In-Service Failures Project". Immediate corrective actions stemming from an approved "Hydraulic Generation Refurbishment and Modernization 22 23 *Project"* which can be accomplished within the project scope and budget may proceed within that project.² Future corrective actions would be included in the "Hydraulic Generation" 24 *Refurbishment and Modernization Project*" submitted in a future Capital Budget Application. 25

² Immediate action that cannot be accomplished within the scope and approved budget of an approved "*Hydraulic Generation Refurbishment and Modernization Project*" would be addressed either through the "*Hydraulic Generation In-Service Failures Project*" or through a Supplementary Capital Budget Application.

1 4.3 Asset Classification Description

- 2 Each asset classification section includes a high level functional description of the group's
- 3 assets. More information about the infrastructure, systems, equipment, and components in an
- 4 asset classification is provided in Appendix A.
- 5

6 4.4 Hydraulic Generating Units Asset Classification

- 7 Hydro's Hydraulic Generating Units Asset Classification consists of:
- 8 Generators;
- 9 governors;
- 10 isolated phase buses;
- spherical valves;
- 12 turbines;
- 13 exciters; and
- metering, monitoring, SCADA, protection and control equipment.
- 15
- 16 Figure 2 is a cross-section of a Hydraulic Generating Unit.



Figure 2: Hydraulic Generating Units

Flowing water is directed from a penstock through a main inlet valve (where equipped) and into 1 2 a spiral case, which encircles the turbine runner. The wicket gates direct water from the spiral 3 case into the turbine runner (noted as turbine blades in Figure 2). The water turns the turbine 4 runner and then flows into the draft tube attached to the turbine. The water passes through 5 the draft tube and on to the tailrace to exit the generating station. A shaft connects the turbine 6 runner and the generator rotor. Turning the runner causes the rotor to turn. Electrical 7 interaction, created by the unit exciter system, between the stator and the moving rotor 8 produces electricity for transmission to customers. A unit governor system controls the flow of 9 water, by way of the wicket gates, to ensure an appropriate amount of water is passing through the turbine so as to supply the electrical power required from the generator. The electricity is 10 passed from the generator to the electrical transmission system outside the hydraulic 11 generation station through an electrical isolated phase bus system. Rotating equipment 12 requires lubrication and, as such, the unit has an automatic greasing system. Hydraulic 13 generating units have protection, control, instrumentation, condition monitoring, SCADA³ and 14 15 metering equipment to ensure safe, reliable operation and asset management data for the unit.

³ Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems gather information from the field, transfer the information back to a central site, alert the central site of abnormal system conditions, perform necessary analysis and control, and display information to operators. Operators interface with the SCADA which connects to equipment in the field.



Figure 3: Dismantled Generator

1 4.4.1 Turbine and Generator Six Year Overhauls Program

2 The Six-Year Overhaul involves a partial dismantling the turbine and generator to inspect, test, 3 clean, refurbish the units. This may entail replacing defective components and, as required, 4 undertaking corrective refurbishment or replacement action. The generator activities involve 5 such activities as are cleaning and inspection of rotor and stator assembly, electrical testing on 6 rotor/stator assembly and calibration and testing of turbine and generator protection devices. 7 The turbine activities involve such activities as verification of bearing and seal clearances and 8 testing and calibration of turbine protection, control and monitoring devices. During these 9 overhauls, due the dewatering of the unit, the draft tube and penstock are also inspected. 10

11 4.4.2 Turbine Major Refurbishment Program

12 The Turbine Major Refurbishment occurs on approximately a 15 to 25-year cycle and involves 13 completely disassembling, inspecting, testing, assessing the turbine mechanical components 14 and, as required, carrying out corrective work to refurbish or replace components to maintain the turbine performance until the next major refurbishment. As the unit is dismantled for the
turbine major refurbishment, this offers an opportunity to carry out, if required, other
sustaining work on the unit, including:

• Inspection and replacement, as required, of the head cover and bottom ring bushings;

- inspection and, as required, replacement of the operating ring bearing;
- 6 replacement of wicket gate V packing;
- 7 replacement of various gaskets and seals;
- 8 refurbishment of runner due to cavitation damage;
- 9 machining of other unit surfaces as required based on condition assessments; and
- testing and calibration of turbine protection, control and monitoring devices.
- 11

12 In the past, concrete growth in the turbine foundation and the resulting erosion caused 13 movement of the turbine lower primary stationary seal. This could cause contact between the 14 stationary and rotating seals and require a full dismantling of the unit to correct. Therefore, as 15 required, grouting and machining of the upper and lower primary seals is also included in the 16 Major Turbine Refurbishment.

17

18 4.4.3 Generator Refurbishment Program

Hydro's generator stator windings have an anticipated service life of 40 years. As a unit approaches the end of its expected service life, a condition assessment is carried out. These assessments reveal signs of electrical deterioration such as seeping asphalt or cracked insulation, or mechanical deterioration such as shifting windings as a unit approaches the end of its useful life. At this point, Hydro takes action to replace the windings. Hydro undertook work to replace generator stator windings due to stator mechanical and electrical deterioration from 2009 to 2014. Future work of a similar nature will be completed within this program.

26

27 4.4.4 Spherical Valve By-Pass Refurbishment Program

Since 2013, Hydro has completed five spherical valve by-pass refurbishment projects due to deterioration and poor operating performance of the by-pass valve and control system. As the spherical valve by-pass reaches its end of service life, the valves begin to malfunction and
become prone to failures due to seized internal components. Future work of this nature will be
undertaken within this Program.

4

5 4.4.5 Exciter Replacement and Refurbishment Program

Hydro has undertaken ten exciter replacements due to a withdrawal of manufacturer product
support. Future work to replace or refurbish existing exciters will be completed within this
Program.

9

10 4.4.6 Automate Generator Deluge Systems Program

Since 2013, Hydro has been automating the deluge systems at Bay d'Espoir. Future work to
automate the remaining systems will be completed under this Program.

13

14 4.4.7 Refurbish Generator Bearings Program

Since 2013, Hydro has been refurbishing the generator bearings and housings to eliminate oil
loss from the bearing housing. Future work of this nature will occur under this Program.

17

18 4.4.8 Replace Auto Greasing Systems Program

As the auto-greasing system on a generating unit ages, it becomes prone to issues such as solenoid failures, damaged timers and switches, and leaking tubing. On older units, the unavailability of replacement components makes maintenance of the systems difficult. Since 2013, Hydro has replaced six automatic greasing systems due to deterioration, incompatibility with new controllers, and ongoing maintenance issues. This program will be used to undertake future work of this nature.

25

26 4.4.9 Replace Unit Metering, Monitoring, Protection, SCADA & Control Assets Program

In 2016, the Bay d'Espoir Unit 7 vibration monitoring system was replaced to improve condition
monitoring of Unit 7. The previously installed vibration monitoring system was unreliable. The

29 new monitor has increased the diagnostic information available to asset management and

maintenance personnel. Hydro plans additional work starting in 2018 to replace the other
monitors on Bay d'Espoir Units 1 to 5 due to the monitors being obsolete. The new monitors
will allow long-term trending of data.

4

Hydro will replace protective relays, annunciators, human-machine interfaces, other metering,
monitoring, protection, and control equipment as it becomes obsolete, fails or operate
unreliably to ensure reliable operation of protective devices.

8

9 In 2017, a multi-year project to install a new Asset Health Monitor system for Upper Salmon
10 started. The new Asset Health Monitor system will gather diagnostic data from the generating
11 unit and provide trending analysis for asset management and maintenance personnel. Hydro
12 plans additional work starting in 2018 to replace obsolete monitoring devices on Bay d'Espoir
13 Units 1 to 5.

14

In 2017, Hydro identified control cables in its Hydraulic Generating Station are leaking oil, which
is contaminated with PCB's. In 2018, Hydro will start a five-year effort to replace the cables and,
if required, associated infrastructure.

18

Hydro expects additional replacement of metering, monitoring, protection, and control
equipment assets, including wiring, panels and other supporting materials and devices, due to
deterioration and obsolescence and to provide more functional equipment. Work of this nature
will be covered by this Program.

23

24 4.4.10 Other Sustaining Activities

25 As described in Section 4.2 Program Types and Timing.

26

27 4.5 Hydraulic Structures Asset Classification

- 28 Hydro's Hydraulic Structures Asset Classification consists of:
- control gates;

- 1 penstocks;
- 2 surge tanks; and
 - remote water level systems.
- 4

3

5 Figure 4 is a cross-section of a hydroelectric installation showing the intake gate.



Figure 4: Cross-section of intake

6 Hydro uses hydraulic control structures to control the flow of water from reservoirs. Structures 7 associated with a powerhouse intake control the flow of water from the reservoir into 8 penstocks which transport water to a hydraulic generating unit (shown as a turbine and a 9 generator in Figure 4) to produce electricity. Structures associated with a spillway control the 10 flow of water from the reservoir into a spillway (spilling). Spilling, when required, is undertaken 11 to avoid damage to the reservoir dams or dykes caused by excessive water in the reservoir. 12 Hydro's control structures consist of structural, mechanical, and electrical systems (Figure 5). 13 The water flows through the concrete structures and the mechanical systems incorporated into 14 the concrete structure. The mechanical systems controlling the flow of water include a vertical 15 sliding gate, a gate hoist, gate rollers, seals, and embedded steel parts in the concrete to allow

movement of the gate by the hoist. Electrical systems include heaters to prevent icing of the mechanical systems in the concrete structure, power supply systems and control systems for the gate equipment. The stoplogs are mechanical systems of wood or steel members placed by lifting devices between control structures and the reservoirs to stop water from flowing through the concrete structures when the mechanical gate systems are being worked upon. Hydro has 21 hydraulic control structures, which incorporate 40 gates.



Figure 5: West Salmon Spillway Control Structure

- A penstock is a large pipe, most commonly constructed of welded steel, which conveys water
 from a reservoir to turbine. Hydro has eight steel and one wood stave penstock serving the
 hydraulic units and three arrangements with penstock/power tunnel combinations.
- 10

Hydraulic generating stations with high head designs have surge tanks connected to penstocks to neutralize the impact of sudden changes in pressure on the penstock caused by operation of the station. Water flows into the tank when the penstock water pressure increases and out of the tank when penstock pressure decreases, thus mitigating the effects of water hammer on a penstock. Hydro has four surge tanks in two hydraulic generating stations (Figure 6).



Figure 6: Surge Tanks at the Bay d'Espoir Hydraulic Generating Station

1 The primary preventive maintenance procedure for Hydraulic Structures is a yearly inspection.

2 Based upon condition, overhauls are performed on a 10 to 15 year frequency.

3

4 4.5.1 Refurbish and Replace of Control Gates Infrastructure Program

5 Failure of subcomponents of control structures can result in safety hazards, equipment 6 damage, or the inability to operate gates as required. A failed gate control system has resulted 7 in the filling of the penstock too quickly, creating hazardous conditions. The failure of gate 8 heaters can result in mechanical components freezing, causing inoperability. Since 2009, Hydro 9 has undertaken control gate refurbishments in Hinds Lake, Upper Salmon, and Bay d'Espoir for 10 intake structures and at Salmon River, Victoria and Burnt Dam for spillway structures. This work has included structural, mechanical, electrical and control system work. Future refurbishment
work will be executed through this Program.

3

4 4.5.2 Refurbish Surge Tanks Program

5 Hydro carries out progressive inspections monthly and annually on surge tanks and a major 6 inspection every six years. Based on these inspections, Hydro determines whether corrective 7 action is required. Over time, protective coatings degrade, resulting in increased corrosion 8 which, if left unmitigated, may result in leaks or structural failure of the tanks. Failure of the 9 cathodic protection and protective coating of the surge tanks resulted in corrosion on the Bay 10 d'Espoir assets. In 2014, 2015, and 2016, Hydro completed projects to refurbish the surge 11 tanks. Future refurbishment work on any surge tanks will be covered by this Program.

12

13 4.5.3 Other Sustaining Activities

14 As described in Section 4.2 Program Types and Timing.

15

16 **4.6 Reservoirs Asset Classification**

- 17 Hydro's hydraulic reservoirs asset classification consists of:
- 18 ams;
- 19 dykes;
- power canals;
- spillways;
- control weirs;
- fuse plugs;
- tunnels;
- instrumentation; and
- public safety control measures.

27

28 Figure 7 is a general cross-section of an embankment type dam.





Dams and dykes are constructed to increase the storage capacity of the reservoir. The majority 1 2 of Hydro's dams are embankment type structures. The largest structure is 63 m high. Power 3 canals are typically a dyke lined canal developed to convey water between reservoirs or from a 4 reservoir to an intake structure. Passive overflow spillways are dams that are built to spill water from a reservoir at a specific elevation. Overflow spillways in Hydro's system are constructed of 5 6 rock fill with steel sheet pile cores, concrete or timber crib. Control Weirs are low head 7 concrete overflow spillways that maintain the water elevation upstream of the weir to within a 8 specified range. Fuse plugs are sections of dams that are constructed of earth materials and 9 designed to fail in a controlled manner without damaging adjacent larger, more critical dams. 10 Power tunnels convey water, through rock, from a reservoir to an intake structure. Diversion 11 tunnels divert water around the work site. Dam instrumentation provides measurements for 12 comparison to the dams design criteria.



Figure 8: Hinds Lake Power Canal

Hydro has approximately 80 dykes and major structures in this classification. Hydro carries out
 preventive maintenance activities at various frequencies for different asset types. For instance,
 dam-type assets are visually inspected biweekly and undergo semi-annual engineering
 inspections.



Figure 9: Safety Boom and Signage

5 4.6.1 Upgrade Public Safety around Dams and Waterways Program

Public safety risks are determined by completing risk assessments in accordance with the
Canadian Dam Association's Dam Safety Guidelines, 2007 that includes guidelines for public
safety and security around dams. Appropriate control measures are installed to reduce the

safety risk to the public. These measures include such items as signage, fencing, audible or
visual alarms, booms and buoys (as shown in Figure 9), operational changes and public
education. Hydro has conducted seven public safety projects since 2011. Future work to further
enhance public safety around Hydro dams and waterways will be undertaken through this
Program.

6

7 4.6.2 Other Sustaining Activities

- 8 As described in Section 4.2 Program Types and Timing
- 9

10 **4.7** Site Buildings and Services Asset Classification

- 11 Hydro's Site Buildings and Services Asset Classification consists of:
- water distribution systems;
- fuel storage and distribution systems;
- powerhouse buildings;
- service buildings;

16 • helicopter Pads;

• site fencing and gate controls;

18 • parking lots;

- 19 stairways; and
- site access roads.



Figure 10: Paradise River Generating Station

Water distribution systems collect, transmit, treat, store, and distribute domestic water. Fuel 1 2 storage and distribution systems handle diesel, helicopter, and gasoline fuels. Powerhouse 3 buildings contain a hydraulic generating unit(s) and the unit's auxiliary mechanical and electrical 4 equipment. Service buildings are other buildings required for a hydraulic generating station, 5 which include warehouses, maintenance buildings, training facilities, site accommodations, and 6 security offices. Helicopter pads allow helicopters to use relatively flat, clearly marked, 7 obstacle-free hard surfaces to land and take off safely. All sites have fencing and/or gates with 8 controls to maintain site security and public safety. The parking lots and stairways provide 9 vehicle parking and safe access to facilities. Site and access roads allow access to hydraulic 10 generation locations, such as generating stations and dams.

- 11
- 12 Site Buildings and Services assets are inspected and, where applicable, tested annually.

1 4.7.1 Access Road Refurbishment Program

2 Since 2010, Hydro has undertaken four projects to refurbish access roads to its hydraulic 3 generating stations to maintain safe site access. Deterioration was a result of insufficient 4 drainage, washouts, or the normal wear/loss of road topping material. Hydro expects to 5 undertake similar work in the future and will execute it within this Program.

6

7 4.7.2 Diesel Fuel Storage Refurbishment and Replacement Program

8 Hydro has 19 diesel fuel storage tanks at its hydroelectric generating stations. These are subject 9 to deterioration (e.g. reduced wall thickness, corrosion) which is detected during routine tank 10 inspections. Tanks are also subject to changing government regulations. Hydro will use this 11 program to refurbish or replace tanks when deteriorated and to comply with government 12 regulations. Hydro has tanks in remote locations and since 2007 has installed remote 13 monitoring on a portion of those tanks. If required to add remote monitoring to other tanks, 14 Hydro will undertake this work within this Program.

15

16 4.7.3 Draft Tube Deck Refurbishment Program

17 A draft tube deck is a common feature in a hydroelectric plant. The draft tube is where the 18 exhausted water from the hydro unit exits and is directed to the tailrace. The draft tube deck is 19 a reference to the full structure including the substructure, exit water channels, and the deck 20 above that can be driven over or has walk access to install draft tube gates. Draft tube gates are 21 used to isolate the hydro unit by preventing tailrace water from coming back up through the 22 unit. Over time, concrete degrades and the structure experiences wear due to weather and 23 water erosion. Once this damage occurs, refurbishment of the structures is required to ensure 24 the reliable operation of the hydro units. Future refurbishment work on any Draft Tube Deck 25 will be covered by this Program.

26

27 4.7.4 Other Sustaining Activities

28 As described in Section 4.2 Program Types and Timing.

- 1 4.8 Common Auxiliary Equipment Asset Classification
- 2 Hydro's Common Auxiliary Equipment Asset Classification consists of:
- station service;
- 4 ancillary AC/DC electrical system;
- 5 standby diesel generators;
- 6 cranes;
- 7 fire protection and detection systems;
- 8 powerhouse public address systems;
- 9 compressed air systems;
- 10 service/cooling water systems;
- domestic water systems;
- 12 drainage/unwatering systems;
- water level systems;
- heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems;
- 15 waste oil storage tanks; and
- 16 lube oil storage.
- 17
- 18 Figure 11 depicts the Bay d'Espoir Station Service Transformers, one of many examples of
- 19 auxiliary equipment required for Hydro's daily operations.



Figure 11: Bay d'Espoir – Station Service Transformers

1 Station service system uses transformers and other equipment to convert AC electricity to a 2 voltage acceptable for use in the ancillary AC/DC electrical system which distributes electricity 3 to ancillary equipment needed in the operation of the hydraulic generating station. Standby 4 diesel generators are installed as back-up at locations that require electricity for operations. 5 Cranes are used during maintenance and capital work. Fire protection and detection systems 6 are installed to protect people, buildings, power transformers, generators, and other 7 equipment. Powerhouse public address systems allow communication within a noise working 8 environment. Compressed air systems provide pressurized air to equipment that requires 9 pressurized air to operate, such as governors, and spherical valves. Service/cooling water systems are used to remove heat from turbines and generators, particularly bearings and 10 11 generator stators. Domestic water systems supply water where water is needed.

1 Drainage/Unwatering Systems remove water from the hydraulic generating unit to allow access 2 to the turbine. Water level systems provide water level monitoring in streams, lakes or 3 reservoirs. Air conditioners control the temperature for personnel and equipment. Heating, 4 ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems also provide humidity control for humidity-5 sensitive electrical equipment. Ventilation systems remove waste heat generated by generating 6 units, and circulate fresh air using ducts and fans. Waste oil storage tanks hold used oil for 7 disposal. Lube oil storage are laydown areas for the 200 litre drums of lube oil that are located 8 at most generating stations.

9

10 There is a mixture of time based preventive maintenance procedures ranging from weekly to 11 yearly, and a mixture of operational hour preventive maintenance procedures ranging from 500 12 to 2,000 hour checks used to assess and maintain these assets.

13

14 4.8.1 Station Service Refurbishment and Replacement Program

15 Station service systems in Hydraulic Generating Stations are complex systems comprised of a number of subsystems. Devices such as reclosers and circuit breakers require replacement as 16 17 they become obsolete, resulting in the unavailability of replacement parts required to maintain 18 equipment or operate unreliably. Equipment may require replacement to reduce fault levels, 19 and arc-flash levels, or improve protection coordination, either of which may result in safety 20 hazards or equipment damage if left unmitigated. Electrical equipment, such as transformers, 21 are prone to insulation breakdown and other deterioration as they reach the end of their useful 22 service life and require refurbishment or replacement. In 2015, 2016 and 2017, station service 23 electrical equipment was replaced at Cat Arm and Bay d'Espoir due to operational failures, 24 deterioration, and weak protective coordination between devices. Hydro expects work of this 25 nature to occur in the future and will undertake that work under this Program.

26

27 4.8.2 Service/Cooling Water Refurbishment and Replacement Program

28 Over time, cooling water pipes can become clogged with organic slime and hardened organics

29 that attaches to the pipe walls causing the cooling water flows to decrease significantly.

Additionally, older cooling water pipes are constructed of mild steel, which is prone to corrosion over time. Since 2009, Hydro has undertaken 11 projects to replace cooling systems and piping, pump, and instrumentation components due to pipe fouling from material build up and corrosion. Future capital work on service/cooling water systems will be undertaken within this Program.

6

7 4.8.3 Air Conditioning Refurbishment and Replacement Program

8 Hydro has refurbished or replaced air conditioning systems and improved ventilation in four 9 projects due to obsolescence, resulting in the unavailability of replacement components require 10 to maintain units. Air conditioning systems are also replaced or upgraded due to increased 11 cooling requirements. Future capital work for this will be executed through this Program.

12

13 4.8.4 Standby Generator Refurbishment and Replacement Program

Since 2009, Hydro has replaced three standby generators at Bay d'Espoir due to poor performance and the inability to reliably supply station service power in an emergency. Primary power diesel generators have been replaced at the Burnt Dam and Victoria Control Structure locations. Diesel generators require an engine overhaul based on operating hours and operating performance. Typically, standby diesels rarely require this refurbishment and primary power diesel generators require this refurbishment about every five years. Future replacement and refurbishments of diesel generators will be completed under this Program.

21

22 4.8.5 Ancillary AC/DC Electrical System Refurbishment and Replacement Program

In 2011 and 2013, Automatic Transfer Switches were replaced at Bay d'Espoir and Hinds Lake due to operational failures. In 2015, Hydro started the installation of Infrared Inspection Viewports in electrical equipment at various hydraulic generating stations to allow safe inspection of the equipment while energized. Installations of the viewports will occur under this Program. In addition, Hydro expects that the replacement and refurbishment of ancillary AC/DC electrical assets will continue to maintain a reliable supply of electricity. In the future, this work will occur under this Program.

4.8.6 Other Sustaining Activities - Common Auxiliary Equipment Program

2 As described in Section 4.2 Program Types and Timing

Appendix A

Full Asset Description

1 Hydraulic Generating Units

2 Generator

3 A generator is an electric rotating machine that transforms mechanical power from a hydraulic

- 4 turbine into electric power.
- 5

6 Stator Assembly

A stator consists of a core and a frame; it is the stationary part of a machine that serves as both
a magnetic circuit and a supporting member. The core is made up of sheets of electrical steel;
the sheets, which are 0.35–0.5 mm thick and insulated with varnish, are formed into stacks and
fastened in the cast or welded frame. Stator windings fit into slots made in the core. The stator
is cooled with surface air coolers, which are heat exchangers that have cooling water flowing
through which cool the hot air blown around the stator.

13

14 Stator Assembly

The rotor consists of a fabricated spider, laminated rim, field poles and windings, a brake ringand collector rings.

17

18 Thrust and Guide Bearing

19 The thrust and guide bearing combination on the generator sustains axial and lateral loading 20 and prevents axial and lateral movement. The bearing consists of a segmented guide bearing, 21 thrust block, rotating ring, segmented spring-supported thrust bearing, base ring, oil reservoir,

- 22 cooling coils, alarm devises, and a high pressure oil injection system for start-up (if equipped).
- 23

24 Cooling Water System

25 The cooling water system supplies water to the thrust and guide bearing cooling coil to cool the

- 26 oil reservoir. The cooling water also supplies the surface air coolers in the generator to cool the
- 27 stator and rotor by air circulation within the generator.

1 Governor

The governor serves to keep the speed of the hydro unit constant in order to maintain the systems frequency of 60 hertz. Any change in load or other operational disturbances will cause the governor to open or close the wicket gates to allow more or less water to maintain the constant speed of the Hydro Unit.

6

7 Governor Speed Generators

Speed control is one of the primary functions of a governor. On Mechanical governors, a set of rotating flyballs, opposed by a spring, controls the position of a valve. The valve controls the flow of oil to a servomotor that controls the wicket gates. Any change in speed will cause the valve to be moved off its centered position, making the gates open or close, and changing the unit's speed. Modern electronic governors control the gates by monitoring electronic signals from speed sensors.

14

15 Governor Pump

16 The pump used by the governor to port oil through the governing system.

17

18 Governor Piping System

- 19 The network of pipes required to deliver the governor oil to the desired location.
- 20

21 Accumulator Tank

- 22 An accumulator tank stores oil for the governor system and is pressurized by air.
- 23

24 Servomotor Assembly

- 25 The servomotors are hydraulically actuated pistons, controlled by the governor, that move the
- 26 linkages connected to the wicket gates to allow water regulation to the hydraulic generating
- 27 unit to maintain a constant speed.

1 Isolated Phase Bus

Isolated phase bus is the current carrying conductors used to transmit large currents. For
Hydro's generation sites, it is the means used to carry the current from the generators to the
step-up transformers. The conductors are individually contained within housings to provide
electrical and physical protection and to minimize the possibility of faults.

6

7 Disconnect Switch

8 Disconnect switches are used to electrically isolate the isolated phase bus either for 9 maintenance activities or troubleshooting. Proper operation of these switches is essential for

- 10 the establishment of a safe work environment and for reliable and secure system operation.
- 11

12 Grounding Switch

Grounding switches are used to provide a safe and secure electrical connection between a piece of equipment and ground. Proper grounding of equipment is essential for the establishment of a safe work environment.

16

17 Buswork

18 Buswork is the current carrying conductors which provide connections for the electrical circuits.

19

20 Main Inlet Valve

21 Main Inlet Valves are mainly employed in power plants with more than one generating unit 22 sharing a common penstock. When one penstock is used to supply two or more generating 23 units these valves are installed on each unit to provide isolation from the penstock water 24 supply. This allows the operation of one unit while the other unit is down for maintenance or in 25 stand-by. Most of Hydro's Main Inlet Valves are of the spherical valve type.

1 Turbine

A turbine is a rotary machine that converts kinetic energy and potential energy of water into
mechanical work. Components of the turbine include:

4

5 Runner

- 6 Flowing water is directed on to the blades of a turbine runner, creating a force on the blades.
- 7 Since the runner is spinning, the force acts through a distance, which is the definition of work.

8 In this way, energy is transferred from the water flow to the turbine.

9

10 Draft Tube

- 11 In power turbines a diffuser tube is installed at the exit of the runner, known as draft tube.
- 12

13 Guide Bearing

- 14 The guide bearing on the turbine sustains lateral loading and prevents lateral movement. The
- 15 bearing consists of a segmented guide bearing, oil reservoir, cooling coils, and instrumentation
- 16 to monitor bearing temperature and oil levels within acceptable ranges.
- 17

18 Auto-greasing System

- 19 The auto-greasing system delivers controlled amounts of lubricant to multiple locations on a
- 20 hydraulic generating unit while the machine is in operation.
- 21

22 Turbine Shaft and Coupling

- 23 The turbine shaft is the portion of the hydraulic units' shaft that is connected to the turbine.
- 24 The shaft coupling joins the generator shaft to the turbine shaft.

25

26 Scroll Case

27 A spiral-shaped steel intake guiding the flow into the wicket gates located just prior to the

28 turbine.

1 Headcover Assembly

- 2 The headcover is the top stationary part of a hydraulic turbine that encloses the system.
- 3

4 Wicket Gates and Linkages

Adjustable elements that control the flow of water from the scroll case into the turbine passageby the linkages connected to the servomotors.

7

8 Excitation

9 Excitation Transformer

10 The excitation transformer is a part of the excitation system. It is used to convert the generator 11 terminal voltage to a lower voltage which supplies the rectifier. The excitation system creates 12 the DC energy for the rotating magnetic field in the generator to enable conversion of 13 mechanical energy into electrical energy. Without an excitation transformer, a generating unit 14 is not able to produce electricity.

15

16 Field Breaker

The field breaker is a circuit breaker used to isolate the power supply between the excitation system and the generator rotor. The field breaker performs switching actions to complete, maintain, and interrupt current flow under normal or fault conditions. The reliable operation of the field breaker through its fast response and complete interruption of current flow is essential for the protection of the excitation system.

22

23 Metering, Monitoring, Protection, SCADA and Control

24 Ground Cubicle

25 Minimizes fault damage incurred by generators, and maintains sufficient fault detection to

26 improve power system reliability.

1	Auto Control Panel
2	The auto control panels are where control or monitoring instruments are displayed. This is
3	where operators interface with the generating unit.
4	
5	Synchronizing Panel
6	Synchronization panels are mainly designed and used to meet power system requirements.
7	These panels function both manually and with an automatic synchronizing function for one or
8	more generators or breakers. They are widely used in synchronizing generators.
9	
10	Temperature and Frequency Control Panel
11	This panel displays the temperature and frequency of the hydro unit.
12	
13	Time and Frequency Clock
14	Highly sensitive equipment used to measure the time and frequency of the unit.
15	
16	Oscillogragh
17	An Oscillogragh is a device for recording oscillations, especially those of an electric current.
18	
19	Voltage and Megawatt Panel
20	This panel displays the voltage and megawatt output from the hydro unit.
21	
22	Recorder
23	The recorder records the voltage and megawatt readings of the unit.
24	
25	Control Cables and Junction Boxes
26	Control cables connect various circuits for the operation of each generator. Junction boxes are
27	also located along cable paths where it is practical to terminate cables from various sources.

1 Vibration Monitoring System

2 Hydro Unit Systems

For Hydro Units vibration sensors are mounted on the critical bearings and wired to the plants
computer system or to a dedicated vibration monitoring system. Two alarm levels (soft and
trip) are then set to alert the operator that maintenance attention is needed or in the case of a
Trip Alarm to shut the machine down to prevent failure.

7

8 Handheld Units

9 Handheld vibration units use magnetic vibration sensors that are directly connected to the
10 equipment to monitor vibration and record data. This data can then be downloaded to a
11 computer for analysis.

12

13 Data Acquisition System

This system measures an electrical or physical phenomenon such as voltage, current,
temperature, pressure, or sound with a computer. The system consists of sensors,
measurement hardware, and a computer with programmable software.

17

18 Hydraulic Structure

19 Substructure

20 The substructure is the underlying or supporting structure, such as the concrete foundation.

21

22 Superstructure

The superstructure is the components of a hydraulic structure that are on top of the substructure. This includes components such as the structural steel, hoists and motors for the gates.

26

27 Gates

28 The structure gates are designed to hold back water. In a spillway the water is on one side and

29 the other side is typically dry when the gates are closed. Depending on the function of the

1	particular structure, the gates are opened to move water from one reservoir to another, or to
2	spill water from the reservoir when the water level exceeds the maximum safe level.
3	
4	Stoplogs/Master logs
5	The stoplogs are a set of wooden or steel logs that are put in place by a crane or hoist with the
6	help of a lifting device called the master log. The stop logs act as a temporary measure to
7	isolate the water side of the gate for maintenance.
8	
9	Gate Hoist
10	A gate hoist is a device used for lifting or lowering a gate by means of a drum or lift-wheel
11	around which a wire rope or chain wraps.
12	
13	Gate Rollers, seals, and embedded parts
14	The gate rollers are attached to the gate and roll along the embedded steel in the gains.
15	
16	Heating Systems
17	There are three heating systems that can be used in a structure; the first is a gain heater that
18	heats the roller path on the side of the structure and ensures the roller path is free of ice during
19	the winter. Sill heaters heat the bottom of the gate where it sits on the concrete substructure
20	so that the gate does not freeze to the bottom during winter. The other heating system is on
21	the gate itself and is called gate heaters. Gate heaters are used to ensure that ice does not form
22	inside the gate and that water side of the gate is free of ice during the winter.
23	
24	Control Systems
25	Control systems are typically computer systems designed to control gate systems remotely.
26	Some older technology electronic controllers are used for specific simple control features.

1 **De-icing Systems**

In conjunction with the heating systems other systems are strategically employed to combat ice
around gates. Water up-lifters are used to agitate the water close to the surface of the gate to
inhibit the formation of ice. Bubbler systems use compressed air to lift warmer water at lower
levels in the reservoir to prevent the formation of ice cover or to remove ice build-up on trash
racks.

7

8 Penstock

9 A penstock is a channel for conveying water to a turbine, commonly constructed of steel, wood,10 or rock.

11

12 Surge Tank

13 A surge tank is a tank connected to a penstock carrying reservoir water. It is intended to 14 neutralize sudden changes of pressure in the flow by filling when the pressure increases and

15 emptying when it drops to minimize the effects of water hammer in a penstock.

16

17 Heating Systems

18 The surge tank heating system prevents the stagnant water in the surge tank from freezing in

19 the winter. If surge tank water freezes, water cannot flow freely to avoid water hammer.

20

21 Relief Valves

22 Relief values are an alternative to Surge Tanks to minimize the effects of water hammer in a

23 penstock. The use of a Surge Tank or a relief valve is determined during the design stage of a

24 new unit and it is typically not possible to change the design after initial construction.

25

26 Coating Systems

27 Metal penstocks are coated to protect the steel and welds from corrosion due to the water

28 inside and the elements outside of the penstock or Surge Tank.

1 Drainage Systems

- 2 Drain pipes are installed under the penstocks in the bedding material to collect any leakage
- 3 from the penstocks as well as surface water and any leakage from the intakes/dams.
- 4

5 Water Level Systems

- 6 Water level systems are located at hydraulic structures to provide information to operations to
- 7 make informed decisions about water management and other operating conditions.
- 8

9 Reservoirs

10 Dams and Dykes

- 11 Hydro currently operates more than 100 dams, dykes and hydraulic structures on the island of
- 12 Newfoundland. Hydro dams are constructed to hold back water and raise its level to contain
- 13 water for electricity generation. The majority of Hydro's dams are embankment type structures
- 14 with the highest structure being 63 m high.
- 15

16 **Power Canals**

- Power canals are typically a dyke lined canal developed to convey water from one reservoir to
 another or form a reservoir to an intake structure.
- 19

20 Passive Overflow Spillways

- 21 Passive overflow spillways are dams which are built to spill water from a reservoir at a specific
- 22 elevation. Overflow spillways in our Hydro system are constructed of rock fill with steel sheet
- 23 pile cores, concrete or timber crib.

24

25 Control Weirs

- 26 Control Weirs are low head concrete overflow spillways which maintain the water elevation
- 27 upstream of the weir to within a specified range.

1 Fuse Plugs

- 2 Fuse plugs are sections of dams that are constructed of earth materials and designed to fail in a
- 3 controlled manner without damaging adjacent larger more critical dams.
- 4

5 **Power Tunnels**

6 Power tunnels convey water, through rock, from an intake structure to a generating station.

7

8 **Diversion Tunnels**

9 Diversion tunnels divert water around the work site.

10

11 **Dam Instrumentation**

12 This instrumentation monitors the dam design criteria. Examples of dam instrumentation 13 include piezometers, inclinometers, survey monuments and anemometers. This condition 14 monitoring instrumentation is used to measure movement of the dam structure and water 15 content in the dam.

16

17 Public Safety around Dams Control Measures

Public safety risks are determined by completing risk assessment in accordance with Canadian Dam Association (CDA) guidelines for Public Safety around Dams. Control measures are then implemented to reduce the risk to the public. These measures include such items as signage, fencing, audible or visual alarms, booms, buoys, operational changes and public education.

22

23 Site Buildings and Services

24 Water Distribution System

25 A water distribution system is a system for the collection, transmission, treatment, storage and

26 distribution of water from source to site locations.

1	Piping
2	The network of pipes required to deliver the site water to the site facilities.
3	
4	Pumps
5	The driver of the water from the source is by pumps.
6	
7	Storage Tanks
8	Storage tanks hold water to provide a consistent water pressure at site facilities and a volume
9	of water that can be used for firefighting.
10	
11	Filters
12	To remove sediment and fine particles from the water filtration systems are used.
13	
14	Fuel Storage and Distribution System
15	Fuel Storage and Distribution System are site specific systems to have fuel and distribution
16	methods on site.
17	
18	Diesel Fuel Tank
19	Tanks that house diesel fuel only.
20	
21	Gasoline Fuel Tank
22	Tanks that house gasoline fuel only.
23	
24	Jet Fuel Tank
25	Tanks that house jet fuel only.
26	
27	Fuel Dispenser and Pumps
28	Apparatus used to dispense and meter the fuel.
1	Powerhouse Building
----	---
2	Buildings used to house hydraulic generating units and the auxiliary mechanical and electrical
3	equipment required for the generation of electricity.
4	
5	Vertical Lift Equipment Doors
6	Vertical Lift Doors are large doors that allow access to the powerhouse building for large
7	material and equipment. The doors are operated manually or electrically by a counter weight
8	arrangement.
9	
10	Roof
11	The roof is the structure forming the upper covering of a powerhouse building.
12	
13	Substructure
14	The substructure is the underlying concrete support of the powerhouse.
15	
16	Superstructure
17	The superstructure is the building that is placed upon the substructure. This includes the
18	concrete and steel that make up the walls of the building.
19	
20	Service Buildings
21	Service buildings are any other building on-site that supports Hydro's generation of electricity.
22	This includes warehouses, maintenance buildings, training facilities, site accommodations, and
23	security facilities.
24	
25	Substructure
26	The substructure is the underlying concrete support of the service building.
27	
28	Superstructure
29	The superstructure is the building that is placed upon the substructure.

1 Septic System

- 2 A septic system stores and distributes sewage. This includes a septic tank, septic field and all
- 3 associated distribution piping.
- 4

5 Garage Doors

6 A garage door is a large door on a service building that opens either manually or by an electric

7 motor. These are typically overhead doors similar to automotive garages or residential attached8 garages.

9

10 Exhaust Systems (Welding)

- 11 Wielding exhaust systems are ventilation systems in maintenance buildings that specifically
- 12 circulate fresh air using ducts and fans in the area to ensure worker safety.
- 13

14 Ventilation Systems

- 15 Ventilation systems circulate fresh air using ducts and fans.
- 16

17 Security Systems

- 18 A security system detects and issues an alarm due to an intrusion or unauthorized entry.
- 19 Security systems are also used to prevent unauthorized access to Hydro facilities.

20

21 Helicopter Pad (Helipad)

A helipad is a landing area or platform for helicopters and powered lift aircraft. While helicopters and powered lift aircraft are able to operate on a variety of relatively flat surfaces, a fabricated helipad provides a clearly marked hard surface away from obstacles where such aircraft can land safely.

26

27 Site Fencing and Gate Controls

All sites have fencing and or gates with control to maintain site security and public safety.

1	Parking Lots and Stairways
2	The parking lots and stairways are areas for staff, contractors and the general public to park
3	vehicles for safe access to Hydro's facilities.
4	
5	Site and Access Roads
6	Site and Access Roads are used to allow access to specific locations, such as generating stations,
7	terminal station, hydroelectric dam, and all Hydro locations.
8	
9	Drainage
10	Drainage is the sloping of land to divert water away from a specific area.
11	
12	Culverts
13	Culverts allow the passage of water through/under a road.
14	
15	Bridge
16	Bridges are structures used to span sections of site roads over a stream, river, valley, canal, or
17	any obstacle preventing access to the site location.
18	
19	Common Auxiliary Equipment
20	Station Service
21	A station service switchboard is an electrical panel used to supply low voltage power to the
22	critical and auxiliary electrical equipment necessary for the operation of the generating units.
23	The protective devices included within the station service switchboards are required to monitor
24	the flow of electricity and to interrupt this flow, in a selective and timely manner, in the event
25	of an electrical fault.

1 Station Service Transformers

Station Service Transformers convert electricity from higher voltages to voltages used in the
ancillary AC/DC Electrical system.

4

5 Circuit Breakers

6 Circuit breakers perform switching actions to complete, maintain, and interrupt current flow
7 under normal or fault conditions. The reliable operation of circuit breakers is essential for the
8 protection of the critical and auxiliary equipment supplied by the station service switchboard.

9

10 Disconnects and Switches

Disconnects and switches are used to electrically isolate equipment for maintenance activities or troubleshooting. Proper operation of these switches is essential for the establishment of a safe work environment and for reliable and secure system operation. Faulty and/or malfunctioning disconnects or switches that do not operate properly create a safety hazard.

15

16 Grounding Transformers

Grounding transformers are used to provide a ground path for the station service systems. This ground path ensures that the system's neutral is at or near ground potential. The establishment of a suitable ground enables safe operation of a grounded electrical system, and allows protective devices (like relays or low voltage circuit breakers) to detect and isolate line-toground faults.

22

23 Instrumentation Transformers

Instrument transformers are used to provide inputs to protection, control and metering
equipment required for protection of the electrical equipment supplied from the station service
system.

1 Surge Arrestors

- 2 Surge arresters provide overvoltage protection of electrical equipment from lightning and
- 3 switching surges.
- 4

5 Power Cables and Junction Boxes

- 6 Cables to connect station service to switchgear and electrical panels and ancillary equipment.
- 7 Junction boxes are also located along cable paths where it is practical to terminate cables from
- 8 various sources.
- 9

10 Ancillary AC/DC electrical system

11 Switchgear and Panels

- 12 Switchgear and Panels are devices which are used to distribute electricity to cables. This
- 13 equipment protects the cables and equipment from overload and short circuits.
- 14

15 **Power Cables and Junction Boxes**

- 16 Distributes electricity to equipment
- 17

18 Battery Banks and Chargers

- 19 Provides DC electricity for DC powered equipment.
- 20

21 Diesel Standby Generator

A diesel generator is the combination of a diesel engine with an electric to generate electrical energy. Prime-power diesels provide power to sites that are not connected to an interconnected distribution system. Emergency diesels are on stand-by at various locations within Hydro's system to ensure system reliability.

26

27 Engine

28 This is the diesel engine used to drive the genset.

1 Generator

- 2 The generator converts mechanical energy from the engine to electricity.
- 3

4 Enclosure

- 5 Some diesels are located outside and require an enclosure to house the unit away from the
- 6 weather.
- 7
- 8 Cranes
- 9 Cranes are machines used for moving heavy objects, typically by suspending them from a
- 10 projecting arm or beam.

11

12 Overhead

- 13 An overhead crane consists of parallel runways with a traveling bridge spanning the gap. A
- 14 hoist, the lifting component of a crane, travels along the bridge.
- 15

16 Monorail

- 17 A traveling crane suspended from a single rail.
- 18

19 Gantry

- 20 Gantry cranes are a type of crane built atop a gantry, which is a structure used to straddle an
- 21 object or workspace
- 22

23 Wire Rope

24 Wire rope is a length of rope made from wires twisted together as strands.

25

26 Fire Protection and Detection System

- 27 A fire alarm system has a number of devices working together to detect and warn people
- 28 through visual and audio devices when smoke, fire, carbon monoxide or other emergencies are
- 29 present.

1 Transformer Deluge System

A transformer deluge fire sprinkler system is an automated water spray system where the water distribution piping is equipped with open spray nozzles for discharging over a transformer. Deluge systems are connected to a water supply through a deluge valve that is opened by the operation of a smoke or heat detection system.

6

7 Fire Panels

A Fire Alarm Control Panel, or Fire Alarm Control Unit, is the controlling component of a FireAlarm System.

10

11 Generator Deluge System

12 A generator deluge fire sprinkler system is an automated water spray system where the water

13 distribution piping is equipped with open spray nozzles for discharging within the generator.

14 Deluge systems are connected to a water supply through a deluge valve that is opened by the

15 operation of a smoke or heat detection system.

16

17 Inergen System

18 Inergen agent is a mixture of three naturally occurring gases: nitrogen, argon, and carbon 19 dioxide. This system releases the Inergen agent when the system is activated and floods the 20 contained room with the agent to extinguish the fire by decreasing the oxygen concentration 21 below levels required to sustain combustion.

22

23 Office Sprinkler System

24 An office space sprinkler system is a system for protecting a building against fire by means of

25 overhead pipes which convey water to heat-activated outlets.

1 **Passive Fire Protection**

Passive fire protection is an integral component of the three components of structural fire
protection and fire safety in a building. This protection is used to contain fires or slow the
spread of fires.

5

6 **Powerhouse Public Address System**

A public address system is an electronic sound amplification and distribution system with a
microphone, amplifier and loudspeakers, used to allow a communication within a loud
powerhouse.

10

11 Compressed Air System

- 12 Compressed air is air kept under a pressure that is greater than atmospheric pressure.
- 13

14 Air Receiver Tank

15 This is the tank for where the pressurized air is stored until it is required.

16

17 Air Dryer

An air dryer is used for removing water vapor from compressed air. The process of air compression concentrates atmospheric contaminants, including water vapor. This raises the dew point of the compressed air relative to free atmospheric air and leads to condensation within pipes as the compressed air cools downstream of the compressor.

22

Excessive water in compressed air, in either the liquid or vapor phase, can cause a variety of operational problems for equipment using the compressed air. These include freezing of outdoor air lines, corrosion in piping and equipment, malfunctioning of pneumatic process control instruments, fouling of processes and products, and more.

27

28 Compressors

A machine used to supply air at increased pressure.

1	Service/Cooling Water System
2	Service or Cooling water is the water removing heat from a machine or system.
3	
4	Pumps
5	Cooling water pumps distribute the water from the source to the system.
6	
7	Basket Strainers
8	Cooling water is sourced from the tailrace or other unfiltered sources and the basket strainer is
9	a closed vessel with cleanable screen element designed to remove and retain foreign particles
10	down to 0.001 inch diameter from various flowing fluids
11	
12	Piping, valves, and controls
13	The piping, valves and controls are required components of the cooling water system.
14	
15	Domestic Water System
16	Domestic water use is water used for indoor and outdoor site purposes such as washrooms,
17	and kitchens.
18	
19	Drainage/Unwatering System
20	This system handles the removal of water from the hydraulic generating unit draft tube for
21	maintenance.
22	
23	Sump Pumps
24	The pumping system required to remove the water.
25	
26	Water Level System
27	Water level or gauge height or stage is the elevation water in a reservoir.

1 Air Conditioners

Air conditioners control the temperature in many locations for personnel and equipment. The
units also provide humidity control in rooms with sensitive electrical equipment like
communication rooms.

5

6 Ventilation System

- 7 Ventilation systems circulate fresh air using ducts and fans.
- 8

9 PCB Waste Oil and Waste Oil Tanks

10 These are specifically marked oil tanks that only contain waste oil. Once the tanks are full, a

11 waste disposal company comes to site to empty the tank. PCB waste oil has to be disposed of

- 12 properly outside of the province, thus the reason for two types of waste oil storage.
- 13

14 Lube Oil Storage

Lubrication oil storage includes laydown areas for the 200 litre drums that are located at most generating stations, carrying devices for these drums, and smaller storage containers that are used for top-ups when required. The proper storage for lube oil is important to equipment health because a proper container will limit any air borne particulates or any moisture from contaminating the oil.

Appendix B

Operational Hour and Time Based Activity Background

Time Based Activities

- 1 Time based maintenance is maintenance performed on equipment based on a calendar
- 2 schedule that is planned in advance. Hydro's Time Based PM includes:
- Daily operational checks running maintenance;
- 4 PM 1: Weekly Checks;
- PM 2: Bi-Weekly Checks;
- 6 PM 3: Monthly Checks;
- 7 PM 4: Quarterly Checks;
- 8 120 Day Transformer Inspection;
- 9 PM 5: Semi-Annual Checks;
- 10 PM 6: Yearly Checks;
- PM 8: 3 Year Checks; and
- PM 9: 6 Year Checks.
- 13 Note: All the PM checks except for the PM 9 are operating expenditures.
- 14

15 **Operational Hour Activities**

- 16 Operational Hour Preventive Maintenance is performed based on the actual usage time of the 17 piece of equipment. This applies to auxiliary equipment such as compressors that have 18 operational time checks at:
- 19 500 Hour PM;
- 1,000 Hour PM; and
- 2,000 Hour PM.
- 22 Note: All the time based PMs are operating expenditures.
- 23

For each Time Based and Operational Hour activity listed specific check sheets has been developed for each asset classification, such as mechanical, electrical, and Protection and Control. On each check sheet, there are specific checks and duties that have to be completed. If abnormalities (e.g. unexpected wear on a runner) are found, a report is made to the Long-Term

- 1 Asset Planning group for condition assessment and, if required, determination of the corrective
- 2 action and timing. This work may or may not require capital expenditures.

Appendix C

Overhaul Timing Background

1 Major Equipment and Structural Overhauls

2 Major Equipment and Structural Overhauls are required on assets to ensure safe reliable3 operation.

4

5 For Major Equipment and Structural Overhauls the timing is nominally between 6 and 25 year

6 frequency. Some examples are:

- Generating Unit Major Overhauls, approximately every 6 years;
- 8 Generating Unit Turbine Refurbishments, approximately every 15 25 years;
- 9 Control Structure Major Overhauls, approximately every 10 years; and
- Intakes, Spillways, and Bypasses Major Overhauls, approximately every 15 years.
- 11

To determine the timing and the tasks in each overhaul, information such as the following isreviewed:

- 14 **1. Timing**15 Is the unit overhaul required at this time (based on equipment condition)?
 16 Is there sufficient generation is available on the electrical system to
 - Is there sufficient generation is available on the electrical system to allow the
 outage? and

Will any spilling of reservoir water occur during the time the outage is required?

- 18
- 19
- 20 **2. Condition**

٠

21 There are two types of assessments that Long Term Asset Planners use to determine 22 the condition of an asset, Class 1 or Class 2 assessments.

- Class 1 Assessments: These assessments are completed using information from
 condition monitoring or during maintenance procedures.
- Class 2 Assessments: These assessments are completed using information from detailed, extensive asset inspection or testing. The information is obtained through overhauls conducted and investigations completed by people with specialized expertise. The activities required can involve advanced testing and or disassembly of equipment to perform an inspection and testing.

1	3.	Asset Criticality
2		Asset management personnel have ranked hydraulic generation assets criticality. This
3		ranking is used in determining the priority of work in a given year.
4		
5	4.	Frequency of Operation
6		An asset that is used more frequently will require more maintenance, both preventive
7		and corrective, therefore a unit that is used more will have overhauls scheduled more
8		frequently.
9		
10	5.	Safety
11		Projects that have safety justifications are given high priority.
12		
13	6.	Reliability
14		Overhauls can be performed earlier for the units that exhibit poor reliability.
15		
16	7.	Geographical Location
17		The maintenance centre for Hydro Generation is located in Bay d'Espoir. When work is
18		required at stations or structures outside the Bay d'Espoir area plans are developed to
19		pool many activities together to increase efficiency.

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2. Overhaul Unit 3 Turbine Valve – Holyrood

WOLSTON T	Electrical	

Electrical
Mechanical
Civil
Protection & Control
Transmission & Distribution
Telecontrol
System Planning

Overhaul Unit 3 Turbine Valves

Holyrood

July 2018



1 Summary

2 This project is for the scheduled overhaul of Generating Unit 3 Turbine Valves at the

Holyrood Thermal Generating Station (Holyrood). The generating units at Holyrood experience
numerous system faults and swings in load during system events, which increases the forces
and load induced upon the turbine control valve. Completing scheduled overhauls at the
correct times are required to ensure reliable operation.

7

8 The report illustrates the primary reasons why the turbine valves are overhauled on a three 9 year schedule. It also emphasizes consultant reviews of the system and their recommendations 10 and findings. Important factors that support the conclusions made by this report include, but 11 are not limited to, age of equipment, major work and/or upgrades, anticipated useful life, 12 maintenance history, and historical information. 13

14 The estimated project cost is approximately \$3,290,500 with planned completion in 2019.

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1	1 Int	troduction			
2	Hydro	's Holyrood Thermal Generating Station (Holyrood) is a critical part of the Island			
3	Interconnected System (IIS). The three oil-fired generating units provide an installed capacity of				
4	490 M	W. As part of the generation process, numerous valves in the system control different			
5	functio	ons such as controlling the main steam flow into the high compression stage of the			
6	turbin	e and releasing steam from the turbine in the event of a unit trip. All of the valves are			
7	requir	ed to operate reliably during steam production and are overhauled on a standard three-			
8	year cy	ycle.			
9					
10	2 Pr	oject Description			
11	This pr	oject is required to complete a scheduled turbine valves overhaul for Unit 3 at Holyrood.			
12					
13	This m	ajor overhaul consists of disassembly, inspection and reassembly of the following:			
14	•	Two main stop valves;			
15	•	Two combined reheat stop/intercept valves;			
16	•	Four control valves; and			
17	•	Auxiliary valves (blowdown valve and non-return valves).			
18					
19	The va	lves will be refurbished as required through replacement of damaged parts.			
20					
21	The wo	ork required for this project can be classified into three categories:			
22	1.	Routine standard work defined by the equipment manufacturer;			
23	2.	Defined work, which is extra to the standard work and identified prior to the overhaul;			
24		and			
25	3.	Unforeseen work, which may result from examination of the equipment during the			
26		internal inspection.			
27					
28	The so	chedule to complete the standard and defined work is within the specified overhaul			
29	period	. Action by the contractor on unforeseen work is determined in consultation with Hydro			

staff. The valve overhaul will take approximately 12 weeks to complete, and any unforeseen
 work, particularly if components need to be sent off site for refurbishment, could alter the
 schedule and have an impact on the overall cost.

4

5 3 Justification

This project is justified on the requirement to maintain the generating equipment in its optimal
operating condition. It will also identify any unusual findings (internally or externally) that, if not
corrected or controlled, could lead to premature failure of the equipment.

9

10 Since the installation of Unit 3 in 1979, valves overhauls of the turbine and auxiliaries have been performed on a scheduled basis that reflected industry standards. The turbine valves 11 12 manufacturer recommended that a three-year cycle should be maintained for turbine valve 13 overhauls to minimize unplanned corrective maintenance. In January 2010, AMEC Americas 14 Limited (AMEC) was contracted by Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro to conduct a Phase 1 15 Condition Assessment and Life Extension Study of the Holyrood Generating facility. The study 16 agreed with the three-year cycle for turbine valve overhauls. Hydro has maintained this cycle 17 since the generating units were put into service. Also, the Holyrood Turbine Service Provider, GE, provided engineering recommendations to complete the scheduled turbine valve overhaul 18 19 to avoid the risk of turbine overspeed and forced outages.

20

21 The Unit 3 turbine valves were last overhauled in 2016 and will be due for an overhaul in 2019.

22

23 3.1 Existing System

The three major components of the thermal generating units are the power boiler, turbine, and generator. Through combustion of No. 6 fuel oil, the power boiler provides high energy steam to the turbine. The turbine is directly coupled to the generator and provides the rotating energy necessary for the generator to produce rated output power. The Unit 3 turbine was manufactured by Hitachi in 1978. The turbine was supplied with major
 turbine valves including control valves, stop valves, intercept valves, a blowdown valve, and
 extraction steam non-return valves.

4

5 The control valves control the flow of steam to the turbine to rotate the generator rotor for 6 electricity production. These valves open and close to vary the flow rate of the steam, thus 7 varying the production of electrical energy. These valves also perform the vital function of 8 protecting the turbine from overspeed failure during emergency shut down. The stop, 9 intercept, and blowdown valves protect the turbine from overspeed failures in emergency 10 conditions. The extraction non-return valves allow steam to flow from the turbine to the feedwater heaters to preheat the boiler feedwater for thermal efficiency gains. These valves 11 12 are designed to slam shut during emergencies such as sudden loss of load to protect the 13 turbine from water induction and overspeed failure.

14

15 **3.2 Operating Experience**

16 Turbine valves have operated reliably and safely, with no forced outages, under the current17 maintenance practices since the 2016 overhaul.

18

19 3.2.1 Historical Information

Since the commissioning of Unit 3 in 1979, turbine valve overhauls have been performed on a
 three-year frequency that matches industry standards. Table 1 details the costs incurred for the
 last three overhauls.

Year	Unit	Type of Overhaul	Costs
2016	3	Major ¹	5,869
2013	3	Valves	1,003 ²
2010	3	Valves	909 ²

Table 1: Unit 2 Overhaul Maintenance H	listory (\$000s)
--	------------------

¹ A major overhaul also includes a Valves Overhaul.

² It should be noted that the costs in 2010 and 2013 were Operating Budgets. Also, in 2013 the work was done in parallel with the Unit 1 turbine rebuild and as such there were shared overhead costs.

1 4 Conclusion

The purpose of the Unit 3 turbine valve overhaul is to restore their capabilities to ensure that
the valves perform safely, efficiently, and reliably until the next overhaul. This project will
contribute to ensuring the reliable operation of Holyrood Unit 3 generating unit.

5

6 4.1 Project Estimate

7 The estimate for this project is shown in Table 2.

Project Cost	2019	2020	Beyond	Total
Material Supply	30.0	0.0	0.0	30.0
Labour	386.3	0.0	0.0	386.3
Consultant	24.0	0.0	0.0	24.0
Contract Work	2,156.3	0.0	0.0	2,156.3
Other Direct Costs	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.4
Interest and Escalation	174.2	0.0	0.0	174.2
Contingency	519.3	0.0	0.0	519.3
Total	3,290.5	0.0	0.0	3,290.5

Table 2: Project Estimate (\$000s)

8 4.2 Project Schedule

9 The anticipated project schedule is provided in Table 3.

Table 3: Project Schedule

Activity		Start Date	End Date
Planning	Open Project, prepare work breakdown structure	Jan 2019	Jan 2019
	and scope statement		
Procurement	Order parts	Jan 2019	Feb 2019
Construction	Perform pre-shutdown checks and isolations	Jun 2019	Jun 2019
	Remove, dismantle and inspect valves	Jul 2019	Jul 2019
	Overhaul and re-assemble valves	Jul 2019	Aug 2018
Commissioning	Perform operational checks	Sep 2019	Sep 2019
Closeout	Prepare closeout documentation	Sep 2019	Dec 2019

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Mechanical	
Civil	
Protection & Control	
Transmission & Distribution	
Telecontrol	
System Planning	

Condition Assessment and Miscellaneous Upgrades Holyrood

July 2018



1 Summary

The project is the last year of a three-year program at Holyrood Thermal Generating Station (Holyrood) that was started in 2017 and proposed for completion in 2019. It includes a Level 2 condition assessment related to internal components of the main steam generators (boilers) and also associated external high energy piping. In addition to the condition assessment work, various refurbishments and replacements will take place related to several pieces of equipment and other infrastructure.

8

9 Holyrood has exceeded the normal life expectancy for thermal generating stations. In order to 10 maintain reliable operation of the station, this project proposal is to execute a detailed 11 investigation to determine the appropriate timing of refurbishment and replacement work, 12 correct deficiencies identified during plant operation, and complete work on assets that are 13 required on a regular basis.

14

15 The estimated project cost is approximately \$1,968,800 with the majority of the inspection and

16 testing work to be performed during the planned outage for each generating unit in 2019.

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Appendices

Appendix A Holyrood Level II Condition Assessment - 2017

1 1 Introduction

2 This project is the last year of a three-year program, outlined in the 2017 Capital Budget 3 Application, for the Holyrood Thermal Generating Station (Holyrood) that was started in 2017 4 and will continue to 2019. The 2017 project was approved by the Board under Board Order No. P.U. 45(2016) and the 2018 project was approved by the Board under Board Order No. P.U. 5 6 43(2017). The scope for the 2019 project includes a Level 2 condition assessment related to 7 internal components of the main steam generators (boilers) and associated external high 8 energy piping. Additionally, Hydro is proposing to complete various upgrades and 9 replacements, as outlined in the following sections.

10

11 2 Project Description

12 The project includes a Level 2 condition assessment on internal components of the main steam 13 generators (boilers) and associated external high energy piping to detail refurbishment or 14 replacement work to be completed in succeeding years. Additionally, the following 15 miscellaneous upgrades will be completed:

- Replacement of boiler expansion joints and boiler refractories.
- 17 Upgrade of site security.

18 • Replace back-up control center building air conditioning system.

19

Other miscellaneous upgrades or replacements identified in the 2017 to 2019 condition assessments or recommended by the boiler contractor during unit overhauls that are confirmed as capital and are required to ensure reliable operation of Holyrood will be completed within the approved budget for this project and reported in the Hydro's 2019 Capital Expenditures and Carryover Report.

25

26 **3 Justification**

Holyrood has exceeded the normal life expectancy for thermal generating stations. Units 1 and2 at Holyrood are 48 years old and Unit 3 is 38 years old. Considering the age, there is

infrastructure and equipment that need to undergo a Level 2 condition assessment,
 refurbishment, or replacement to maintain reliable operation of Holyrood.

3

4 **3.1** Existing System

Each generating unit at Holyrood has an oil-fired boiler. Each boiler generates steam with high
flow rate at high pressure. The steam is transferred from each boiler through high energy piping
and passes through a steam turbine. The steam spins the turbine that drives a generator to
produce electricity.

9

After the Muskrat Falls development is brought into service, Holyrood assets can be separatedinto two classes:

- 12 1. Assets that will remain in service for a standby generation period and will be shut down
- 13 at the end of this period as electricity generation will be no longer required at Holyrood.
- 14 These assets such as boilers and auxiliary systems will require condition assessments to 15 ensure short term reliability; and
- Assets that will be required to remain reliable for more than 20 years to support
 synchronous condenser operation. Some assets such as the waste water treatment
 plant and basins require condition assessments to ensure long term reliability.
- 19

20 3.2 Operating Experience

21 The existing main steam generators (boilers) and associated high energy piping (main steam 22 piping, hot reheat piping, cold reheat piping and high pressure feed water piping) are subjected 23 to high temperatures, corrosion and erosion deterioration mechanisms. For this reason, 24 continued Level 2 condition assessments are required to ensure reliable operation, and these 25 components have been a focus of the condition assessment projects since 2012. Through 26 previous condition assessments, issues were identified with piping wall thinning, thermal 27 cracking of boiler internal headers, and weld deficiencies. The consequence of operating with 28 these issues would result in operating the equipment at less than the design criteria with 29 increased likelihood of failure.
As deficiencies are discovered, upgrades ensure safe and reliable operation. Recommended interventions from previous condition assessments are included in the scope of subsequent projects. For example, the 2018 condition assessment project currently being executed was guided by the results of the 2017 project. Background assessment information and recommendations from the 2017 project are provided in Appendix A. The 2019 project scope will be guided by the results of the 2018 work completed this year.

7

8 Level 2 condition assessments are required to identify required work and to allow for planned9 interventions to avoid failures and unplanned outages.

10

The Holyrood gated site covers approximately 286,000 square meters. The current security system was installed in 2007-2008. Since then, there have been changes to the site and operations, including the addition of the Gas Turbine in 2015-2016. Currently, many occupied zones are not monitored via security cameras due to outdated and non-functioning cameras. For example, the contractor parking lot, main parking lot, marine terminal, and site access gates are unmonitored. The current security system is outdated, often malfunctions, and is no longer reliable.

18

19 The Backup Control Center (BCC) must be readily available and properly maintained to ensure 20 its capability. The BCC contains essential operating equipment that can control Hydro's 21 generating systems in the event that the Energy Control Center (ECC), located at Hydro Place, 22 becomes inoperable. The BCC building, constructed in 2006, has an air conditioning unit in the 23 control room installed at the time of construction. The existing air conditioning unit is at the 24 end of its useful service life. For safe and reliable operation of the BCC equipment, proper 25 cooling is required to avoid overheating. In addition, the existing air conditioning unit is not 26 linked to the BCC emergency generator. If power is lost to the BCC building, the emergency 27 generator will automatically start providing power to the BCC computer equipment but not the 28 cooling system. Without having the cooling system linked to the emergency generator, the 29 control room equipment is at risk of overheating during a power outage.

1	3.2.1 Historical Information
2	Hydro is presently working on the activities outlined in the 2018 project of this program.
3	
4	3.2.2 Anticipated Useful Life
5	It is anticipated that Holyrood will continue reliable operation as a thermal generating station
6	until the Muskrat Falls development is brought into service and thereafter as a Synchronous
7	Condenser station.
8	
9	4 Conclusion
10	Holyrood has exceeded the normal life expectancy for thermal generating stations.
11	
12	This project is the last year of a three year program that was started in 2017 and proposed for
13	completion in 2019. It includes a condition assessment and various sustaining refurbishments
14	and replacements related to several major pieces of equipment and infrastructure.
15	
16	This program is required to ensure a reliable operation for Holyrood as a power generating
17	station until the Muskrat Falls development is brought into service.
18	
19	4.1 Project Estimate
20	The estimate for this project is shown in Table 1.

Project Cost	2019	2020	Beyond	Total
Material Supply	150.2	0.0	0.0	150.2
Labour	127.9	0.0	0.0	127.9
Consultant	384.0	0.0	0.0	384.0
Contract Work	883.0	0.0	0.0	883.0
Other Direct Costs	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Interest and Escalation	114.7	0.0	0.0	114.7
Contingency	309.0	0.0	0.0	309.0
Total	1,968.8	0.0	0.0	1,968.8

Table 1: Project Estimate (\$000s)

1 **4.2 Project Schedule**

2 The anticipated project schedule is provided in Table 2.

Table 2: Project Schedule

Activity	Start Date
Initiation	Feb 2019
Condition Assessment Contract	Mar 2019
Inspection Contracts	Apr 2019
Site Investigations and Inspections	Apr-Oct 2019
Replacement and Refurbishment	Jun-Jul 2019
Condition Assessment Report	Nov 2019
Close Out	Dec 2019

Appendix A

Holyrood Level II Condition Assessment - 2017

Amec Foster Wheeler 4th Floor, 393 University Avenue Toronto, Ontario, Canada. M5G 1E6 Tel: (416) 592-7000 Fax: (416) 592-8284 www.amecfw.com



December 20, 2017

Jamie Curtis Project and Quality Assurance Engineer Holyrood Thermal Generating Station Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro

Re: Holyrood Thermal Generating Station Level II Condition Assessment 2017 NDE Inspections

Dear Mr. Curtis,

Amec Foster Wheeler prepared a Level II condition assessment for Holyrood Thermal Generating Station (HTGS), based on the results of the Level I assessment [1]. The Level II focused on major boiler components and high-energy piping, including pipe support systems. Since then, follow-up inspections have been conducted based on the recommendations provided in the condition assessments [2][3][4][5].

The scope of the 2017 inspections was:

- 1. Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC)
 - a. Unit 2 Economizer Inlet Header Piping,
 - b. Unit 2 Boiler Feed Pump Piping at Flow Element (FE) 554,
 - c. Unit 2 Repaired area on Bend 4 upstream of the No. 6 High Pressure Feedwater (HPFW) Heater,
 - d. Unit 3 Repaired Area above the No. 6 HPFW Heater.
 - e. Unit 3 Emergency Reheat Attemperator Refill Line Piping at FE 3595,
- 2. NDE Data collection
 - a. Unit 1 Phased Array Ultrasonic Testing (PAUT) of lower vestibule feeder tubes
 - b. Unit 1 and Unit 2 Boroscope inspection of economizer inlet headers
 - c. Unit 3 Replica and UT inspections of the main steam turbine terminal

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3. Unit 3 Boiler Tube Inspections

The findings from these 2017 activities are summarised in the attached table. The FAC Analysis Report is attached as an Appendix to this summary letter. The NDE reports are provided in the 2017 reference Binder [6].

FAC Inspection Results

FAC inspections were recommended based on previous findings with low re-inspection intervals and areas showing degradation in similar locations in other units. All the recommended locations were inspected. The FAC analysis report is included as an attachment to this letter. The previously repaired areas were found to be in good condition for continued operation. The Unit 3 Emergency Reheat Attemperator Refill Line Piping at FE 3595 was replaced [7]. There was no FAC assessment at this location.

Two locations on Unit 2 had measurements below the ASME calculated pressure-based minimum wall thickness [8]: Piping to the Economizer inlet header and FE 554. A temporary weld buildup was applied to FE554 and replacement was planned for September 2017 [9].

The economizer inlet header piping thinned area was too large to apply a National Board Inspection Code compliant weld repair. Instead this location was dispositioned through analysis. Replacement was planned for September 2017 and analysis using the guidance in EPRI NP-59911-SP [10] and the ASME B31.1 standard was applied to allow operation until replacement [11]. Both locations were replaced in the fall 2017 Unit 2 outage.

As part of an effort to disposition the low FAC inspection findings, re-rating of the feedwater piping in the Holyrood units was considered. The FAC inspection results and piping replacements demonstrate that the burden for remediation and analysis will increase with advancing plant age. In particular, areas adjacent to welds, where the machined counter-bore contributes to the reduced margin on wall thickness, will necessitate repairs on otherwise acceptable pipe segments. In an attempt to address this concern, an investigation into the necessary steps to reduce the registered design pressure was undertaken [12], however the effort for re-rating was significant and therefore this option was not pursued. It is recognized that the expectation is for an increasing number of piping replacements on the feedwater system in future outages.

Boiler Tube Inspection Deferral

Boiler tubes in Holyrood TGS experience fireside corrosion and erosion. Reliable operation to 2021 was concluded in a previous assessment with the exception of Unit 3. Specific sections of Unit 3 had lower margins on minimum acceptance criteria and were recommended for reinspection in 2017. Due to outage limitations only accessible areas were inspected. With the exception of one location, the wall thicknesses were above the minimum acceptable and showed minimal change. The one location on the south bend at the 9th floor Reheater tubes, found a significant wall thickness difference from the 2016 inspection. Weld repairs were applied. Deferral of the remainder of the inspections to 2018 was deemed acceptable but procurement of spare tubing and inspection of locations near furnace wall lugs were recommended [13].

Other NDE Inspections

PAUT was completed on bends in the lower vestibule feeder pipes on Unit 1 to determine if there was evidence of corrosion fatigue cracking on the feeder ID on the bends. The

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inspections would follow-up on work performed in 2013 to support the conclusion that cracking in the lower feeder pipes was not an active mechanism [5]. The 2017 PAUT inspection did not find any indications of cracking in the feeder pipes. Internal pitting was noted in one location (minimum wall thickness of 0.325"). Similar indications of pitting were observed in previous inspections [3] but were found to be inactive. The wall loss is not considered an operability concern.

Internal video inspection of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 economizer inlet headers was planned but only the Unit 1 inspection could be completed. The inspection report did not note any concerning indications, e.g. extension of the existing thermal fatigue cracking. The report did mention that the colour of the scale appeared to have changed. Images from the inspection video also show small dark spots. These do not appear to be an integrity concern but other changes to the internal scale should be noted in the next scheduled inspection in 3 years.

A Replica and PAUT inspection of the Unit 3 main steam piping at the West Upper turbine terminal point weld was performed in accordance with the recommended 3-year cycle. Although the wall thickness measured was slightly lower than previously reported [4] this does not pose an integrity concern. The volumetric inspection, the replication and magnetic particle inspection found no indications of creep damage. It was also found that the wall thicknesses on both side of the weld were above the pressure based minimum requirements identified in Appendix C of the 2014 report [4]. Despite these findings monitoring on a 3-year cycle should continue as a lead indicator of end of creep life.

Conclusion

The HTGS piping is in good condition considering its age. FAC requires continued monitoring. Weld repairs and replacements were required to maintain compliance with the power piping code at the system design pressure. More repairs and replacements should be expected as the margin to minimum wall thickness is further reduced during operation. Piping sections that have been replaced are expected to be fit for service to end of life with no further inspection required. Inspections should continue at their recommended frequency in order to ensure reliable operation.

The current assessments consider operation to an end of life of 2021.

Inspection Recommendations

Based on a review of the 2017 inspection results and previous condition assessments the following inspections should be carried out in 2018.

- 1. Unit 1 Inspection of Steam Drum Downcomer Penetration.
- Unit 3 Economizer Inlet Header internal visual inspection to monitor ligament cracking. PAUT Inspection to characterise and size the ligament cracks should be reconsidered, though the difficulties in inspecting ligaments have been previously noted.
- 3. Unit 3 Boiler Tube Inspection (deferred from 2017 scope and additional):
 - a. High temperature superheater, 8.5th floor, overhead, tube (nested tubes adjacent to outlet header),
 - b. Reheater, 9th floor, overhead, tube (nested tubes adjacent to outlet header),
 - c. Reheater and Superheater tube bends at furnace wall lug connections.

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- 4. FAC Inspections where available previous year of inspection and location index provided.
 - a. Unit 3 Boiler Feed Pump Discharge Low Flow Line Connection to Main Run. Elbow and Pipe (2014, 3-4).
 - b. Unit 3 West Boiler Feed Pump Discharge. (Repaired 2015, 3-3).
 - c. Unit 3 High Pressure (HP) Heater No. 6 ByPass 1st Elbow D/S of Tee bypass branch (left bend). (2015, 3-1).
 - d. Unit 3 High Pressure (HP) Heater No. 6 ByPass last Bypass elbow (vertical to horizontal bend). (2015, 3-2).
 - e. Unit 3 Boiler Feed Pump Discharge Flow Element 3554.
 - f. Unit 1 West BFP discharge elbow and reducer (Repaired 2015, 1-3).

If operation beyond 2021 is anticipated it is recommended that a review of the Level II condition assessments and maintenance program be completed. A similar review is recommended if there is a significant change in operating patterns, e.g. to 2-shifting.

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REFERENCES

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- [2] A. Valsalan, Holyrood Thermal Generating Station 2016 NDE Inspections, Amec Foster Wheeler File No. BW018/002/000001 R00, February 17, 2017.
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- [4] T. Ogundimu, "2014 Level II Condition Assessment Boiler and Steam Piping, Flow Accelerated Corrosion, Units 1 and 3 Generators, Civil Structures," File No. AM160/RP/002 R01, December 5, 2014.
- [5] D. McNabb, "Holyrood Thermal Generating Station Condition Assessment and Life Extension Study –Phase 2, 2012/13 Level II Condition Assessment Boiler and High-Energy Piping," File No. AM132/RP/005 R03, November 13, 2013.
- [6] NDE Reference Binder, Amec Foster Wheeler File No. AM231/RE/004 R00, December 15, 2017.
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- [10] "Acceptance Criteria for Structural Evaluation of Erosion- Corrosion Thinning in Carbon Steel Piping", EPRI Technical Report NP-5911-SP, July 1988.
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- [12] D. McNabb, "Re: Analysis for Re-Rating the HP Feedwater Piping", E-mail Record AM231/RE/005, 15 June 2017.
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Appendix A

Table A1 Results and Recommendations from the 2017 NDE Inspections

Unit	Component/Location	Inspection	Findings	Recommendations
Jnit 1	Economiser Inlet Header	Internal Visual	Borehole cracking unchanged. Discolouration of internal surface noted.	No re-inspection required to end of life. Or re-inspect in 3 years.
Jnit 1	Lower Vestibule Feeder Tubes	Phased Array Ultrasonic Testing	No cracking found. Minor internal pitting noted	No re-inspection required to end of life.
Jnit 2	Feedwater - BFP Discharge: Economizer Inlet Header Piping	UT Grid for Flow Accelerated Corrosion	Measurements below minimum wall thickness found. Assessed for continued operation. Bend replaced in fall 2017.	No re-inspection required to end of life.
Jnit 2	Feedwater - BFP Discharge: Flow Element 554	UT Grid for Flow Accelerated Corrosion	Measurements below minimum wall thickness found. Pad weld applied. FE replaced in fall 2017.	No re-inspection required to end of life.
Jnit 2	Feedwater – Heater No.6 Bypass Piping	UT Grid for Flow Accelerated Corrosion	Re-inspection of 2016 pad weld. All locations were above minimum wall thickness. Adjacent pipe is limiting.	Re-inspection of bend in 2 years.
Jnit 3	Feedwater – Heater No.6 Discharge Piping	UT Grid for Flow Accelerated Corrosion	Re-inspection of 2014 pad weld. All locations were above minimum wall thickness. Adjacent pipe is limiting.	Re-inspection of bend in 4 years.
Jnit 3	Main Steam Turbine Terminal	Replica, PAUT, UT, Magnetic Particle	No indications of creep found. Microstructure shows high-temperature creep damage consistent with previous findings. Wall thickness noted to be slightly lower than previously report.	Continue recommended monitoring in 3 years.

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FLOW ACCELERATED CORF	ROSION ANALYSIS REPORT	
Client: Amec FW Newfoundland, Holyrood	Thermal Generating Station	amec foster wheeler
Unit:	Systems:	Date:
2, 3	Feedwater	December 20, 2017
Operating Years:		Amec Foster Wheeler File Number:
Total:	Unit 2 – 46 years Unit 3 – 38 years	AM231/003/000001 Attachment
Since Last Inspection:	1 year	1
Inspection Method:	Inspection Procedure/Technique:	Inspection Date:
Ultrasonic (U/T)		May-June
Pulse Eddy Current (Incotest)		
Radiography		
X-Ray Fluorescence (Material Testing)		
SCOPE (Locations and Component	Summary):	

Amec Foster Wheeler Nuclear Canada recommended follow-up inspections in 2017 based on previous Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) inspections. The recommendations considered the findings for previous years which were reaching the noted re-inspection time (half of the remaining wall thickness margin in most case) and similar locations that saw degradation in other units. All recommended locations were inspected. A correction was made to the 2017 FAC inspection report which reduced the inspection/repair scope. The remaining inspections were executed. The location numbers below are consistent with the 2016 numbering.

Unit 2

2-1: BFP Discharge - Piping to Economiser Inlet Header

- Double bend upstream of economizer inlet header
- (see drawing 238-10-6022-028 R4)

2-2: BFP Discharge Flow Element 554

- Piping upstream and downstream of flow element
- (see drawing 238-10-0210-024 R1)

2-3: BFP Discharge - No. 6 Heater Bypass (area repaired in 2016)

- First lower bend after tee connection from outlet of heater no. 5, straight section after tee connection, first bend, straight section, second bend, straight section upstream and downstream of valve, straight section, third bend
- (see drawing E-343-M-001 R19 and 238-10-6022-028 R4)

Unit 3

3-2: BFP Discharge - No. 6 Heater Discharge (area repaired in 2014)

- Downstream of FE3595, on straight pipe sections around valves TV3623B and ZS3623
- Immediately adjacent to the FE, upstream and downstream on straight pipe sections and on straight pipe sections of the connecting 1" lines
- Upstream of FE3595, on straight pipe sections between valves and reducers off BFP P1
- (see drawing E-343-M-001 R19)

Piping in the Reheat Attemperator Fill Line at FE 3595 was replaced. No FAC assessment was done.

RESULTS AND COMMENTS:

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This report is a follow up of the preliminary assessment and recommendations made during the 2017 outage, based on the NDE data received. All the locations inspected were either previous pad weld repairs or re-inspections of areas recommended for revisit due to low margin. Measurements were only taken in areas of interest and not around the entire pipe circumference. As such, the EPRI band method could not be applied. Where the minimum measured wall thickness remained above the ASME minimum, the wall loss rate from the last inspection was applied and a re-inspection interval determined. When the minimum wall thickness was below the ASME minimum, repair, replacement or disposition was completed.

Locations that had been marginally above the ASME minimum wall thickness the year before (2-1, 2-2), were found to be below in the 2017 inspection. A Weld repair was required for the FE 554 location (2-2) and replacement was executed in the fall of 2017. A disposition to demonstrate fitness for service was prepared for the economizer inlet piping (2-1) and the replacement was executed in Fall 2017.

Locations Below Code Minimum Wall:

- 2-1: BFP Discharge Piping to Economiser Inlet Header
- 2-2: BFP Discharge Flow Element 554

Results and Recommendations:

2-1: BFP Discharge - Piping to Economiser Inlet Header

A small area was recommended for re-inspection based on the 2016 inspection analysis. Wear rate analysis was performed using the UT data from a grid layout. Some locations were below the calculated pressure based minimum wall thickness. Analysis was performed to support operation until replacement of elbow could be executed in the Fall of 2017. Replacements was completed. No re-inspection for the remaining plant operating life is necessary.

2-2: BFP Discharge Flow Element 554

This location was recommended for re-inspection and repair based on the 2016 analysis results. Results from the 2017 inspection found grid points below the calculated pressure based minimum wall thickness. The 2016 analysis did not note any measurements below minimum wall thickness and this extent of wall loss is not expected to have occurred over only one operating year. The source of the discrepancy is not known though differences in the precise inspection location and the finer grid size used in the 2017 inspection likely contributed. A pad weld was applied while a replacement FE was fabricated to the original FE dimensions. The FE was replaced in the Fall of 2017. No re-inspection of this location is required for the remaining plant operating life.

2-3: BFP Discharge - No. 6 Heater Bypass (area repaired in 2016)

Weld repair was conducted in this area in 2016 to increase the wall thickness and to provide additional margin. The pad weld was re-inspected in 2017. Using the wear rate from the original wall thicknesses in 2016 analysis with the 2017 measurements, the reinspection interval for this location is 2 years.

3-2: BFP Discharge - No. 6 Heater Discharge (area repaired in 2014)

Weld repair was conducted in this area in 2014 to when a single low wall thickness measurement was noted. The pad weld was reinspected in 2017. The 2017 inspection area does not appear to be centred on the pad weld but provides measurements on a portion of both the pad weld and the adjacent pipe material. The pad welded area showed significant margin on the minimum wall thickness. Areas adjacent to the pad weld, with the original pipe material showed lower margin to minimum wall thickness. Using the wear rate from the original wall thicknesses in 2014 analysis with the 2017 measurements, the re-inspection interval for this location is 3.9 years.

References:

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Γ						- 0	0	1
	tion Status		Comments	Measured max and min wall thickness have been updated for 2011 inspection results. Calculated inspection results reference previous complete inspection (2016), Pipe was replaced Fall 2017.	Measured max and min wall thickness have been updated for 2011 inspection results. Cakulated inspection results reference previous complete inspection (2016), FE was replaced Fall 2017.	Re-inspection time updated with wall thickness of re- inspected area after 2016 pad weld. Max wear and wear rate reported here are the original 2016 date (pre-repair) of the pad welded area.	2014 pad weld re-inspected tr confirm margin. Max wear and wear rate are from the original 2014 inspection results, prior to the pad weld.	
Analysis	Inspec		Potential Signs of FAC	Significant	Moderate	Significant	Significant	
DE Data			Re- inspecti on time ⁵ (years)	NA	NA	2.2	3'8	
rrosion NI			Margin to Minimum Req'd Wall Thickness (Inch)	0.012	0.014	0.033	0.049	L L
erated Co	tesults	Calculated	Band Wear rate (Inch/yr) ¹	0.004	£00'0	0.007	0.006	
low Accel	Inspection R		Maximum Wear ³ (Inch)	0.201	0.135	0.337	0,218	
TGS F		ured 17)	Band ² t _{mæx} (Inch)	1.194	1.168	1.173	1.176	
lyrood		Meas (20:	Band ² t _{min} (Inch)	0.972	0.961	1.013	1.029	
– 2017 Hc		Fabricated (")	Nominal Wall Thickness ⁴ (Inch)	1.125	1.125	1.125	1.125	
lary Table			ASME Minimum Wall Thicknes s (Inch)	0.980	086.0	086.0	0.98	
Summ			sch	160	160	160	160	
-	se Data		NPS (Inch)	10	DI	DI	Q	
Table .	Ba		Component	Bend 2	Straight Pipe Segment	Bend upstream of Heater 6 inlet	2nd Elbow Downstream	
			Site No.	2-1	2-2	2-3	3-2	
			Location Description	Economizer Inlet Header Piping Bottom Bends	Boiler Feed Pump Flow Element 554	High Pressure Heater No. 6 Bypass Piping	High Pressure Heater No. 6 Discharge Piping	

0.000" - 0.100" maximum wear 0.100" - 0.200" maximum wear

>0.200" maximum wear

Significant Moderate Minor

² Measurements use the max and min from the re-inspected areas (since full circumference bands were not inspected in 2017).
³ This column represents band wear.

⁴ This column represents nominal wall thickness corresponding to the pipe schedule, or assumed pipe schedule if not directly available.
⁵ The re-inspection time is based on margin above the required minimum wall thickness, except for repaired or previously repaired locations.

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Condition Assessment and Miscellaneous Upgrades - Holyrood Appendix A

4. Overhaul Olympus Gas Generator – Stephenville

ALL SSIG	Electrical	
PEGN VILLE	Mechanical	
Alexandra de village	Civil	
Mohimed that her	Protection & Control	
TULY 19. 7018	Transmission & Distribution	

Telecontrol

System Planning

Overhaul Olympus Gas Generator

Stephenville

July 2018



1 Summary

The 50 MW Stephenville Gas Turbine, commissioned in 1975, is operated in either generation
mode to meet peak and emergency power requirements, or synchronous condenser mode to
provide voltage support to the Island Interconnected System (IIS).

5

The Stephenville Gas Turbine has been in service for approximately 43 years. The Rolls Royce
Olympus C engines are no longer supported by the original manufacturer. As such, new internal
components are not being manufactured and only refurbished parts are available. The service
life of the engine overhauls, which utilize refurbished parts, is five years. The End B engine has
been in service since the time of its last overhaul in 2014. Thus, this engine is nearing the end of
its useful overhaul life.
To maintain operational reliability of the gas turbine plant, the gas generator engine needs to

14 be sent to a gas turbine service facility for a scheduled overhaul.

15

16 The estimated project cost is approximately \$1,666,800, with planned completion in 2019.

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	4.2 Project Schedule

1 **1 Introduction**

The 50 MW Stephenville gas turbine, which was commissioned in 1975, is operated in either generation mode to meet peak and emergency power requirements, or synchronous condenser mode to provide voltage support to the Island Interconnected System (IIS). Hydro overhauls the Stephenville gas turbine engines on a five-year cycle. The End B engine has been in service since the time of its last overhaul in 2014.

7

8 2 Project Description

9 This project will overhaul the Stephenville gas generator End B engine serial number 202223.
10 The scope of work for the project includes the following:

- Removal and transportation of the engine to a service facility for disassembly,
 inspection and overhaul. The service facility will be determined by public tender;
- Post-overhaul performance testing of the refurbished engine at the service facility; and
- Return transportation, installation and commissioning of the overhauled engine.
- 15

16 **3 Justification**

This project is required to maintain the reliable operation of the Stephenville Gas Turbine. Without an overhaul, the risk of an End B engine in-service failure increases. In the event of an in-service failure, the gas turbine will operate on reduced capacity until a spare engine is available and installed, thus reducing the capacity to 25 MW for approximately one week until an available spare 19 MW engine was installed. In this configuration, capacity will be limited to 38 MW for approximately 20 weeks while the engine is repaired. If a spare engine is not available, the gas turbine capacity is 25 MW for 20 weeks.

24

25 3.1 Existing System

The Stephenville Gas Turbine provides backup generation and synchronous condense support to the Island Interconnected System. The gas turbine consists of two Rolls Royce Olympus C engines (End A and End B), and two Curtis Wright power turbines, connected to a single 50 MW generator by two SSS Clutches. The plant was placed in service in 1975.

- 1 Figure 1 is an image of the Stephenville Gas Turbine Plant and Figure 2 is an image of the gas
- 2 generator engine.







Figure 2: Gas Generator Engine

1 When the gas turbine operates in generation mode, at least one of the engines has to run 2 continuously for the generator to produce power. However, when the generator runs in 3 synchronous condensing mode only one engine is required to bring the generator up to the 4 proper speed. At that point, the generator can operate without the engine, which is then shut 5 down.

6

7 3.2 Operating Experience

8 The Stephenville Gas Turbine has been in service for approximately 43 years. The Rolls Royce 9 Olympus C engines are no longer supported by the original manufacturer. As such, new internal 10 components are not being manufactured and only refurbished parts are available. The service 11 life of the engine overhauls, which utilize refurbished parts, is five years. The End B engine has 12 been in service since the time of its last overhaul in 2014. Thus, this engine is nearing the end of 13 its useful overhaul life.

14

15 3.2.1 Maintenance Support Arrangements

16 Normal routine maintenance work is performed by Hydro. However, gas turbine service 17 companies such as Rolls Wood Group Ltd. and Alba Power Ltd., both located in the United 18 Kingdom, have been contracted in the past to perform visual inspections, on-site specialty 19 maintenance items, and major shop overhauls of gas generator engines.

20

21 3.2.2 Maintenance History

Borescope inspections for the gas generator engines were completed every two years until
2014. Considering the age and anticipated increased operation of the engines, annual
borescope inspections were completed thereafter.

25

26 3.2.3 Anticipated Useful Life

27 As refurbished rather than new parts are used in this engine overhaul, the anticipated service

28 life before next scheduled overhaul is five years.

1 3.3 Development of Alternatives

2 There are no alternatives to this project. Replacement, instead of overhauling the engine, is not
3 possible as there are no new similar engines manufactured.

4

5 4 Conclusion

6 The Stephenville Gas Turbine provides back-up generation and synchronous condense support 7 to the Island Interconnected System. As new internal components are not available, the service 8 life of an engine overhaul, using refurbished parts, is five years. The End B engine has been in 9 service since its last overhaul in 2014. Thus, the engine is nearing the end of its useful overhaul 10 life. To maintain operational reliability of the Stephenville Gas Turbine Plant, the End B engine 11 needs to be sent to a gas turbine service facility for a scheduled overhaul.

12

13 **4.1 Project Estimate**

14 The estimate for this project is shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Project Estimate (\$000s)

Project Cost	2019	2020	Beyond	Total
Material Supply	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
Labour	121.2	0.0	0.0	121.2
Consultant	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Contract Work	1,151.0	0.0	0.0	1,151.0
Other Direct Costs	45.7	0.0	0.0	45.7
Interest and Escalation	84.0	0.0	0.0	84.0
Contingency	263.9	0.0	0.0	263.9
Total	1,666.8	0.0	0.0	1,666.8

1 4.2 Project Schedule

2 The anticipated project schedule is provided in Table 2.

Activity		Start Date	End Date
Planning	Open Project	Jan 2019	Jan 2019
Procurement	Public tender for engine overhaul	Feb 2019	Mar 2019
and Execution	Tender evaluation and award	Mar 2019	Mar 2019
	Transportation and overhaul	April 2019	Jun 2019
	Return transportation and	Jul 2019	Aug 2019
	installation		
Commissioning	Commissioning	Aug 2019	Aug 2019
Project Closeout	Project Closeout	Sep 2019	Dec 2019

Table 2: Project Schedule

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	Electrical	
PROFESSIONA	Electrical Mechanical	
Sulu PROFESSIONAL	Electrical Mechanical Civil	
SULU PROFESSIONAL SULU PROFESSIONAL MARREN	Electrical Mechanical Civil Protection & Control	
A.C. WABREN	Electrical Mechanical Civil Protection & Control Transmission & Distribution	
A.C. WABREN BOTZALINE BOTZALINE BOTZALINE BOTZALINE BOTZALINE BOTZALINE BOTZALINE BOTZALINE BOTZALINE BOTZALINE BOTZALINE	Electrical Mechanical Civil Protection & Control Transmission & Distribution	

Upgrade Human-Machine-Interface and Automatic Voltage Regulator

Hardwoods Gas Turbine

July 2018



1 Summary

2 This report details the upgrade of the Human-Machine-Interface (HMI) and the Automatic 3 Voltage Regulator (AVR) at the Hardwoods Gas Turbine site. Both systems are vital to the 4 operation of the gas turbine and need to be replaced due to obsolescence. The HMI and AVR 5 present a risk of having to implement restrictions on the gas turbine operations in the event of 6 failure of either system. If the HMI fails, local control is unavailable and detailed alarms, 7 monitoring and data trending of the gas turbine stops. Without local control, the gas turbine 8 would be unavailable until installation of the spare obsolete HMI, and after that it would run at 9 risk of failure for three months until a new HMI was procured and installed. If the AVR fails, the 10 gas turbine will not be available for operation as there will be no supply of voltage to the 11 generator.

12

The estimated project cost is approximately \$685,900 (the HMI project is approximately
\$368,500, and the AVR project is approximately \$317,400) with a planned completion in 2019.

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1 **1 Introduction**

The 50 MW Hardwoods Gas Turbine Human-Machine-Interface (HMI) is the infrastructure through which the local operator performs local control and monitoring of the gas turbine. The obsolete HMI software will not operate on present day computer operating systems. If the HMI computer fails, the gas turbine cannot be locally controlled and monitored until the software and computer are replaced with modern versions.

7

8 The Hardwoods Gas Turbine Automatic Voltage Regulator (AVR) is a device that uses the 9 turbine's static excitation system to maintain acceptable generator voltage and control of 10 reactive power flow from the generator. The AVR manufacturer has declared this model 11 obsolete, which limits replacement components availability and could delay the return to 12 service of the gas turbine upon failure of a component.

13

14 2 Project Description

15 The scope of this project includes:

- Removal and disposal of the existing obsolete HMI software and computer;
- 17 Procurement and installation of new HMI including:
- 18 o Provision of new HMI software and computer;
- Provision of communications modules in the control system to facilitate new HMI
 interaction with the control system;
- 21 Conversion and integration of existing HMI graphics into the new software; and
- 22 Testing of HMI interaction with control system;
- Removal and disposal of existing obsolete AVR; and
- Procurement, installation, and testing of new AVR.
- 25

26 **3 Justification**

27 This project is justified on the requirement to maintain reliable operation of the Hardwoods Gas

28 Turbine.

1 3.1 Existing System

2 The HMI is used for local control and data collection for the Hardwoods Gas Turbine. It provides

- 3 detailed alarms for troubleshooting and collects trend data for historical analysis.
- 4

5 The HMI consists of specialized software called PCView and an operating system called QNX 6 (not a Windows compatible product) running on an obsolete computer that is connected to the 7 gas turbine control system. Communications modules reside in the control system cabinet that 8 connect to the HMI computer. Interactive graphics were developed by the manufacturer for the 9 HMI, which consist of graphics for control, monitoring, alarms, and trended data.

10



11 Figure 1 shows the HMI.

Figure 1: HMI Console

The HMI software entered Limited Lifecycle phase in July 2017 and will enter the obsolete phase in June 2018. In the obsolete phase, the manufacturer will not supply technical support or software upgrades. The last update to the software was in 2012. If the HMI computer fails, it cannot be replaced with a Windows-based computer as the HMI software and operating system will not operate within the Windows environment. The operation of the gas turbine will be significantly impaired without the HMI system as it cannot be locally controlled and monitored.

1 The Energy Control Centre (ECC) can operate the gas turbine with limited alarms but critical 2 data will not be collected and there will no local monitoring of gas turbine alarms and critical 3 operating parameters. There is insufficient remote visibility of the gas turbine's operation to 4 run it without an HMI in-service and a local operator present to monitor it. Hydro's current 5 operating regime is to have a local operator present while a gas turbine is generating power to 6 monitor its operation and attend to any issues. Without an HMI, the local operator has no 7 visibility into the condition of the gas turbine, and the gas turbine would therefore be 8 unavailable. Although Hydro has a spare HMI of identical vintage to the operating HMI, the gas 9 turbine would have to be shut down by the ECC for approximately one hour while the back-up 10 unit was installed, since local monitoring would be unavailable once the HMI has failed. 11 Subsequently, it would take approximately three months to have a new HMI prepared, 12 installed, and tested, during which time Hydro would be exposed to a subsequent failure of the 13 only available obsolete HMI.

14

The automatic voltage regulator (AVR) is a micro-processor based system that uses the turbine's static excitation system to maintain acceptable generator voltage and control of reactive power flow from the generator. It consists of a cabinet of redundant controllers and assorted electrical components as shown in Figure 2.



Figure 2: AVR Cabinet (Left to Right: Front, Inside Top, Inside Bottom)

This AVR was installed in 2006 and the manufacturer moved the model into the 'Limited' phase 1 2 of its life cycle in the beginning of 2017. This phase means the manufacturer cannot guarantee 3 life cycle services and support due to the scarcity of key components and technical knowledge. Therefore, a component failure may result in unavailability of the gas turbine for an extended 4 5 period due to scarcity of replacement components. As well, the AVR software used for 6 configuration and troubleshooting does not work with modern Windows operating systems, 7 restricting the ability of Hydro personnel to use computer-based tools for troubleshooting. As a 8 result, Hydro has to engage the manufacturer for troubleshooting activities, which increases 9 the time to correct problems.

10

11 **3.2 Operating Experience**

12 The HMI has provided adequate service since the control system upgrade in 2000 and the AVR13 has provided adequate service since 2006.

14

15 3.2.1 Maintenance or Support Arrangements

16 Hydro has maintained an HMI software support subscription with the Original Equipment

17 Manufacturer (OEM) for the provision of technical support and upgrades at no cost.

18

19 3.2.2 Anticipated Useful Life

20 The anticipated useful life of the new HMI and AVR is 18 years.

21

22 **3.3 Development of Alternatives**

- 23 Two alternatives for upgrading the HMI are:
- 24 1. Upgrade present OEM version to the next edition; or
- 25 2. Replace with an HMI from another manufacturer.

26

The first alternative requires importing and conversion of original graphics and database configuration to enable functionality in the new operating software environment. This alternative has the least requirement for development as it is from the OEM and is anticipated
to be the lower cost, lower time for implementation, and least potential for mismatch of databetween HMI and control system.

3

The second alternative requires a complete development of all graphics and database points to be used in a different software application and efforts to establish interaction between the HMI and control system from two different manufacturers. This alternative is anticipated to require the most effort to review and test and presents a higher risk of issues with interoperability between the HMI and control system.

9

Additional communications hardware, a new computer with a modern Windows operating
system, and testing are common aspects to both alternatives and do not impact the cost
differential between the two options. Therefore, Alternative 1 was selected.

13

14 The AVR is to be tendered to determine the lowest cost and functionally acceptable option to15 purchase.

16

17 **4 Conclusion**

While the HMI has performed satisfactorily to date, the HMI software cannot be transferred to a Windows-based computer if the HMI computer fails. If the HMI fails, the gas turbine cannot be locally controlled or monitored. The ECC does not have sufficient visibility to operate the gas turbine without local detailed monitoring, and in the event of failure the gas turbine operation would be through installation of the only available obsolete spare HMI. It would take approximately three months to have a new HMI prepared, installed, and tested, during which time Hydro would be exposed to a subsequent failure of the spare HMI.

25

While the AVR has performed satisfactorily to date, the AVR manufacturer cannot guarantee
life cycle services and support due to the scarcity of key components and technical knowledge.
Therefore, a component failure may result in unavailability of the gas turbine until a new AVR is

1 purchased, installed, and tested. It is anticipated that the development and installation of a

- 2 new AVR would require five months.
- 3

4 This project will eliminate these risks to operation of the gas turbine, providing greater

- 5 confidence of reliable operations.
- 6

7 4.1 Project Estimate

8 The estimate for this project is shown in Table 1.

Project Cost	2019	2020	Beyond	Total
Material Supply	9.0	0.0	0.0	9.0
Labour	234.0	0.0	0.0	234.0
Consultant	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Contract Work	291.0	0.0	0.0	291.0
Other Direct Costs	7.0	0.0	0.0	7.0
Interest and Escalation	36.7	0.0	0.0	36.7
Contingency	108.2	0.0	0.0	108.2
Total	685.9	0.0	0.0	685.9

Table 1: Project Estimate (\$000s)

9 4.2 Project Schedule

10 The anticipated project schedule is provided in Table 2.

Table 2: Project Schedule

Activity		Start Date	End Date
Planning	Project launch and site visit	Feb 2019	Feb 2019
Design	Information Gathering	Mar 2019	Mar 2019
	Design work for HMI	Apr 2019	May 2019
	Design work for AVR	May 2019	Jun 2019
Procurement	Issue contract for HMI	Mar 2019	Jul 2019
	Issue contract for AVR	Mar 2019	Aug 2019
Construction	HMI	Jul 2019	Aug 2019
	AVR	Aug 2019	Aug 2019
Commissioning	Commissioning	Aug 2019	Aug 2019
Closeout	As-Built drafting	Sep 2019	Sep 2019
	Project closeoul	000 2019	000 2019

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Telecontrol	
System Planning	

Terminal Station Refurbishment and Modernization

July 2018



1 Summary

- 2 Hydro aims to replace or refurbish failing or failed terminal station assets to ensure the delivery
- 3 of safe, reliable, least-cost electricity in an environmentally responsible manner.
- 4

5 Hydro's philosophy for the assessment of equipment and the selection and justification of 6 projects is outlined in the *Terminal Station Asset Management Overview*. Version 3 of this 7 document is part of the 2019 Capital Budget Application. Changes in this revision are outlined in 8 a new section in the document, titled *"Changes in Version 3"*.

- 9
- 10 Hydro proposes the following activities under the 2019 Terminal Station Refurbishment and
- 11 Modernization Project:
- 12 replacement of instrument transformers;
- 13 replacement of disconnect switches;
- replacement of surge arrestors;
- 15 refurbishment and modernization of power transformers;
- 16 replacement of insulators;
- refurbishment and upgrade of station grounding;
- 18 refurbishment of equipment foundations;
- installation of fire suppression systems in control buildings;
- refurbishment of control buildings;
- protection, control, and monitoring replacements and modernization; and
- refurbishment of the Wabush terminal station.
- 23

24 Hydro will execute the majority of these activities in a multi-year approach, with all activities

25 scheduled for completion before the end of 2020.

26

27 The total estimated project cost is approximately \$29,952,900 with a planned completion of

28 2020.

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1 1 Terminal Station Refurbishment and Modernization Project

Terminal stations perform a critical role in the transmission and distribution of power across the province. Terminal stations contain electrical equipment (i.e. transformers, circuit breakers, instrument transformers and disconnect switches) and all associated protection and control relays and equipment required to protect, control, and operate the province's electrical grid. Terminal stations act as transition points in the transmission system and interface points with the lower voltage distribution and generation systems. Hydro owns and operates 69 terminal stations across the Island and Labrador Interconnected Systems.

9

10 Hydro executes a robust capital program to ensure the delivery of safe, reliable, least-cost 11 electricity in an environmentally responsible manner. Hydro's capital program sees the 12 replacement and refurbishment of equipment based on Hydro's long-term asset management 13 strategy.

14

Historically, the refurbishment of control buildings has been carried out under the 'Upgrade Office Facilities and Control Buildings' project. Hydro is now carrying out such refurbishments under the Terminal Station Refurbishment and Modernization Project to provide consistency in its approach to Terminal Station assets. The 2019 Capital Budget Application does not include expenditures for Terminal Station battery banks and chargers; however, future capital expenditures will be included in the Project.

21

Hydro's strategy for the replacement, refurbishment, or modernization of terminal stations is
outlined in the *Terminal Station Asset Management Overview, Version 3,* included with this
Capital Budget Application in Volume II, Tab 6.

25

26 **2 2019 Project**

27 The projects identified in this proposal have been selected to align with Hydro's commitment to

28 the delivery of safe, reliable, least-cost electricity in an environmentally responsible manner.

1 **2.1** Electrical Equipment

2 The following electrical equipment upgrades and/or refurbishments are planned for 2019:

- 3 replace instrument transformers;
- replace disconnect switches;
- 5 replace surge arrestors;
- 6 refurbish and upgrade power transformers;
- 7 replace insulators;
- 8 upgrade grounding; and
- 9 install breaker bypass switches.
- 10

11 2.1.1 Replace Instrument Transformers

12 The estimate for this project is \$849,900.

Project Cost	2019	2020
Material Supply	182.8	57.1
Labour	28.3	131.8
Consultant	22.4	22.4
Contract Work	0.0	359.6
Other Direct Costs	9.7	35.8
Total Direct Costs	243.2	606.7

Table 1: Replace Instrument Transformers Project Estimate (\$000s)

13 Project Scope

Hydro replaces instrument transformers due to physical, or electrical, deterioration, or to comply with federal regulations regarding the use of PCBs (as detailed in Section 4.1.1 of the *Terminal Station Asset Management Overview*). Hydro plans to replace the instrument transformers outlined in Table 2.

Station	Equipment ID	Replacement Criteria
Cow Head	TL227 CØ, PT	Failed Electrical Testing
St. Anthony	TL256 BØ, PT	Corrosion
St. Anthony	TL256 CØ, PT	Corrosion
Stony Brook	TL231 CØ, PT	Corrosion
Stony Brook	TL205 AØ, PT	Corrosion
Churchill Falls	230-22 BØ, CT	Same vintage/mfg as units leaking and being replaced in 2018
Churchill Falls	230-22 CØ, CT	Same vintage/mfg as units leaking and being replaced in 2018
Churchill Falls	230-23 CØ, CT	Same vintage/mfg as units leaking and being replaced in 2018
Churchill Falls	230-24 BØ, CT	Same vintage/mfg as units leaking and being replaced in 2018
Churchill Falls	230-24 AØ,CT (c/w PT)	Same vintage/mfg as units leaking and being replaced in 2018
L'anse au Loup	DIST308 (5871623) PT	РСВ
Stony Brook	ВЗ СØ, РТ	Failed Electrical Testing
Stephenville	L405 CØ, CT	Failed Electrical Testing
Holyrood	B6 AØ, PT	РСВ
Holyrood	B6 BØ, PT	РСВ
Holyrood	B6 CØ, PT	PCB
Hardwoods	T1 B-CØ, PT	PCB
Hardwoods	T2 B-CØ, PT	РСВ
Hardwoods	T3 B-CØ, PT	PCB
Hardwoods	B7 AØ, CT	РСВ
Hardwoods	в7 вǿ, ст	РСВ
Hardwoods	в7 сø, ст	РСВ
L'anse au Loup	DIST308 (5869792) PT	PCB

- 1 Occasionally, a unit in one of the diesel plants across Hydro's operating area experiences an
- 2 issue that necessitate an unplanned overhaul. Where appropriate, Hydro may complete such an
- 3 overhaul under this project and, if possible, defer one of the units planned for completion.

1 **2.1.2** Replace Disconnect Switches

2 The estimate for this project is \$1,814,900.

Table 3: Replace Disconnect Switches Project Estimate (\$000s)

Project Cost	2019	2020
Material Supply	283.0	58.0
Labour	96.3	483.3
Consultant	87.2	237.6
Contract Work	113.0	371.6
Other Direct Costs	6.5	78.4
Total Direct Costs	586.0	1,228.9

3 Project Scope

- 4 Hydro replaces disconnect switches when damaged beyond repair, parts required for repair are
- 5 unavailable due to obsolescence, or it is not economical to repair (as detailed in Section 4.1.2 of
- 6 the Asset Management Overview). Hydro plans the replacement of the disconnect switches
- 7 noted in Table 4.

Table 4: Disconnect Switches Replacements

Station	Equipment ID	Condition
Hampden Tap	L51-1/L51G	Alignment Issue
Hampden Tap	L52-1/L52G	Alignment Issue
Buchans	L28L32-1	Drivetrain issue
Buchans	L28L32-2/L32G	Alignment Issue
Sunnyside	L02L07-1	Age >50 yrs
Sunnyside	L06L07-1/L06G	Age >50 yrs
Sunnyside	B1L03-2/L03G	Age >50 yrs
Sunnyside	B1L02-1	Age >50 yrs
Bay D'espoir	B5B6-1	Age >50 yrs
Bay D'espoir	B1T2-1	Age >50 yrs
Churchill Falls	B25B26	Obsolescence
Churchill Falls	21B23	Obsolescence

1 2.1.3 Replace Surge Arrestors

2 The estimate for this project is \$129,500.

	•	
Project Cost	2019	2020
Material Supply	41.4	0.0
Labour	60.2	0.0
Consultant	19.1	0.0
Contract Work	0.0	0.0
Other Direct Costs	8.8	0.0
Total Direct Costs	129.5	0.0

Table 5: Replace Surge Arrestors Project Estimate (\$000s)

3 **Project Scope**

- 4 Hydro replaces surge arrestors based on physical and electrical deterioration (as detailed in
- Section 4.1.3 of the Asset Management Overview). The surge arresters noted in Table 6 have 5
- 6 exceeded their expected service life of 40 years and will be replaced to avoid in-service failure
- 7 and subsequent service interruption.

Table 6: Surge Arrestor Replacement Plan

Station	Equipment ID
Holyrood	T10 H1
Holyrood	T10 H2
Holyrood	T10 H2
Holyrood	T10 X1
Holyrood	T10 X2
Holyrood	T10 X3
Holyrood	SST-1-2 H1
Holyrood	SST-1-2 H2
Holyrood	SST-1-2 H3
Western Avalon	T4 H1
Western Avalon	T4 H2
Western Avalon	T4 H3
Western Avalon	T4 X1
Western Avalon	T4 X2
Western Avalon	T4 X3
Hardwoods	T6SX1
Hardwoods	T6SX2

Hardwoods T6SX3

1 2.1.4 Refurbish and Upgrade Power Transformers

2 The estimate for this project is \$7,302,900.

Table 7: Refurbish and Upgrade Power Transformers Project Estimate (\$000s)

Project Cost	2019	2020
Material Supply	1,300.4	1,224.7
Labour	542.0	584.9
Consultant	185.0	175.0
Contract Work	1,385.0	1,563.5
Other Direct Costs	143.0	199.4
Total Direct Costs	3,555.4	3,747.5

3 Project Scope

- 4 Hydro carries out a number of refurbishment and upgrade activities on power transformers
- 5 including:
- 6 oil reclamation or replacement;
- oil dehydration;
- 8 corrosion remediation;
- 9 refurbishment to address leaks;
- 10 tap changer overhauls;
- bushing replacements;
- 12 protective device replacements;
- 13 cooling fan/radiator replacement; and
- major refurbishment, which may include combinations of the above.
- 15

Hydro also installs online dissolved-gas analysis devices on critical power transformers. Hydro's
power transformer refurbishment and modernization philosophies can be found in Section
4.1.6 of the Asset Management Overview. Hydro plans to complete refurbishments and
upgrades on the power transformers listed in Table 8.

Refurbishment	Station	Equipment ID
Activity		
Major	Bottom Brook	Т3
Refurbishment	Deer Lake	T2
	Plum Point	R1
	Plum Point	R2
	Bottom Brook	T1
	Hardwoods	Т2
	Western Avalon	T4
Oil Reclamation	Bear Cove	T1
or Replacement	Wabush	Т3
Oil Dehydrator	Bay D'espoir	T1
	Holyrood	UST-3
	Paradise River	T1
	Howley	T2
	Oxen Pond	T2
	St Anthony	T1
Radiator	Bottom Brook	T3 SST
Replacement	Bay d'Espoir	Т6
	Grandy Brook	T1
Tap Changer	Happy Valley	Т2
Refurbishment	Sunnyside	T1
	Sunnyside	T4
	Hardwoods	T1
Tap Changer Oil	Sunnyside	T4
Replacement	Deviale Have	T 4
Bushing	Daniels Harbour	
Replacement	Daniels Harbour	12
	Granite Canal	
	Main Brook	11
	Wabush Is	T1 HV
		1315
	English Harbour West	T1
	Hawkes Bay	T3
	Howley	T2
	Stephenville	T1
	Upper Salmon	T2 HV,N

Refurbishment Station		Equipment ID
Activity		
Online	Come By Chance	T1
Dissolved Gas	Come By Chance	Т2
Analysis	Churchill Falls	T31
	Sunnyside	T1
	Sunnyside	Τ4
	Wabush Terminal Station	T11
	Wabush Terminal Station	T12
	Hardwoods	T6S
	Bottom Brook	T1
	Hardwoods	Т6
	Hardwoods	Τ7
	Howley	T2
	Hardwoods	Т3
	Massey Drive	Т3

1 2.1.5 Replace Insulators

2 The estimate for this project is \$768,500.

Project Cost	2019	2020
Material Supply	0.0	318.0
Labour	11.8	280.6
Consultant	24.0	83.2
Contract Work	0.0	0.0
Other Direct Costs	4.8	46.1
Total Direct Costs	40.6	727.9

Table 9: Replace Insulators Project Estimate (\$000s)

3 Project Scope

- 4 Hydro replaces insulators that are at risk of failure due to cement growth (as detailed in Section
- 5 4.1.4 of the Asset Management Overview). Hydro plans to replace such insulators in the
- 6 following stations:
- 7 Wabush Terminal Station;

- 1 Happy Valley;
- Parsons Pond;
- Glenburnie;
- St. Anthony;
- 5 Main Brook;
- 6 Roddickton; and
- 7 Churchill Falls.
- 8
- 9 2.1.6 Upgrade Grounding
- 10 The estimate for this project is \$1,423,000.

	-	
Project Cost	2019	2020
Material Supply	0.0	5.0
Labour	66.6	101.9
Consultant	477.8	398.1
Contract Work	0.0	304.0
Other Direct Costs	35.8	33.8
Total Direct Costs	580.2	842.8

Table 10: Upgrade Grounding Project Estimate (\$000s)

11 Project Scope

- 12 Hydro analyzes terminal station grounding systems to identify hazardous step and touch
- 13 potentials, and upgrades station grounding to eliminate these hazards (as detailed in Section
- 14 4.1.5 of the Asset Management Overview). Hydro plans to analyze and upgrade the stations
- 15 noted in Table 11.



Table 11: Stations Designated for Grounding Upgrades

1 2.2 Civil Works and Buildings

- 2 The following civil works and buildings activities are proposed for 2019:
- 3 repair equipment foundations;
- 4 install fire suppression; and
 - refurbish control buildings.
- 6

5

7 2.2.1 Repair Equipment Foundations

8 The estimate for this project is \$243,400.

Table 12: Repair Equipment Foundations Project Estimate (\$000s)

Project Cost	2019	2020
Material Supply	0.0	0.0
Labour	80.6	0.0
Consultant	49.0	0.0
Contract Work	109.0	0.0
Other Direct Costs	4.8	0.0
Total Direct Costs	243.4	0.0

1 Project Scope

Hydro repairs concrete foundations in terminal stations when the foundations have
deteriorated severely, compromising structural integrity if not addressed (as detailed in Section
4.2.1 of the Asset Management Strategy and shown in Figure 1). Hydro plans to repair
equipment foundations in the following stations:

- 6 Deer Lake;
- 7 Massey Drive; and
- 8 Buchans.



Figure 1: Compromised Foundation at Buchan's Terminal Station

9 2.2.2 Install Fire Suppression

10 The estimate for this project is \$684,900.

Project Cost	2019	2020
Material Supply	0.0	10.0
Labour	43.4	27.1
Consultant	24.0	26.4
Contract Work	0.0	550.0
Other Direct Costs	1.0	3.0
Total Direct Costs	68.4	616.5

Table 13: Install Fire Suppression Project Estimate (\$000s)

1 Project Scope

- 2 Hydro is installing fire suppression systems in all 230 kV terminal station control buildings due
- 3 to the station criticality (as detailed in Section 4.2.2 of the Asset Management Strategy). Hydro
- 4 plans to install a fire suppression system in the following terminal station control building:
 - Oxen Pond.
- 6

5

7 2.2.3 Refurbish Control Buildings

8 The estimate for this project is \$517,600.

Project Cost	2019	2020
Material Supply	0.0	10.0
Labour	43.4	27.1
Consultant	24.0	26.4
Contract Work	0.0	550.0
Other Direct Costs	1.0	3.0
Total Direct Costs	68.4	616.5

Table 14: Refurbish Control Buildings Project Estimate (\$000s)

9 Project Scope

Hydro will refurbish control buildings with an emphasis on structural, building envelope, and roofing refurbishment to ensure the structural integrity and security of the buildings and to prevent leaks (as detailed in Section 4.2.3 of the Asset Management Overview). Hydro will refurbish the following control buildings in 2019:

14

15 Holyrood Terminal Station

- Replace Roof System (Figure 2): Roof has reached end of expected service life, and is
 displaying significant surface cracking. Evidence of leaking present.
- Exterior Doors (Figure 3): Exterior doors are heavily rusted and deteriorated.
- Other Upgrades: Hydro will address other issues such as failed HVAC equipment, battery
 room ventilation, obsolete low voltage distribution equipment, and corroded water
 service entry.



Figure 2: Leaking Roof at Holyrood



Figure 3: Rusted Doors at Holyrood

1 <u>Come By Chance</u>

2	•	Replace Roof System (Figure 4): Roof has reached end of expected service life, and is
3		displaying significant surface cracking.

- Exterior Metal Cladding (Figure 5): Exterior cladding is severely rusted, and must be
 replaced to prevent deterioration of building structure and maintain weather-tightness.
- Other Upgrades: Hydro will address other issues, such as heaters, battery room

ventilation, station service automatic transfer switch, low voltage distribution panel, and
 domestic plumbing.



Figure 4: Roof Surface Cracking at Come By Chance



Figure 5: Rusting Exterior Cladding at Come By Chance

2.3 Protection, Control, and Monitoring Refurbishment and Upgrades

2 The estimate for this project is \$5,967,400

Table 15: Protection, Control, and Monitoring Refurbishment and UpgradesProject Estimate (\$000s)

Project Cost	2019	2020
Material Supply	780.5	347.8
Labour	788.9	1,110.4
Consultant	865.8	440.4
Contract Work	0.0	1,419.0
Other Direct Costs	52.0	162.6
Total Direct Costs	2,487.2	3,480.2

3 Project Scope

Hydro has an ongoing program to replace electromechanical and obsolete solid-state relays
with modern digital relays, improving reliability and functionality. Hydro's approach to
protection, control, and modernization asset management is detailed in Section 4.3 of the Asset
Management Overview. Hydro plans to replace the protective relays noted in Table 16.

Table 16: Protective Relay Replacement Plan

Station	Equipment ID	Relay Type
Bay d'Espoir	TL 206	Electromechanical
Sunnyside	TL 206	Electromechanical
Cat Arm	TL 247, BUS 1	Electromechanical
Deer Lake	TL 247	Electromechanical
Hinds Lake	G1, T1,T2	Electromechanical
Western Avalon	T1,T2,T4	Electromechanical
Holyrood	B12L65 and B2L68 Reclosing	Electromechanical
Western Avalon	T1,T2,T3,T4, and T5 Paralleling	Obsolete Solid-State,
		heightened risk of failure

8 Following a 2014 review of Hydro's breaker failure protection, Hydro began implementing a

9 program to expand breaker failure protection beyond its 230 kV stations, including terminal

1 stations rated 66 kV and above. Hydro plans to implement breaker failure protection in the

- 2 following stations:
 - St. Anthony; and
 - Stony Brook.
- 5

4

3

Additionally, to provide higher data resolution for the prompt and accurate identification and
troubleshooting of system issues, Hydro will upgrade the Data Alarm Management in the
following station:

- Holyrood.
- 10

9

- 11 Hydro will also install Digital Fault Recorders in the following location to improve the analysis of
- 12 system events in the area served by the station:
- Berry Hill.
- 14

15 2.4 Wabush Terminal Station Refurbishment

16 The estimate for this project is \$3,835,700.

Table 17: Wabush Terminal Station Refurbishment Project Estimate (\$000s)

Project Cost	2019	2020
Material Supply	385.0	5.0
Labour	388.8	634.9
Consultant	0.0	0.0
Contract Work	180.0	1,909.9
Other Direct Costs	75.8	256.3
Total Direct Costs	1,029.6	2,806.1

17 Project Scope

18 On August 5, 2016, Hydro applied to the Board for approval to acquire the Wabush Terminal

19 Station and was subsequently approved in Board Order No. P.U. 37(2016). It was identified

- 20 within the application that many of the assets in the Wabush Terminal Station are nearing the
- 21 end of their useful lives and will require refurbishment or replacement in coming years.

In a supplemental budget application titled "Assessment and Refurbishment – Wabush Terminal Station", submitted on March 17, 2017, Hydro proposed to address immediate concerns to ensure reliability of the Wabush Terminal Station. Additional refurbishment activities were proposed and approved in Hydro's 2018 Capital Budget Application. Hydro plans to continue the refurbishment of the Wabush Terminal Station, proposing the following work for this 2019 Capital Budget Application:

- 7 protection upgrades of transformers T1 and T2;
- procurement and replacement of two 46kV circuit breakers (46-1 & 46-2) and
 associated foundations, cables, and protection;
- 10 procurement and installation of three 46kV disconnect switches; and
- 11 major inspection of synchronous condenser SC1.
- 12

In 2017, Hydro acquired the electrical equipment in the Churchill Falls Switchyard dedicated to
serving Labrador West. As part of the Wabush Terminal Station Refurbishment activities, Hydro
plans to replace four Current Transformers and one Current Transformer/Capacitive Voltage
Transformer combination units in the Churchill Falls Switchyard, which are included in the
instrument transformer section of this project.

18

19 3 Project Cost

20 3.1 Project Estimate

The project estimate for the terminal station refurbishment and modernization program isshown in Table 18.

Project Cost	2019	2020	Beyond	Total
Material Supply	2,973.1	2,025.6	0.0	4,998.7
Labour	2,202.8	3,354.8	0.0	5,557.6
Consultant	1,870.3	1,383.2	0.0	3,253.5
Contract Work	2,087.0	6,477.5	0.0	8,564.5
Other Direct Costs	347.9	815.5	0.0	1,163.4
Interest and Escalation	421.6	1,382.9	0.0	1,804.5
Contingency	988.4	3,622.3	0.0	4,610.7
Total	10,891.1	19,061.8	0.0	29,952.9

Table 18: Project Estimate (\$000s)

1 **3.2 Project Schedule**

2 Due to the large number of individual activities enveloped in this project, it is not practical to

3 provide individual project schedules. Detailed project schedules will be developed at project

4 initiation. However, a typical high-level schedule for a multi-year project is as follows:

- 5 Year 1: Planning, Design, and Procurement; and
 - Year 2: Construction, Commissioning, and Closeout.
- 7

6

8 All activities have a planned completion of 2020.

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Electrical	
Mechanical	
Civil	
Protection & Control	
Transmission & Distribution	
Telecontrol	
System Planning	

Terminal Station Asset Management Overview

Version 3

July 2018



1 Summary

Hydro has developed an ongoing capital program to replace or refurbish assets as the end of
design life is reached or the assets require attention due to obsolescence or anticipated failure.

5 Prior to 2017, Hydro's terminal station projects were divided into two categories: stand-alone 6 and programs. Programs included projects that are proposed year after year to address the 7 upgrade or replacements of deteriorated equipment (e.g. disconnects or instrument 8 transformers) and have similar justification each year. Stand-alone projects do not meet the 9 definition of an annual program. Hydro typically had as many as 15 separate program-type 10 projects in its Capital Budget Application, with each program based upon a particular type of 11 asset.

12

Starting with the 2017 Capital Budget Application, Hydro implemented a change to how the terminal station programs are submitted for consideration by the Board. The programs have been consolidated into the Terminal Station Refurbishment and Modernization Project resulting in improved regulatory efficiency and easing the administrative effort for the Board and Hydro. This approach also allows Hydro to realize efficiencies by improving coordination of capital and maintenance work in terminal stations.

19

In the 2019 Capital Budget Application, Hydro has submitted a revised Terminal Station Asset Management Overview – Version 3, with changes noted in Section 1.1 to provide an updated overview of Hydro's Terminal Station asset maintenance philosophies in one document. The Terminal Station Refurbishment and Modernization Project, included in this Capital Budget Application, includes proposals for required terminal station work, referencing specific section and following the philosophies of this Overview document.

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1 1 Introduction

Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro has 69 terminal stations that contain electrical equipment
(e.g. transformers, circuit breakers, instrument transformers, disconnect switches) and
associated protection and control relays and equipment required to protect, control, and
operate Hydro's electrical grid.

6

7 Hydro has an Asset Management System that governs the life cycle of its terminal station 8 assets. This system monitors, maintains, refurbishes, replaces, and disposes of assets with the 9 objective of providing safe, reliable electrical power in an environmentally responsible manner 10 at least-cost. Within this system, assets are grouped such as breaker, transformers, grounding 11 systems, buildings, and sites. This allows the asset managers to establish consistent practices 12 for equipment specification, placement, maintenance, refurbishment, replacement, and 13 disposal. These practices result in a consistent approach to monitoring, assessments, and action justifications for capital refurbishment and replacement for asset sustaining projects. Hydro 14 15 established programs that enact these practices for groups or sub-groupings of assets (e.g. High 16 Voltage Switch Replacements).

17

Part of Hydro's annual capital program is a sustaining effort to ensure the safety and reliability 18 19 of terminal station assets. As submitted in its 2017 application, Hydro has consolidated its 20 terminal station sustaining work into one project, the Terminal Station Refurbishment and 21 *Modernization Project* (the Project), in an effort to streamline the capital budget process and to 22 ensure opportunities for synergies across projects are realized. Additionally, Hydro submitted 23 the Terminal Station In-Service Failures Project to cover the replacement or refurbishment of 24 failed equipment or incipient failures. Hydro is utilizing this document, Terminal Station Asset 25 Management Overview (the Overview), as a reference for both projects to streamline and focus 26 information submitted. The Overview provides supporting information that was historically 27 presented, on an annual basis, for similar classification projects in the Application. The 28 remainder of this document provides information on the assets involved, an overview of each 29 asset program, and updates in the event of changes to Hydro's asset management

philosophies. 1 2 3 Hydro will revise and resubmit the Overview as required in future Capital Budget Applications 4 as it implements changes to its asset management philosophies appropriate for inclusion in the 5 Overview. 6 7 1.1 Changes in Version 3 Hydro has submitted Version 3 of this document with the 2019 Capital Budget Application. All 8 9 material changes in this version are shaded in grey, and are summarized below: 10 Addition of section 4.1.9 – Battery Banks and Chargers; • Addition of section 4.2.3 – Control Buildings; and 11 12 Addition of 'Digital Fault Recorders' to section 4.3.1 – Protection and Control Upgrades 13 In 2016, Hydro submitted its 'Upgrade Office Facilities and Control Buildings Condition 14 15 Assessment and Refurbishment Program Asset Management Strategy Plan' in its 2017 Capital 16 Budget Application, which outlined Hydro's approach to address aging and failing building 17 infrastructure. Beginning with the 2019 Capital Budget Application, Hydro will undertake the 18 refurbishment of terminal station control buildings under the Terminal Station Refurbishment 19 and Modernization Program. 20 21 Minor changes to syntax have been made to improve reading and to reflect that this document 22 has been previously submitted, and is no longer a newly established approach. These minor 23 changes have not been highlighted. 24 2 Terminal Stations Background 25 26 2.1 Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro's Terminal Stations 27 Terminal stations play a critical role in the transmission and distribution of electricity. Terminal 28 stations contain electrical equipment (e.g. transformers, circuit breakers, instrument

29 transformers, disconnect switches) and associated protection and control relays and equipment

1	required to protect, control, and operate the Hydro's electrical grid. Stations act as transition
2	points within the transmission system and interface points with the lower voltage distribution
3	and generation systems. Hydro owns and operates 69 terminal stations throughout
4	Newfoundland and Labrador.
5	
6	2.2 Terminal Station Infrastructure
7	Stations contain the following infrastructure, which is described throughout this report:
8	transformers;
9	circuit breakers;
10	instrument transformers;
11	 disconnect, bypass and ground switches;
12	• surge arrestors;
13	• grounding;
14	• buswork;
15	 steel structures and foundations;
16	 insulators;
17	control buildings;
18	 protection and control relays;
19	 yards, fences and access roads; and
20	battery banks.
21	
22	Many of Hydro's terminal stations were constructed in the 1960's. Annual capital commitment
23	is required to sustain terminal station assets, ensuring the provision of reliable electrical
24	service.
25	
26	3 Terminal Station Capital Projects
27	3.1 Historical Terminal Station Capital Projects
28	In the 2016 Capital Budget Application, there were 22 individual terminal station projects,
29	accounting for approximately \$30,000,000 or 16% of the capital budget. Historically, Hydro's

terminal station projects were divided into two categories: stand-alone and programs. 1 2 Programs include projects that are proposed year after year to address the required 3 refurbishment or replacement of assets (e.g. disconnects or instrument transformers) and have similar justification and other information presented each year. Stand-alone projects do not 4 5 meet the definition of an annual program and are not included in this project. Of the 22 6 individual terminal station projects proposed in 2016, 15 were program-type projects. In the 7 2017 Capital Budget Application, Hydro consolidated the historical station projects into the 8 Terminal Station Refurbishment and Modernization Project.

9

3.2 Hydro's Approach to Terminal Station Capital Project Proposals

- 11 The programs now included in the Project are:
- 12 1. Upgrade Circuit Breakers (Beyond 2020);
- 13 2. Replace Disconnect Switches;
- 14 3. Install Fire Protection;
- 15 4. Replace Surge Arrestors;
- 16 5. Upgrade Terminal Station Foundations;
- 17 6. Replace Battery Banks and Chargers;
- 18 7. Refurbish Control Buildings;
- 19 8. Upgrade Terminal Station for Mobile Substation;
- 20 9. Install Breaker Bypass Switches; and
- 21 10. Protection and Control Refurbishment and Upgrades.¹
- 22
- 23 The Terminal Station Refurbishment and Modernization Project excludes:
- Transformer Replacement and Spares: Although transformer replacement fits within the
- 25 description of a terminal station program, these projects often have unique justification
- and a high project cost and, therefore, are proposed separately;

¹ As noted in the 2017 edition of this document, the 2016 Upgrade Terminal Station Protection and Control Upgrade, Upgrade Protective Relays, Upgrade Fault Recorders, Upgrade Data Alarm Systems and Install Breaker Failure Protection projects were combined in the Overview and Project as Protection and Control Refurbishment and Upgrades Program.

• Accelerated Circuit Breaker Replacement: Hydro proposed the accelerated replacement 1 2 of 230kV Circuit Breakers as part of the 2016 Capital Budget Application Upgrade Circuit 3 Breakers project. This project involves the replacement of high-voltage circuit breakers 4 through the year 2020. As this project has already been approved, it is not included in 5 the Terminal Station Refurbishment and Modernization Project. However, future 6 breaker replacements not captured in the 2016 Upgrade Circuit Breakers project will be 7 included in future Capital Budget Applications and, therefore, the justification for such 8 programs is included in this report;

- Activities that cannot be scheduled for inclusion in a Capital Budget Application as these
 will be submitted as either a supplementary capital budget application or executed in
 the Terminal Stations In-Service Failures Project;
- Activities in response to additional load or reliability requirements as these projects
 generally have unique justification and will be proposed separately; and
- Activities in response to significant isolated issues in a particular station (e.g.
 replacement of a failed power transformer) as these projects generally have unique
 justification and will be proposed separately.
- 17

Hydro continues to maintain individual records with regards to asset capital, maintenance and
retirement expenditures and performance, which will be used to support the development of
the annual capital plan.

21

This document is submitted to the Board as part of the 2019 Capital Budget Application. Hydro will annually submit proposals for the *'Terminal Station Refurbishment and Modernization Project'* and the *'Terminal Station In-Service Failures Project'* referencing the most recent Overview. Future Applications will not include a copy of the Overview unless Hydro revises its contents. When the Overview is revised, Hydro will clearly denote such changes for review and approval by the Board.

1 **3.3 Benefits of this Approach**

As supporting information for programs changes infrequently, referencing the Overview in the
Project documentation will eliminate the preparation and review of repetitious information.
Hydro estimates that this approach could save up to \$120,000² annually, not including time and
costs for review by the Board and Intervenors.

6

7 Hydro has a proactive Asset Management System that strives to anticipate future failures so that refurbishment or replacement can be incorporated into an Application. However, there are 8 9 instances in which projects are not included in an Application as immediate refurbishment or 10 replacement is required (i.e. occurrence of an unanticipated failure or the recognition of an 11 incipient failure) to maintain the delivery of safe, reliable electricity at least cost. These 12 situations seldom include extenuating or abnormal circumstances and costs. With aging station 13 assets, unanticipated failures may increase. This increase will require additional future efforts 14 to provide and review regulatory documentation. By introducing a Terminal Station In-Service 15 Failures project, there will be a reduced need for that documentation and change management processes for relatively minor failure correction. Each year, Hydro will provide a concise 16 17 summary of the previous year's work.

18

As personnel look to further coordinate work by location, Hydro expects the Terminal Station Refurbishment and Modernization Project will provide opportunities whereby Hydro can further optimize the coordination of capital and maintenance work to minimize outages to customers and equipment.

23

24 4 Asset Management Programs

- 25 4.1 Electrical Equipment
- 26 4.1.1 High Voltage Instrument Transformer Replacements
- 27 The metering protection and control devices (e.g. protective relaying, power quality monitors,

² If the work undertaken in the 2017 Terminal Station Refurbishment and Modernization Project had been submitted as 12 individual projects, it is estimated preparation would be approximately \$10,000 per project.
and kilowatt-hour meters) used in generation and transmission systems are not manufactured to handle the electricity involved in those systems. Measurement of the electricity's currents and voltages are provided to these devices through a current transformer (CT) and a potential transformer (PT), respectively. CTs and PTs are collectively known as instrument transformers (IT) (Figure 1). Hydro has approximately 900 individual high voltage ITs within the Island and Labrador Interconnected Systems.

7

A high-voltage IT consists of a tank, bushing, and an insulated electrical primary and secondary
winding. The insulation system involves the use of insulating oil or dry type insulation and a
high voltage porcelain bushing, which allows the safe connection of the winding to high voltage
conductors. The winding is enclosed in a steel tank.



Figure 1: 69 kV Current Transformer (left) and Potential Transformer (Right)

- 12 Hydro's manages planned IT replacements in three categories:
- 13 1. Condition;
- 14 2. PCB compliance replacements; and
- 15 3. manufacturer and model.

1 Condition

2 Deterioration or damage to the various IT components can result in the failure of the unit to 3 provide accurate measurements to metering, protection, and control devices, which may affect 4 the safe and reliable operation of the generation and transmission systems. Failure could also 5 result in an oil spill. Also, in some situations, pieces of the IT may be forcibly projected under 6 catastrophic failure resulting in a safety risk for personnel in the area or damage to other 7 infrastructure.

8

9 Damage to an IT normally results from vandalism, impacts from catastrophically failed
10 equipment, or accidental contact of mobile equipment. Upon such incidents, Hydro assesses
11 the electrical and physical integrity of the IT to determine if replacement is required.

12

Hydro monitors ITs for physical and electrical deterioration by conducting regular visual
 inspections of the units as part of its station inspection program plus regularly scheduled
 station Infrared inspections and electrical insulation testing.

16

Physical deterioration involves conditions such as oil leaks, rusting, or small chips and cracks inthe insulation. Figure 2 shows an example of rusting on a PT tank.



Figure 2: Rusting on Potential Transformer

Electrical deterioration is identified by conducting Power Factor testing at intervals, which is
 used to establish the rate and level of insulation degradation. Hydro uses a world recognized
 testing company, Doble Engineering Company, to provide an assessment of the test results

4

5 Unit deterioration information is reviewed regularly by Asset Management personnel to 6 determine when corrective maintenance or unit replacement is required. Hydro conducts 7 minor IT corrective maintenance, such as painting and small bushing chip treatment; however, 8 major corrective maintenance or unit refurbishments are not undertaken as economical 9 options for this type of work have not been found. Units requiring major corrective 10 maintenance or refurbishments are replaced.

11

12 **PCB Compliance Replacements**

13 Environment Canada's PCB Regulations requires that by 2025 all ITs are not to have a PCB concentration greater that 50ppm. ITs are sealed, oil-filled units, in which the oil acts as an 14 15 electrical insulator. Equipment manufactured prior to 1985 has been known to contain PCBs. Due to the age of the units and the risk of introducing contamination (e.g. air) that could impact 16 17 the electrical integrity of an IT, Hydro does not sample ITs. Therefore, establishing the actual 18 PCB concentration in an IT is not possible. Hydro, in consultation with manufacturers, has 19 established that units manufactured before 1985 are suspected to contain PCBs in 20 concentration levels greater than or equal to 50 ppm. Thus, Hydro has a program to replace all 21 suspect oil-filled ITs before 2025.

22

23 Manufacturer and Model

In 2010, Hydro experienced a failure of a 230 kV ASEA IMBA Current Transformer. The failure
 analysis recommended this manufacturer and model be replaced over time. These
 replacements are included in this program.

27

28 Exclusions from the IT Replacement Program

29 Modern day circuit breaker technology includes CTs embedded in the circuit breaker bushings.

Therefore, where possible, external CTs will be displaced by bushing CTs as circuit breakers are
 replaced and, as such, CTs are not included in this program.

3

4 4.1.2 High Voltage Switch Replacements

5 High Voltage switches are used to isolate equipment either for maintenance activities or system 6 operation and control (e.g. disconnect switches). Switches are also used to bypass equipment 7 to prevent customer outages while work is being performed on the equipment. Disconnect 8 switches are an important part of the Work Protection Code as they provide a visible air gap 9 (i.e., visible isolation with an open switch) for utility workers. Work Protection is defined as "a 10 guarantee that an ISOLATED, or ISOLATED and DE-ENERGIZED, condition has been established for worker protection and will continue to exist, except for authorized tests." Proper operation 11 12 of disconnect switches is essential for a safe work environment and for reliable operation.

13

The basic components of a disconnect switch are the blade assembly, insulators, switch base 14 15 and operating mechanism. The blade assembly is the current carrying component in the switch, while the operating mechanism moves it to open and close the switch. The insulators are made 16 17 of porcelain and insulate the switch base and operating mechanism from the current carrying 18 parts. The switch base supports the insulators and is mounted to a metal frame support 19 structure. The operating mechanism is operated either manually, by using a handle at ground level to open and close the blade, or by a motor operated device, in which case the switch is 20 21 known as a Motor-Operated Disconnect (MOD). A disconnect and its associated components 22 are shown in Figure 3.



Figure 3: Various Components of a High Voltage Disconnect Switch

Hydro monitors the condition of its switches by conducting regular visual inspections of the 1 2 units (through station inspection and Infrared inspection programs) and reviewing reports from the work order system and staff. Issues commonly reported include inoperable mechanical 3 linkages, misalignment of switch blades, broken insulators, and seizing of moving parts. Asset 4 management personnel determine the timing of corrective maintenance or switch 5 6 replacement. If the required parts are available then repairs are undertaken as part of ongoing 7 maintenance. Switches that have operating deficiencies and have reached a service life of 50 8 years or greater are designated for replacement. Switches that have no replacement parts 9 available due to obsolescence, are damaged beyond repair, or cannot be economically repaired 10 and do not require immediate replacement are designated for replacement under this program. 11

12 Figure 4 shows an example of a badly damaged disconnect switch.



Figure 4: Broken Insulator on 69 kV Disconnect Switch

1 4.1.3 Surge Arrestors Replacements

2 Surge arresters (also known as lightning arrestors) are used on critical terminal station 3 equipment to protect that equipment from voltage due to lightning, extreme system operating 4 voltages and switching transients (collectively called overvoltages). In these situations, voltage 5 at the equipment can rise to levels which can damage the equipment's insulation. The surge 6 arrestors act to maintain the voltages within acceptable levels. Without surge arrestors, 7 equipment insulation can be damaged and faults can result during overvoltages. Hydro typically 8 has surge arresters installed on the high side and low voltage sides of it 46 kV and above power 9 transformers.

- 10
- 11 Figure 5 shows the arrestors on a 230kV power transformer.



Figure 5: Western Avalon Terminal Station Transformer T3 230 kV Surge Arresters

Surge arrestors can fail as a result of the cumulative effects of prolonged or multiple overvoltages. When a surge arrester fails, it is not repairable and must be replaced immediately; otherwise, the major equipment may be exposed to damaging overvoltages. The older arrester designs have a higher incidence of failure than the newer designs.

5

6 Hydro's surge arrestor asset management program replaces surge arrestors based upon the

- 7 following criteria:
- 8 1. Removal of gapped type arresters with Zinc Oxide design due to enhanced performance;
- Replace units due to a condition identified through visual inspections for chips or cracks
 or electrical testing such as Power Factor testing;
- If failures occur on a given transformer, all arresters on both the high and low side are
 considered for replacement either immediately or in a planned fashion; and
- If transformers are being planned for maintenance or other Capital work, consideration
 is given to changing aged arresters on a common outage. Hydro targets replacement at

40 years of age to reduce the risk of in-service failures and minimize service
 interruptions.

3

4 4.1.4 Insulator Replacements

Insulators provide electrical insulation between energized equipment and ground. When an
insulator fails and a fault occurs, a safety hazard to personnel and customer outages may occur.

8 Insulators consist of insulating material such as glass, porcelain and metal end fittings to attach 9 the insulator to the structure and the conductor. The metallic hardware is mated with the 10 porcelain or glass insulator using cement. There are different styles of insulators (e.g. post, cap 11 and pin, suspension). An example of a suspension insulator is shown in Figure 6.

12

13 Terminal stations contain post type, cap and pin-top, multi-cone and suspension type14 insulators.



Figure 6: A Multi-cone type insulator prone to failure due to cement growth

1 For insulators using porcelain, cement is used in mating the porcelain and metal hardware. 2 Some older insulators have been damaged by a phenomenon known as cement growth. This is 3 a common problem in the utility industry. In such situations water is absorbed into the concrete 4 causing swelling of the cement during freeze/thaw cycles, placing stress upon the porcelain. 5 Over time, the increasing pressure caused by cement growth will crack or break the porcelain 6 resulting in insulator failure. In such situations, porcelain may fall presenting a safety hazard to 7 crews or damaging equipment below. Also, faults resulting in outages to customers often occur when insulator failure leads to flash-over³. Insulator manufacturers have identified and 8 9 researched cement growth problems and have improved their cement quality to eliminate this 10 problem.

11

Hydro carries out detailed insulator surveys by geographical area. Hydro identifies any insulator
types known to be prone to failure due to cement growth and replaces these insulators under
this program.

15

16 4.1.5 Grounding Refurbishment and Upgrades

The grounding system in a terminal station or distribution substation consists of copper wire used in the ground grid under the station, gradient control mats for high voltage switches, and bonding wiring connecting the structure and equipment metal components to the ground grid (Figure 7). In the event of a line to ground fault, electrical potential differences will exist in the grounding system. If the grounding system is inadequate or deteriorated these differences may be hazardous to personnel. These potential differences are known as step and touch potentials. Effective station grounding reduces these potentials to eliminate the hazard.

³ Flashover is an electrical arc between the electrified end and the un-electrified (ground) end of an insulator due to insulator failure.



Figure 7: Typical Grounding Connection on Terminal Station Fence

To determine whether grounding upgrades are required, Hydro performs a step and touch 1 2 potential analysis of the terminal station or distribution substation. A step and touch potential 3 analysis involves the gathering of field data and conducting analysis in order to determine if 4 ground grid modifications are required to eliminate step and touch potential hazard. This 5 engineering is conducted in accordance with the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers 6 (IEEE) Standard 80-2000. Grounding systems with hazardous step and/or touch potentials are 7 upgraded by adding additional equipment bonding, gradient control mats, or copper wire to 8 the station grounding grid. In the case where the terminal station grounding infrastructure has 9 deteriorated with age or is damaged due to accidental contact or vandalism, the grounding 10 system is refurbished by correcting damage or replacing missing infrastructure. Upgrades and 11 refurbishments are made in accordance with Hydro's Terminal Station Grounding Standard.

1 4.1.6 Power Transformer Upgrades and Refurbishment

Power transformers are a critical component of the power system. Transformers allow for the
cost-effective production, transmission and distribution of electricity by converting the
electricity to an appropriate voltage for each segment of the electrical system and allow for
economic construction and operation of the electrical system.

6

7 Hydro has 136 power transformers 46kV and above, as well as several station service
8 transformers at voltages lower than 46kV.

9

10 The basic components of a power transformer are:

- Transformer steel tank, which contains the metal core and paper insulated windings
 responsible for voltage conversion, oil which is part of the insulating system, and a
 gasket system that keeps the oil from penetrating the environment;
- Bushings mounted to the top of the transformer tank that connect the windings to the
 external electrical conductors;
- Radiators and cooling fans that remove heat for the transformer's internal components;
- Load tap changer, which is attached internally or externally and is the device through
 which transformer's voltage is maintained at acceptable levels; and
- Protective devices to ensure the safe operation of the transformer, such as gas detector
 relays, oil level and temperature relays and gauges.
- 21

Figure 8 shows a picture of a 75 MVA, 230/66 kV power transformer at Hardwoods TerminalStation.



Figure 8: Power Transformer

1 Transformers are expensive components of the electrical system. Hydro, like many North 2 American utilities, is working to maximize and extend the life of transformers by regularly 3 assessing their condition, executing regularly schedule maintenance and testing, and 4 undertaking refurbishment or corrective actions as required. Transformers regularly undergo 5 visual inspection as part of Hydro's terminal station inspection and scheduled preventive 6 maintenance and testing to identify concerns regarding a transformer's condition such as:

- 7 1. Insulating oil and paper deterioration;
- 8 2. oil moisture content;
- 9 3. oil leaks;
- 10 4. tank, radiators and other component rusting/corrosion;
- 11 5. tap changer component wear or damage;
- 12 6. damaged/Deteriorated and PCB contaminated bushings;

- 1 7. failure of the protective devices; and
 - 8. cooling fan failures.
- 3

2

4 Details on the assessment procedures and corrective action for each of these concerns are5 provided below.

6

7 Transformer Oil Deterioration

8 The insulating oil in a transformer and its tap changer diverter switch is a critical component of 9 the insulation system. Normal operation of a transformer will cause its oil to deteriorate. 10 Deterioration results from a number of causes such as heating, internal arcing of electrical components, or ingress of water moisture into the transformer. Deterioration of the oil will 11 12 affect its function in the insulation system and may damage the paper component of the insulation system. Unacceptable levels of deterioration can affect the reliable operation of the 13 transformer. To ensure the oil in a transformer is of acceptable quality, Hydro has an oil 14 15 monitoring program through which oil samples are obtained annually from each transformer and analyzed by a professional laboratory. The test results are assessed to determine the level 16 17 of deterioration. If an unacceptable level of deterioration is identified, required corrective 18 action is identified by asset management personnel. This action entails either the 19 refurbishment of the oil to improve its quality, or the replacement of the oil.

20

21 Moisture Content

Oil samples are also analyzed to determine moisture content. Moisture in a power transformer may be residual moisture or may result from the ingress of atmospheric moisture. Oil and insulating paper with high moisture content has a reduced dielectric strength, and therefore its performance as an electrical insulator is diminished. To address transformers with high moisture content, Hydro will install an online molecular sieve dry-out system, which circulates and dries the transformer oil without requiring an equipment outage.

1 Oil Leaks and Corrosion

2 Transformer oil leaks are an environmental hazard and as oil is part of the insulation system, 3 unchecked leaks can affect the safe and reliable operation of a transformer. Leaks can be 4 caused by a number of factors, including failed gaskets, perforated radiators, tank piping and 5 other steel components. Transformers are visually inspected for leaks as part of the regularly 6 scheduled terminal station inspection program and assessed by asset management personnel 7 to determine the level of corrective action. Minor action (e.g. small repairs, patching and minor 8 painting) is undertaken as part of the maintenance. Work requiring major refurbishments and 9 replacements (e.g. radiator or bushing replacements, gasket replacements, and tank rusting 10 refurbishment) are undertaken under this program.

11

12 Load Tap Changer

Load tap changer diverter switches, which are externally mounted on the tank, adjust the 13 voltage by changing the electrical connection point of the transformer winding. This involves 14 15 moving parts, which are subject to wear and damage. Additionally, in older non-vacuum 16 designed diverter switches, arcing occurs during the movement, leading to deterioration of the insulating oil. This wear and deterioration can lead to failure of the tap changer. Oil testing 17 18 techniques have been developed by professional laboratories that provide assessments of the 19 condition of the parts and oil. Oil samples are obtained annually from each load tap changer to 20 perform a Tap Changer Activity Signature Analysis (TASA) by the laboratory. This analysis 21 provides a condition assessment of the tap changer oil and components, along with 22 recommendations for implementation by Hydro. Recommendations can range from continued 23 or increased annual sampling, planned refurbishment, or to immediately remove from service, 24 inspect and repair. The latter two activities are covered by this project. Another component 25 covered by this project is to correct leaking seals between tap changer diverter switches and 26 the transformer main tank. Currently Hydro has several transformers that show low levels of combustible gases, such as acetylene, due to gasses migrating from the tap changer diverter 27 28 switch compartment to the main tank.

1 Bushings

In addition to the aforementioned leaking bushings, Hydro must also address suspected
bushings for compliance with the latest PCB Regulations, as well as bushings with degraded
electrical properties.

5

6 The latest regulations state that all equipment bushings in-service beyond 2025 must have a 7 PCB concentration of less than 50 mg/kg. Hydro has approximately 500 sealed bushings that 8 were manufactured prior to 1985 which are suspected to contain PCBs greater than 50 mg/kg 9 and possibly greater than 500 mg/kg. Some sealed bushings have sampling ports to allow 10 sampling; however, Hydro does not sample due to small quantity of oil in bushings and the risk 11 of contamination during sampling. Bushings that are known or suspected of having 12 unacceptable PCB levels are replaced.

13

Hydro performs Power Factor testing on bushings every six years as part of the transformer
preventive maintenance. When Power Factor results indicate unacceptable electrical
degradation, bushings are scheduled for replacement.

17

18 **Protective Devices and Fans**

19 Protective devices and cooling fans are tested during visual inspections and preventive 20 maintenance, and are replaced when they fail to operate as designed, or their condition 21 warrant replacement. In addition, cooling fans are added where additional cooling is required 22 due to increased loads.

23

24 On-line Oil Analysis

In addition to oil quality, Dissolved Gas Analysis (DGA) is performed on oil. DGA analyzes the levels of dissolved gases in oil, which provides insight into the condition of the transformer insulation. The presence of gases can indicate if the transformer has been subjected to fault conditions or overheating, or if there is internal arcing or partial discharge occurring in the windings. The annual oil sample test can only provide an analysis of transformer condition at

the time when the sample is taken. In 2015, as part of this program, Hydro began installing 1 2 Online Dissolved Gas Monitoring on Generator Step-Up (GSU) Transformers, to allow real-time, 3 continuous monitoring of dissolved gases in oil. The online gas in oil monitoring continuously 4 monitors the transformer and provides early fault detection. Continuous data is also a useful 5 tool for personnel to trend gases for the scheduling of repairs or replacement prior to in-service 6 failures, improving the overall reliability of the Island Interconnected System. Continuous 7 monitoring enables Hydro to reduce unplanned outages and lessen the probability of 8 equipment in-service failure.

9

10 This program is being extended to non-GSU transformers in 2017, with Online DGA being 11 installed on critical power transformers on the Island Interconnected System. The factors used 12 to determine the criticality score were submitted to the Board in the June 2, 2014 13 *"Transformers Report"*. Hydro has identified 50 transformers for installation of online DGA 14 devices through 2024.

15

16 4.1.7 Circuit Breaker Refurbishment and Replacements

17 The circuit breaker is a critical component of the power system. Located in a terminal station, 18 each circuit breaker performs switching actions to complete, maintain, and interrupt current 19 flow under normal or fault conditions. The reliable operation of circuit breakers through its fast 20 response and complete interruption of current flow is essential for the protection and stability 21 of the power system. The failure of a breaker to operate as designed may affect the reliability 22 and safety of the electrical system resulting in failure of other equipment and the occurrence of 23 an outage affecting more end users. Hydro has 195 terminal station circuit breakers with 24 voltage rates greater than 66kV in service.

25

26 Currently, Hydro maintains three different types of high voltage circuit breakers:

Air Blast Circuit Breakers (ABCB) - use high pressure air to interrupt currents and
 typically are at least 38 years old at replacement. In the 2016 Capital Budget Application
 "Upgrade Circuit Breakers – Various Sites Project", approval was obtained to replace

Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro 2019 Capital Budget Application

- ABCBs on an accelerated schedule by the end of 2020. This work is covered under a
 separate project and is not part of the work outlined in the Overview.
- Oil Circuit Breakers (OCB) use oil to interrupt currents and typically are at least 36
 years old at replacement. In the 2016 Capital Budget Application "Upgrade Circuit
 Breakers Various Sites (2016-2020)" project, approval was obtained for the
 replacement of 10 OCBs up to 2020 that were not compliant with Environment Canada
 PCB regulations. The remaining non-compliant breakers will be replaced before 2025.
 From 2017 forward, any replacements not previously approved in the 2016-2020 project
 will be included in the work conducted under this section of the Overview; and
- Sulphur Hexafluoride (SF₆) Circuit Breakers use SF₆ gas to interrupt current and installation of these breakers started in 1979, including all new installations. In the 2016 Capital Budget Application "Upgrade Circuit Breakers – Various Sites (2016-2020)" project, approval was obtained, until the end of 2020, for the mid-life refurbishment and replacement of SF₆ circuit breakers with voltage rates 66 KV and above. From 2017 forward, any SF₆ replacements and refurbishments not previously approved in the 2016-2020 project will be included in the work conducted under this section of the Overview.



Figure 9: Circuit Breakers – ABCB (left), Oil (middle), and SF₆ (right)

As presented in the 2016 Capital Budget Application, "Upgrade Circuit Breakers – Various Sites (2016-2020)" project, SF₆ circuit breakers rated at 138 kV and above are required to be refurbished after 20 years of service. Replacement of SF₆ circuit breakers rated at 66 kV and above will be after 40 years of service, as is consistent with Hydro's philosophy, most recently presented to the Board in the 2016 capital budget application "Upgrade Circuit Breakers – Various Sites (2016-2020)" project. Select SF₆ circuit breakers may require replacement before the 40-year service life period based upon their condition and operational history. Hydro expects to replace up to six breakers per year beyond 2020 and an average of five breakers and overhaul one breaker per year for 2022 and 2023 and not require overhauls again until beginning 2030. As per the 2016 Capital Budget Application, "Upgrade Circuit Breakers – Various Sites" project, Hydro does not currently overhaul breakers rated below 138 kV.

7

8 Figure 10 shows the age distribution of circuit breakers not approved for replacement prior to9 2017.





10 4.1.8 Station Service Refurbishment and Upgrades

The power required to operate the various terminal station and distribution substation (collectively referred to as "station" equipment) and infrastructure is provided by the station service system. The station service system provides AC (Alternating Current) and DC (Direct Current) power to operate the equipment in a station. The AC station service is generally supplied by one or more transformers in the station. Due to their criticality, 230 kV terminal stations have a redundant station service feed, fed either through a redundant transformer tertiary winding, supplied from Newfoundland Power's electrical system where available, or by a diesel generator. Common AC station service loads are:

- 6 transformer cooling fans;
- 7 anti-condensation heaters;
- station lighting;
- 9 control building HVAC;
- 10 control building lighting;
- air compressors; and
- battery chargers.
- 13

The DC station service is supplied by a battery bank, which is charged from the AC station service. The DC station service provides power to critical devices in the station and is designed to allow operation of the station in the event of an AC station service failure. Hydro's DC station service system is a 125 V system in the majority of the stations with some lower voltage stations and telecommunications equipment having 48 V systems. Common DC station service loads are:

- 20 circuit breaker charging motors;
- digital relays;
- emergency lighting;
- disconnect switch motor operators; and
- telecommunications equipment.
- 25

As terminal station equipment is replaced, added, or upgraded, the AC and DC station service loads may increase. Upon the installation of new equipment in the terminal station, Hydro carries out a station service study to determine the loading on the station service system. In the event that the new station service loads exceed the design load of the system, upgrades such as cable, circuit breaker panel, splitter, and transfer switch replacements or additions are
 required. Replacement of station service transformers is not included in this program, as they
 are addressed separately in the Application, under the *Replace Power Transformers* project.

4

5 4.1.9 Battery Banks and Chargers

6 Battery banks and chargers supply direct current (DC) power to critical station infrastructure 7 such as circuit breakers, protection and control relays, disconnect switch motor operators, and 8 telecontrol equipment (Figure 11). Battery banks are designed to provide a minimum of eight 9 hours of auxiliary power to critical infrastructure in the event of a loss of AC station service 10 supply. The majority of Hydro's battery banks consist of lead-acid flooded-cell type batteries, which have deteriorating capacity over time. Hydro adheres to IEEE 450 and 1188, which 11 12 recommends replacements of a battery if its capacity has fallen to 80% or less of its rated capacity. The service life of flooded cell batteries is 18 to 20 years while valve regulated lead 13 14 acid (VRLA) batteries have a service life of 7 to 10 years.

15

16 Hydro regularly carries out testing on its battery banks to determine bank capacity and will

17 replace banks and chargers with insufficient capacity under this program.



Figure 11: 125 V Direct Current Terminal Station Battery Bank

1 4.1.10 Install Breaker Bypass Switches

High voltage circuit breakers, with their associated protection and control equipment, are used to control the flow of electrical current to ensure safe and reliable operation of the electrical system (Figure 12). When a breaker is removed for maintenance, troubleshooting, refurbishment, or replacement, an alternate electrical path must be implemented to avoid customer outages. On radial systems⁴, this alternate path is accomplished using a bypass switch. When closed, the bypass switch allows electricity to flow around the breaker allowing the breaker to be safely de-energized, while maintaining service continuity.



Figure 12: Example of Bypass Switch Installation

9 Listed in Table 1 are six radial systems, servicing multiple customers, where breakers are

10 installed without bypass switches. To ensure service continuity during breaker downtime,

11 Hydro will install breaker bypass switches in these locations.

Breaker Location	Customers Affected
Bottom Waters L60T1	2253 Bottom Waters area customers
Buchans B2T1	665 Buchans area Newfoundland Power customers and Duck Pond Mine
Doyles B1L15	3563 Grand Bay, Port aux Basque, and Long Lake area Newfoundland Power customers.
Howley B1T2	773 Hampden and Jackson's Arm area customers and 665 Newfoundland Power Howley area customers (Approved Project Ongoing)
Peter's Barren B1L41	1900 Great Northern Peninsula customers north of Daniel's Harbor
South Brook L22T1	2340 South Brook area customers.

Table 1: Circuit Breakers without Bypass Switches

⁴ A radial system is an electrical network that has only one electrical path between the source and the load.

1 4.2 Civil Works and Buildings

2 4.2.1 Equipment Foundations

Reinforced concrete foundations support high voltage equipment and structures in Hydro's terminal stations. These foundations range in age from one to forty-five years. Terminal station foundations support equipment and bus work. The majority of these structures formed part of the original station construction and are in excess of thirty-five years of age.

7

The service life of galvanized steel structures varies depending on the operating environment,
but can exceed 100 years, outliving the foundations on which they are built. A number of the

10 foundations in Hydro terminal stations have deteriorated significantly due to repeated

11 exposure to damaging freeze/thaw cycles, weathering, and age, leading to concerns over their

12 integrity. Degraded structure foundations are shown in Figure 13 and Figure 14.



Figure 13: Structure B1T1 Bottom Terminal Stations



Figure 14: Structure L01L37-1 Western Avalon Terminal Station

To ensure foundations perform as per the original design intent, severely deteriorated concrete foundations must be refurbished or replaced. Failure to complete repairs could result in a catastrophic failure, causing outages or personal injury. Hydro has carried out engineering inspections of all 230 kV stations and identified foundations requiring repairs. Additionally, Hydro performs visual inspections of foundations every 120 days during regular terminal station inspections. Foundations identified for repair are addressed under this program.

7

8 4.2.2 Fire Protection

9 Hydro's terminal station control buildings contain combustible materials. As these facilities are
10 unattended, a fire could spread causing severe damage to protection and control wiring and
11 equipment, which would cause extended and widespread outages. To restore a terminal station
12 severely damaged by fire to normal operation could take months.

13

14 Hydro is installing gaseous fire suppression systems in its 230 kV terminal stations to protect

15 the control cabinets and cables and any other critical equipment from being destroyed by a fire,

16 without damaging sensitive electronic equipment and wiring.

In the 2015 and 2016 Capital Budget Application "Install Fire Protection" projects, Hydro
received approval to install fire protection in the Holyrood and Bay d'Espoir terminal stations
respectively. Due to their criticality, Hydro intends to continue its program to install fire
suppression systems in all 230 kV terminal stations.

5

6 4.2.3 Control Buildings

7 Terminal station control buildings contain critical station infrastructure such as protection, 8 control, and monitoring equipment, telecontrol equipment, station service equipment, battery 9 banks, and compressed air systems. Many control buildings also contain office, breakroom, and 10 washroom facilities, for use by Hydro crews when working in the station. As the equipment in 11 control buildings is critical to the function of the terminal station, it is imperative that Hydro 12 ensures the structural integrity, weather-tightness, and security of its control buildings. While addressing these issues, Hydro also ensures that building auxiliaries, such as electrical, 13 plumbing, and HVAC systems function properly to ensure reliable and safe operation and use of 14 15 the terminal station and the control building.

16

Typical refurbishment activities for control building involve replacement of the roof membrane, siding, and doors and may also include replacement of electrical equipment (such as distribution panels, transfer switches, or low-voltage disconnects), plumbing (such as water service entries and internal plumbing), and HVAC (such as intake and exhaust fans, louvers, heaters, and air conditioning).

22

23 Figure 15 and Figure 16 show deterioration at different control building locations.



Figure 15: Terminal Station Control Buildings (Come By Chance and Sunnyside) showing cracking and deterioration of the roof membrane systems.



Figure 16: Building exterior cladding and doorways displaying severe rusting and deterioration

1 **4.3** Protection, Control, and Monitoring

2 4.3.1 Protection and Control Upgrades and Refurbishment

The terminal station protection and control system automatically monitors, analyzes and causes action by other equipment, such as breakers, to ensure the safe, reliable operation of the electrical system or to initiate action when a command is issued by system operators. The protection and control system also provides indications of system conditions and alarms and allows the recording of system conditions for analysis. Hydro carries out capital work on various protection and control equipment, including:

- 9 protective relays;
- 10 breaker failure protection;
- tap h controls;
- data alarm systems;
- frequency monitors;
- digital fault recorders; and
- cables and panels.
- 16

17 Electromechanical and Solid State Protective Relay Replacement

Protective relays monitor and analyze the operation conditions of the electrical system. When a relay identifies unacceptable operating conditions, such as a fault, it will initiate an action to isolate the source of the condition by commanding high voltage equipment such as breakers to operate. Protective relays play a crucial role in maintaining system stability, preventing hazardous conditions from damaging electrical equipment, or preventing harm to personnel.

23

Older relays existing on Hydro's system are the electromechanical and older solid state types and lack features such as data storage and event recording capability. Modern digital multifunction relays are used to replace these older style relays as they have increased setting flexibility, fault disturbance monitoring, communications capability and metering functionality, and greater dependability and security, thus enhancing system reliability. Digital and electromechanical relays are shown in Figure 17.



Figure 17: Digital and Electromechanical Relays

1 In the *"Report to the Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities Related to Alarms, Event* 2 *Recording Devices, and Digital Relays"* dated August 1, 2014, Section 3.1, "Review of Updates 3 and Changes to Existing Digital Relay Program" stated that "Hydro plans to review its existing 4 transformer, bus, and line protections in an effort to develop plans for future implementation 5 of modern digital relays with data storage and fault recording capabilities." To fulfill this 6 commitment, Hydro completed the following:

- A review of all transformer, bus, and line protection on 230 kV, 138 kV, and 69 kV
 systems, including data storage and fault recording capabilities; and
- A plan to replace all existing electromechanical transformer, bus, timer, and line
 protection relays with modern digital relays. The 230 kV relays are the priority for the
 first phase of the plan, with 138 kV and 69 kV to follow.
- 12

As part of the annual Terminal Station Refurbishment and Modernization Project, Hydro will continue to execute the replacement of 230 kV electromechanical and obsolete solid-state transformer, line, and bus relays with modern digital multifunction relays, which began in 2016 under the "Replace Protective Relays" program. Additionally, in line with Hydro's response to request for information CA-NLH-037 of the 2016 Capital Budget Application, Hydro installed
 redundant multifunction transformer protection relays in 2016 for transformers rated above 10
 MVA. Under this program Hydro will continue to install these upgrades.

4

5 Breaker Failure Protection

6 Protective relaying is designed to trip a breaker during fault conditions to remove the fault from 7 the electrical system so as to minimize equipment outages and maintain system stability and 8 safe, reliable operation. When a breaker does not properly isolate a fault, other breakers will be 9 commanded to trip to isolate the fault. This will result in larger outages but will ensure isolation 10 of the original fault in time to minimize damage to equipment and minimize impact to the 11 system. The failure of a breaker to isolate a fault when commanded is called a Breaker Failure. 12 Circuit breaker protective relaying is designed to recognize a breaker failure and to initiate 13 action to surrounding breakers to minimize damage to equipment and the spread of the impact 14 of a breaker failure. This breaker protection feature is called Breaker Failure Protection.

15

Prior to 2014, breaker failure protection was implemented only in Hydro's 230 kV terminal stations. In 2014, Hydro completed a review of breaker failure protection in 66 kV and 138 kV terminal stations. Hydro also developed a protection and control standard "Application of Breaker Failure Relaying" calling for breaker failure protection on transmission breakers rated at 66 kV and above. From this review, Hydro identified 20 terminal stations requiring breaker failure protection.

22

As part of the Hydro's 2016 Capital Budget Application, Hydro proposed and received Board approval for the installation of breaker failure protection in three terminal stations. As part of the annual Terminal Station Refurbishment and Modernization Project, Hydro will continue its plan to execute the installation of breaker failure protection in the remaining terminal stations.

27

28 Tap Changer Paralleling Control Replacement

29 Tap changer paralleling controls are designed to:

• Ensure the load bus voltage is regulated as prescribed by the setting;

- minimize the current that circulates between the transformers, as would occur if the tap
 changers operated on inappropriate tap positions; and
- ensure the controller operates correctly in multiple transformer applications regardless
 of system configuration changes or station breaker operations and resultant station
 configuration changes.
- 7

8 Current tap changer controls are of similar vintage as the power transformers, dating back to 9 the late 1960's, and require replacement. Recent feedback from the tap changer paralleling 10 control supplier indicated older equipment has capacitors that will dry out over time resulting 11 in control issues. Additionally, it was recommended the same controller model be applied to all 12 transformers to optimize tap changing control. The control issues, as described by the supplier, 13 have been observed by Hydro staff at numerous sites during review, which indicated that a high 14 number of operations were experienced at various sites.

15

Hydro plans to start replacing tap changer paralleling controls in 2018 beginning at WesternAvalon Terminal Station.

18

19 Equipment Alarm Upgrades

20 Alarms inform the Energy Control Center and operating personnel that equipment and relaying

21 requires attention and are communicated to the Energy Control Centre and/or displayed locally

22 on the station annunciator (Figure 18).



Figure 18: An annunciator commonly found in Hydro's terminal stations

Hydro's review of Alarms, Event Recording Devices and Digital Relays found that by providing
 more detailed alarm schemes, the ECC and local operators are able to troubleshoot system
 events more accurately and quickly.

4

5 Hydro's internal study identified required increases to alarm detail for five 230 kV terminal 6 stations to the Energy Control Centre. Stony Brook, Holyrood, Sunnyside, Oxen Pond, and 7 Massey Drive were assessed. Hydro proposed and received approval to implement the 8 proposed upgrades at the Stony Brook terminal station as part of the 2016 Capital Budget 9 Application "Upgrade Data Alarm Systems" project. Hydro will continue its plan to install 10 improved data alarm management as part of the Terminal Station Refurbishment and 11 Modernization project, with the remaining stations being addressed in future applications.

12

13 Frequency Monitoring Additions

As a result of investigations into the outage of January 2013, a recommendation was made to install frequency monitoring devices on the Island Interconnected System to allow better analysis of system events, such as pre- and post-fault scenarios. It was recommended that one

such device be installed in an Eastern, Western, and Central location on the Interconnected 1 2 System. Hydro Place (East), Massey Drive Terminal Station (West), and Bay d'Espoir Terminal 3 Station #2 (Central) have been chosen for the installation of frequency monitoring devices.

4

5 Digital Fault Recorders

6 Digital fault recorders (DFRs) record analog electrical data, such as voltage, frequency, and 7 current, as well as digital relay contact positions, at a high resolution to allow Hydro to determine the cause and location of an electrical fault. This data allows Hydro to restore service 8 9 in a timely manner and address system configurations and settings to mitigate the impact of 10 future faults and improve the protection of critical electrical infrastructure. Hydro has DFRs deployed in several stations and has a program to install DFRs in areas where Hydro does not 11 have sufficient DFR coverage to allow the analysis of faults. 12

13

14 **Protection and Control Cable and Panel Modifications**

- 15 This program will cover protection and control panels and wiring that may require alteration,
- replacement or addition to existing wiring due to deterioration from environment conditions, 16
- 17 accidental damage or the modification/addition protection and control equipment.

7. Diesel Genset Replacements (2019-2020)

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Electrical	
Mechanical	× •
Civil	
Protection & Control	
Transmission & Distribution	
Telecontrol	
System Planning	

Diesel Genset Replacement

Cartwright

July 2018


1 Summary

2 This project is for the replacement of diesel generator set Unit 2052 in the Cartwright Diesel3 Generating Station.

4

Gensets have an expected average service life of 100,000 operating hours. Hydro's asset
management strategy is to replace gensets when they reach approximately 100,000 operating
hours to ensure reliable operation. This is consistent with other utilities in Canada with prime
power diesel plants. Cartwright's Unit 2052 has accumulated approximately 107,909 hours as of
March 31, 2018.

10

11 To avoid significant risk associated with overhauling this unit past its expected lifespan and to

- 12 maintain reliable operations in Cartwright, Unit 2052 requires replacement.
- 13

14 The project is estimated to cost approximately \$3,947,400 with planned completion in 2020.

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1 **1 Introduction**

Cartwright is located on the east coast of Labrador. Hydro provides electrical service to
approximately 330 customers in the community from the Cartwright diesel generating plant
consisting of four gensets; two rated at 450 kW, one at 600 kW, and one at 720 kW.

5

6 Electricity in each community is supplied solely by a diesel generating plant owned and

7 operated by Hydro. Figure 1 is a map of a Labrador showing the location of Cartwright.



Figure 1: Map of Southern Labrador - Cartwright

8 2 Project Description

9 This proposed project is for the replacement of Unit 2052, a 720 kW unit at the Cartwright

10 generating plant, with a 925 kW unit. The estimated project cost includes all costs associated

11 with the procurement and installation of the new genset. To fit the new unit in the plant, Unit

- 1 2036 will be moved to the location of 2052 and the new 925 kW unit will be put in Unit 2036's
- 2 place (please refer to Figure 2). Piping modifications to the existing cooling system will be
- 3 required to accommodate the new unit and a new exhaust system installed with the new unit.



Figure 2: Layout of Cartwright Plant (Existing)

1 **3 Justification**

This project is justified on the requirement to satisfy Hydro's current asset management
strategy to replace gensets when they approach 100,000 operating hours to ensure reliable
power supply. Cartwright Unit 2052 is past end of life and need to be replaced.

5

6 3.1 Existing System

7 The Cartwright Diesel Generating Plant consists of four gensets with an installed capacity of 8 2,220 kW. The genset arrangement includes two 450 kW gensets, one 600 kW genset, and one 9 720 kW genset. The facility is the sole source of power for the community of Cartwright and is 10 required to provide electricity to customers on a continuous basis. The unit breakdown is 11 shown in Table 1.

Unit	kW	Year Installed	Operating Hours
2036	450	1992	58,753
2086	600	2009	28,879
2045	450	1993	75,993
2052	720	1998	107,909
Total kW	2,200 (1500 Firm)		

Table 1: Cartwright Diesel Units

12 3.2 Operating Experience

Unit 2052 has been in service for 20 years. The 720 kW unit has had four overhauls since installation. The last overhaul was performed in 2016 after incurring 94,778 operating hours. The unit had accumulated approximately 107,909 operating hours as of March 30, 2018 and is due for replacement in 2020 based on 20,000 operating hours since its last overhaul and exceeding 100,000 operating hours, which is the normal replacement criteria.

18

19 **3.3 Load Forecast**

20 Table 2 contains the projected load forecast for Cartwright for the next 5 years.

Year	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Forecasted Peak	1025	1025	1027	1027	1028	1032

Table 2: 5-Year Projected Load Forecast for Cartwright

The load in Cartwright is not expected to increase dramatically in the next six years; however, the project to replace the unit is not justified on load growth but rather Hydro's replacement criteria. The proposed increase in unit capacity to 925 kW is the least cost option based on a full cost benefit analysis.

5

6 3.4 Development of Alternatives

Several alternatives were considered for Cartwright and a cost benefit analysis was completed
to determine the most economic unit for the lifespan. Unit 2052 is a 1200 rpm unit that has
proven to be very reliable throughout its lifespan. The options include:

- Alternative 1: Replace Unit 2052 with a larger unit rated at 925 kW, 1200 rpm;
- Alternative 2: Replace Unit 2052 with a larger unit rated at 925 kW, 1800 rpm; and
- Alternative 3: Replace Unit 2052 with existing rated unit at 725 kW, 1800 rpm.¹
- 13

14 3.5 Cost Benefit Analysis

The economic analysis for this proposal uses a comparison of the cumulative present worth (CPW) of each alternative to determine the least cost alternative. The CPW analysis considered a study period of 25 years. The discount rate used in the study is 5.9 percent, which reflects Hydro's current long term weighted cost of capital.

19

20 The CPW analysis for each alternative was performed using the following information:

- Estimated capital costs;
- forecasted fuel costs;
- estimated unit overhaul costs and intervals;

¹ There are no 725 kW, 1200 rpm units available.

- estimated unit replacements and years; and
- remaining book values.
- 2 3

1

Using Diesel Plant Simulator software, the total operating hours, fuel consumption and 4 5 production (kWh) per unit for each alternative was determined for every year of the study 6 period. The main inputs to this simulator included load forecasts, load duration curves and 7 diesel unit specifications. By analyzing the annual operating hours for each unit the overhaul 8 and replacement intervals could be projected. Cost estimates for overhauls and unit 9 replacements were developed. Replacing Unit 2052 with a larger unit would result in greater 10 plant efficiency with fewer units online at certain times. The units online would be operating 11 with higher load, which is more efficient. For example, instead of running two units in the 12 summer for a load of 800 kW, the new larger unit could be operated solely and burn less fuel in 13 the process. The Cumulative Net Present Value analysis results are presented in Table 3.

Table 3: Analysis Summary

Cartwright Unit 2052 Replacement				
Alternative Comparison Cumulative Net Present Value To The Year 2018				
Alternatives	Cumulative Net Present Value	CPW Difference between Alternative and the Least Up front Cos Cost Alternative		
	(CPW)			
925 kW - 1200 PM	(CPW) 22,379,624	0	3,812,500	
925 kW - 1200 PM 925 kW - 1800 PM	(CPW) 22,379,624 23,381,274	0 1,001,649	3,812,500 3,448,900	

As shown in Table 3, Alternative 1 - replacing Unit 2052 (725 kW) with a 925 kW 1200 rpm unit, is the least cost alternative, based on the total operating hours, fuel consumption, number of replacements and the number of overhauls. This is based on 20,000 hour overhaul for both 1800 rpm and 1200 rpm units, which is current practice. Hydro is undergoing an internal study that may push 1200 rpm unit overhauls past 20,000 hours to 30,000 hours. This would further justifies the larger up-front capital cost of a 1200 rpm unit versus a 1800 rpm unit as there would more operating hours between overhauls and also extend the lifespan past 100,000

hours. However, this cost benefit analysis still favors the 1200 rpm unit even with the 20,000 1 2 hour overhaul interval.

3

4 4 Conclusion

By 2020, Unit 2052 at Cartwright Diesel Plant will have operated more than 115,000 hours, 5 6 reaching the end of its lifespan and needing to be replaced to maintain acceptable reliability for power generation. Replacing Cartwright Unit 2052 (725 kW) with a 925 kW 1200 rpm unit, is 7 8 the least cost alternative.

9

10 4.1 **Project Estimate**

The estimate for this project is shown in Table 4. 11

Project Cost 2019 2020 Beyond Total 1,059.3 1,069.3 Material Supply 10.0 0.0 Labour 221.6 662.5 884.1 0.0 Consultant 243.3 549.6 792.8 0.0 Contract Work 50.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 Other Direct Costs 20.0 187.6 0.0 207.6 Interest and Escalation 30.8 312.0 0.0 342.8 0.0 600.8 0.0 600.8 Contingency

525.6

Table 4: Project Estimate (\$000s)

3,421.8

0.0

3,947.4

4.2 Project Schedule 12

Total

13 The anticipated project schedule is provided in Table 5.

Activity		Start Date	End Date
Planning	Open project and develop design	Jan 2019	Feb 2019
	transmittal.		
Design	Finalize size and output requirements	Mar 2019	Jun 2019
	of new unit.		
	Complete mechanical.	Jul 2019	Sep 2019
	Complete electrical design.	Jul 2019	Sep 2019
	Complete protection and control	Jul 2019	Sep 2019
	design.		
Procurement	Order genset.	Oct 2019	May 2020
	Order switchgear.	Oct 2019	May 2020
Construction	Disconnect and remove Unit 2052.	Jul 2020	Jul 2020
	Install new genset.	Jul 2020	Aug 2020
	Modify cooling system.	Aug 2020	Aug 2020
Commissioning	Commission genset.	Aug 2020	Aug 2020
Closeout	Project closet out.	Sep 2020	Oct 2020

Table 5: Project Schedule

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Electrical	
Mechanical	
Civil	
Protection & Control	
Transmission & Distribution	
Telecontrol	
System Planning	

Distribution System Upgrades 2019

Various Sites

July 2018



1 Summary

Historically, Hydro used a component condition assessment based approach to identify parts of
its distribution system that needed to be refurbished to ensure reliable operation. With the
2019 Capital Budget Application, Hydro is enhancing this on-going effort to increase distribution
reliability by focusing on refurbishment of distribution feeders that have poor reliability
performance.

7

8 A brief description of work Hydro proposes to undertake in this project is:

- Bottom Waters (L3, L6 and L7) Replace poles, insulators, conductor, transformers,
 cribs, crossarms, reroute feeder and install a three-phase recloser;
- Barachoix (L1 and L4) Replace poles, insulators, conductor, transformers, cribs and
 crossarms; and
- 13 3. Hawke's Bay (L3) Replace poles, insulators, transformers, cribs and crossarms.
- 14

In this project Hydro is also proposing to replace inefficient area lighting fixtures with energy
efficient LED fixtures in the isolated diesel generation communities of Hopedale, Postville,
Makkovik, Rigolet, Black Tickle, Charlottetown, Port Hope Simpson, St. Lewis, Mary's Harbour,
L'Anse au Loup, Grey River, Francois, McCallum, St. Brendan's, and Little Bay Islands.

19

20 The estimated project cost is approximately \$5,880,900 with planned completion in 2020.

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1 1 Introduction

Through its distribution system, Hydro provides electricity to customers in many rural 2 3 communities. Historically, Hydro used a component condition assessment based approach to 4 identify parts of its distribution system that needed to be refurbished to ensure reliable 5 operation. With the 2019 Capital Budget Application, Hydro is enhancing this on-going effort to 6 increase distribution reliability by focusing on refurbishment of distribution feeders that have 7 poor reliability performance. These feeders were identified through the examination of the 8 Worst-Performing feeders. To identify those feeders, Hydro uses Customer Hours of Interruption (CHI)¹, System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI)², and System Average 9 Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI)³ to identify worst performing feeders that should receive 10 capital expenditures for refurbishment and upgrade. This process includes: 11

- 12 (i) Calculating reliability indices for all distribution feeders based on data for 2013-2017. All
- these reliability indices are calculated excluding loss of supply outages, planned outages,
 customer requests and major events. The five year average value is considered for
 ranking the feeders;
- 16 (ii) Ranking the feeders based on CHI, and SAIFI/SAIDI⁴;
- 17 (iii) Analysing the reliability data for the top twenty worst performing feeders to identify the
- 18 root cause of the poor performance; and
- (iv) Where work is required to address reliability performance, performing a feeder study,
 which includes such activities as inspection data review, system design review and
- 21 recommendations for corrective actions.

¹ CHI is the sum of the products of the outage duration multiplied by the number of customers affected during the outage for each event within a one year period.

² SAIFI is the System Average Interruption Frequency Index per year which indicates the average of sustained interruptions per customer served per year or the average number of power outages a customer has experienced in the respective distribution system per year.

³ SAIDI indicates the System Average Interruption Duration Index for customers served per year, or the average length of time a customer is without power in the respective distribution system per year.

⁴ CHI ranks the feeder based on the impact the feeder has on overall reliability indices; directing resources on these feeders will improve the corporate level statistics; however, this might lead to ignoring the smaller problematic feeders. To overcome this problem, the top twenty worst performing feeders based on SAIFI/SAIDI are also examined.

Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro 2019 Capital Budget Application

energy efficient LED lights in isolated diesel communities
2 Project Description
An overview of the reliability related work to be completed in this project is:
1. Bottom Waters (L3, L6 and L7), Central Interconnected
 Replace distribution structures, conductor, insulators, transformers, cribs
crossarms, anchors and downguys;
 Install a three-phase recloser; and
Reroute feeder.
2. Barachoix (L1 and L4), Central Interconnected
• Replace distribution structures, conductor, transformers, cribs, crossarms, anchor
and downguys.
3. Hawke's Bay (L3), Northern Interconnected
 Replace distribution structures, transformers, cribs, crossarms, anchors and
downguys.
The project will also install LED area lighting fixtures to replace high pressure sodium and
mercury vapour street lights in the communities of Hopedale, Postville, Makkovik, Rigolet, Black
Tickle, Charlottetown, Port Hope Simpson, St. Lewis, Mary's Harbour, L'Anse au Loup, Grev
River, Francois, McCallum, St. Brendan's, and Little Bay Islands.
3 Justification
This project is justified so as to maintain or improve the reliable operation of Hydro'

distribution system and to obtain energy efficiency gains in communities supplied by diesel

Hydro continues to replace high pressure sodium and mercury vapour area lights with more

generators.

1 3.1 Existing System

2 3.1.1 Bottom Waters

Feeders to be addressed (L3, L6 and L7) are three-phase and total 39.4 km in length.
Communities serviced include La Scie, Brent's Cove, Harbour Round, Tilt Cove and Round
Harbour. The total number of customers in the communities serviced is 811.

6

7 3.1.2 Barachoix

8 Feeders to be addressed (L1 and L4) are three-phase and total 50 km in length. Communities
9 serviced include Hermitage, Harbour Breton, Furby's Cove, Sandyville and Seal Cove. The total
10 number of customers in the communities serviced is 1,274.

11

12 **3.1.3 Hawke's Bay**

Feeder to be addressed (L3) is three-phase and total 23 km in length. Communities serviced include Eddies Cove West, Port Saunders and Port au Choix. The total number of customers in the communities serviced is 971.

16

17 3.1.4 Communities for LED Streetlights

- 18 The number of streetlights to be replaced, by community, are:
- 19 Hopedale 54 streetlights;
- 20 Postville 33 streetlights;
- Makkovik 43 streetlights;
- Rigolet 49 streetlights;
- Black Tickle 14 streetlights;
- Charlottetown 47 streetlights;
- Port Hope Simpson 28 streetlights;
- St. Lewis 18 streetlights;
- Mary's Harbor 41 streetlights;
- L'Anse au Loup 206 streetlights;
- Grey River 10 streetlights;

• Francois - 16 streetlights;

- McCallum 15 streetlights;
- 3 St. Brendan's 26 streetlights; and
- 4 Little Bay Islands 42 streetlights.
- 5

6 3.2 Operating Experience

7 Appendix A contains the Worst Performing Feeder list and a summary of data analysis for these8 feeders.

9

Feeder Study Reports for Bottom Waters L3, L6 and L7, Barachoix L1 and L4 and Hawke's Bay L3 are included in Appendix B. These reports include a description of the feeder and the communities serviced, analysis of factors that contributed to the reliability performance, and corrective actions recommended.

14

15 3.2.1 Outage Statistics

16 Table 1 lists five-year average distribution reliability data excluding loss of supply, planned

17 outage, customer request and major events for Bottom Waters - L3, L6 and L7, Barachoix - L1

18 and L4, Hawke's Bay - L3 and compares those data to corporate values.

Table 1: Outage Statistics

Feeder	СНІ	SAIFI	SAIDI
Bottom Waters L3	1,737	3.18	9.13
Bottom Waters L6	1,298	2.45	6.45
Bottom Waters L7	4,815	3.73	10.93
Barachoix L1	3,428	2.25	7.51
Barachoix L4	7,614	2.91	9.43
Hawke's Bay L3	4,269	3.43	4.39
Hydro Corporate	957	1.86	3.83

1 **3.2.2** Major Work or Upgrades

Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4 show the major work or upgrades performed on the Bottom
Waters, Barachoix, and Hawke's Bay lines in recent years.

Table 2: Bottom Waters – Major Work or Upgrades

Year	Major Work/Upgrade	Comments
2017	\$44,931	Replace poles, conductor, transformers, insulators,
		crossarms, anchors and downguys, relocate poles
2016	\$57,553	Replace transformers and crossarms, relocate poles
2015	\$69,430	Replace transformers and meters
2014	\$59,671	Replace poles, conductor, transformers and rotten
		platforms

Table 3: Barachoix – Major Work or Upgrades

Year	Major Work/Upgrade	Comments
2017	\$101,387	Replace poles, conductor, transformers, insulators,
		crossarms, anchors and downguys, bond downguys
2016	\$64,396	Replace poles, conductor, transformers, insulators,
		anchors and downguys
2015	\$63,123	Replace poles, transformers, anchors and downguys,
		repair neutral conductor
2014	\$90,956	Replace poles, conductor, transformers, insulators,
		crossarms, anchors and downguys

Table 4: Hawke's Bay – Major Work or Upgrades

Year	Major Work/Upgrade	Comments
2017	\$74,210	Install poles, insulators and conductor.
		Replace insulators, crossarms, and conductor
2016	\$54,417	Install poles, insulators and conductor. Replace
		insulators and crossarms
2015	\$101,263	Install poles, insulators and conductor. Replace
		insulators and crossarm
2014	\$65,299	Install poles, insulators and conductor. Replace
		insulators

1 **3.2.3** Maintenance History

- 2 The five-year maintenance histories for the distribution lines in this report are shown in Table 5
- 3 to Table 10.

Year	Preventive	Corrective	Total
	Maintenance	Maintenance	Maintenance
2017	39.8	5.3	40.1
2016	0.0	9.2	9.2
2015	0.0	12.4	12.4
2014	0.0	5.4	5.4
2013	2.2	3.0	5.2

Table 5: Bottom Waters L3 Five-Year Maintenance History (\$000s)

Table 6: Bottom Waters L6 Five-Year Maintenance History (\$000s)

Year	Preventive	Corrective	Total
	Maintenance	Maintenance	Maintenance
2017	0.0	0.1	0.1
2016	0.0	0.8	0.8
2015	0.0	0.3	0.3
2014	1.4	2.8	4.2
2013	0.0	0.4	0.4

Table 7: Bottom Waters L7 Five-Year Maintenance History (\$000s)

Year	Preventive	Corrective	Total
	Maintenance	Maintenance	Maintenance
2017	0.0	1.0	1.0
2016	0.0	0.7	0.7
2015	3.4	6.7	10.1
2014	0.0	1.2	1.2
2013	0.0	12.9	12.9

Year	Preventive	Corrective	Total
	Maintenance	Maintenance	Maintenance
2017	0.2	10.9	11.1
2016	21.7	51.0	72.7
2015	16.3	14.2	20.5
2014	1.7	18.0	19.7
2013	19.1	15.5	34.6

Table 8: Barachoix L7 Five-Year Maintenance History (\$000s)

Table 9: Barachoix L4 Five-Year Maintenance History (\$000s)

Year	Preventive	Corrective	Total
	Maintenance	Maintenance	Maintenance
2017	0.0	14.3	14.3
2016	25.0	8.7	33.7
2015	8.0	8.5	16.5
2014	0.0	12.7	12.7
2013	0.0	5.5	5.5

Table 10: Hawke's Bay L3 Five-Year Maintenance History (\$000s)

Year	Preventive	Corrective	Total
	Maintenance	Maintenance	Maintenance
2017	1.0	21.2	22.2
2016	1.0	23.0	24.0
2015	1.2	11.5	12.7
2014	1.0	7.1	8.1
2013	0.5	27.7	28.2

1 3.2.4 Historical Information

- 2 Table 11 lists budgeted and actual costs for distribution upgrades in the last five years as well
- 3 the amounts budgeted for 2018.

Year	Project Description	Budget	Actuals
2018F	Upgrade Distribution System – Cartwright (Year 1 of 2)	32.0	
	Upgrade Distribution System – English Harbour West (Year 1 of 2)	255.7	
	Upgrade Distribution System – Farewell Head (Year 1 of 2)	42.7	
	Upgrade Distribution System – Rocky Harbour (Year 1 of 2)	53.4	
	Upgrade Distribution System – Grandy Brook (Year 2 of 2)	643.2	
	Upgrade Distribution System – Ramea (Year 2 of 2)	487.7	
2017	Upgrade Distribution System – Grandy Brook (Year 1 of 2)	32.1	0.0
	Upgrade Distribution System – Ramea (Year 1 of 2)	32.1	0.0
	Upgrade Distribution System – Farewell Head (Year 2 of 2)	856.4	860.0
	Upgrade Distribution System – Paradise River (Year 2 of 2)	621.1	604.9
	Upgrade Distribution System – Happy Valley (Year 2 of 2)	738.8	820.0
	Upgrade Distribution System – King's Point (Year 2 of 2)	737.9	770.0
	Upgrade Distribution System – Sally's Cove (Year 2 of 2)	199.9	211.0
	Upgrade Distribution System – L'Anse au Loup (Year 2 of 2)	1,666.0	1730.0
	Upgrade Distribution System (Reclosers) – Coney Arm and Grandy	623.4	700.3
	Brook (Year 2 of 2)		
	Upgrade Distribution System (Milltown) – Bay d'Espoir (Year 2 of 2)	906.8	940.0
2016	Upgrade Distribution System – Farewell Head (Year 1 of 2)	31.9	109.1
	Upgrade Distribution System – Paradise River (Year 1 of 2)	32.1	0.0
	Upgrade Distribution System – Happy Valley (Year 1 of 2)	32.0	0.0
	Upgrade Distribution System – King's Point (Year 1 of 2)	32.0	5.1
	Upgrade Distribution System – Sally's Cove (Year 1 of 2)	15.4	0.0
	Upgrade Distribution System – L'Anse au Loup (Year 1 of 2)	74.2	2.9
	Upgrade Distribution System (Reclosers) – Coney Arm and Grandy	36.0	0.3
	Brook (Year 1 of 2)		
	Upgrade Distribution System (Milltown) – Bay d'Espoir (Year 1 of 2)	32.0	0.0
	Upgrade Distribution Feeder & Voltage Conversion – Happy Valley	593.7	582.6
	Upgrade Distribution Feeder – Line 1, 3, 4, 6, and 7 Bottom Waters	818.8	446.1
	(Year 2 of 2)		

Table 11: Historical Information (\$000s)

Year	Project Description	Budget	Actuals
2015	Upgrade Distribution Feeder – Line 1, 3, 4, 6 and 7 Bottom Waters	42.7	0.0
	(Year 1 of 2)		
	Pole Replacements – Pinsent's Arm and Labrador City	593.4	524.4
	Insulator Replacements – Farewell Head	500.0	181.3
	Relocate Voltage Regulators – Hawke's Bay	166.4	103.4
	Install Second Distribution Feeder - Nain	1050.3	1,113.1
	Upgrade Distribution Feeder - Line 1 Nain (Year 2 of 2)	261.0	348.8
	Upgrade Distribution Feeder - Line 1 Daniel's Hr. (Year 2 of 2)	877.8	964.9
	Upgrade Distribution Feeder - Line 1 and 2 Main Brook (Year 2 of 2)	837.1	855.8
	Upgrade Distribution Feeder - Line 1 Plum Point (Year 2 of 2)	1,440.9	1,324.4
	Upgrade Distribution Feeder - Line 1 Hampden (Year 2 of 2)	733.2	738.4
2014	Upgrade Distribution Feeder - Line 1 Nain (Year 1 of 2)	43.0	10.0
	Upgrade Distribution Feeder - Line 7 Happy Valley (Year 1 of 2)	64.3	26.6
	Upgrade Distribution Feeder - Line 1 Daniel's Hr. (Year 1 of 2)	69.7	14.9
	Upgrade Distribution Feeder - Line 1 and 2 Main Brook (Year 1 of 2)	64.3	104.7
	Upgrade Distribution Feeder - Line 1 Plum Point (Year 1 of 2)	75.3	6.4
	Upgrade Distribution Feeder - Line 1 Hampden (Year 1 of 2)	53.6	30.5
	Upgrade Distribution Feeder - Line 1 McCallum	359.1	320.1
	Upgrade Distribution Feeder - Line 1, 2, 4 and 5 Barachoix	583.7	553.8
	Upgrade Distribution Feeder - Line 1 Bay d'Espoir	692.6	632.3
	Upgrade Distribution Feeder - Line 1 Conne River	494.2	443.2
	Upgrade Distribution Feeder - Line 1 St. Lewis (Year 2 of 2)	908.1	740.5
	Upgrade Distribution Feeder - Line 1 and 3 Roddickton (Year 2 of 2)	1,259.5	1,366.7
	Upgrade Distribution System - Charlottetown (Year 2 of 2)	365.0	269.2
	Upgrade Distribution System - South Brook (Year 2 of 2)	975.8	846.2
	Upgrade Distribution Feeder - Line 1 Grey River (Year 2 of 2)	487.1	410.8

Year	Project Description	Budget	Actuals
2013	Upgrade Distribution Feeder - Line 1 St. Lewis (Year 1 of 2)	76.9	23.3
	Upgrade Distribution Feeder - Line 1 and 3 Roddickton (Year 1 of 2)	98.4	106.5
	Upgrade Distribution System - Charlottetown (Year 1 of 2)	27.8	22.8
	Upgrade Distribution System - South Brook (Year 1 of 2)	76.3	108.5
	Upgrade Distribution Feeder - Line 1 Grey River (Year 1 of 2)	32.5	111.9
	Upgrade Distribution Feeder - Line 1 Cow Head	665.6	658.4
	Upgrade Distribution Feeder - Line 1 St. Brendan's	330.2	310.7
	Upgrade Distribution Feeder - Line 1 Holyrood	632.4	372.1
	Upgrade Distribution Feeder - Line 11 Wabush	400.8	513.2
	Upgrade Distribution Voltage - Line 6 St. Anthony	641.9	648.6
	Upgrade Distribution Feeder - Line 6 Farewell Head	961.9	980.0
	Upgrade Distribution Feeder - Line 5 Farewell Head	1,110.1	1,184.9
	Upgrade Distribution Feeder - Line 2 Plum Point (Year 2 of 2)	1,110.5	1,276.2

1 3.3 Alternative Analysis

2 3.3.1 Line Upgrades

Three alternatives were considered for each feeder. Constructing an entirely new distribution line and retiring the existing line (Alternative 1), allowing the existing line components to remain in service until failure (Alternative 2), replacing deteriorated line components and utilizing existing non-deteriorated line components (Alternative 3).

7

8 Alternative 1: New Distribution Line

9 There are existing line components that are still operable such as poles, conductor, insulators, 10 and cross arms, and the construction of an entirely new line would lose the benefit of this 11 existing and functional equipment. This alternative requires spending that is unnecessary for 12 the continuation of reliable provision of electricity.

13

14 Alternative 2: Line Components Remain in Service until Failure

15 Allowing existing line components to remain in service until failure is not viable as it negatively

16 affects the reliability of electrical service provided to Hydro's customers, and the lines already

17 show signs of decreasing reliability.

1 Alternative 3: Replace Deteriorated Line Components and Use Non-Deteriorated Components

- 2 Replacing deteriorated line components reduces the chance of outages due to deteriorated line
 3 components, while utilizing existing non-deteriorated line components means Hydro doesn't
- 4 incur the cost to replace line components before end of life.
- 5
- 6 Alternative 3 has been deemed the most acceptable of the three alternatives.
- 7

8 3.3.2 Installation of LED Lighting

9 Two alternatives that were considered were continuing with the status quo (Alternative 1) and 10 replacing existing streetlights with new LED fixtures (Alternative 2).

11

A Cumulative Present Worth Analysis (CPW) determined the cost effectiveness of installing LED lighting. The CPW analysis considered a study period of 20 years. The discount rate used in the study was 5.9 percent, which reflects Hydro's current long term weighted cost of capital. The CPW analysis evaluated the savings in fuel costs offset by the capital investment of installing LED lighting. It is anticipated that Hydro will recover the costs of the installation of LED lighting within six years. Table 12 shows costs savings of \$396,577 over a period of 20 years.

Table 12: CPW Analysis

2019 Distribution Upgrades – LED Replacement									
Alternative Comparison Cumulative Net Present Value To The Year 2018									
	Cumulative Net Present	CPW Difference between							
Alternatives	Value (CPW)	Alternative and the Least Cost							
		Alternative							
	4 5 2 2 3 7 7	0							
LED Replacement	1,532,377	0							

1 4 Conclusion

Hydro needs to maintain reliable energy supply is to customers serviced by its distribution. By
executing the work detailed in this proposal, Hydro expects to improve the overall reliability of
the distribution systems. Also, the installation of LED lighting in the 15 identified isolated
distribution systems yielded cost savings for ratepayers.

6

7 **4.1 Project Estimate**

8 The estimate for this project is shown in Table 13.

Project Cost	2019	2020	Beyond	Total
Material Supply	70.0	1,510.0	0.0	1,580.0
Labour	220.0	525.0	0.0	745.0
Consultant	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Contract Work	80.0	2,130.0	0.0	2,210.0
Other Direct Costs	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Interest and Escalation	20.8	418.1	0.0	438.9
Contingency	0.0	907.0	0.0	907.0
Total	390.8	5,490.1	0.0	5,880.9

Table 13: Project Estimate (\$000s)

9 4.2 Project Schedule

10 The anticipated project schedule is provided in Table 14: Project Schedule

Table 14: Project Schedule

Activity		Start Date	End Date
Planning	Resource Planning	Jan 2019	Jan 2020
Design	Assessment Completed	Sep 2017	Nov 2017
Procurement	Materials Ordered	Jan 2020	Mar 2020
Construction	Monitor Construction Activities	May 2020	Oct 2020
Commissioning	Inspection Preformed by Local Operations	Aug 2020	Sep 2020
	Crews		
Closeout	Project Closeout	Sep 2020	Nov 2020

Appendix A

Worst Performing Feeder List and Summary of Data Analysis

Rank	Feeder	СНІ	Comments
1	Farewell Head, L5	8491	In 2013, poor reliability statistics were driven by a defective terminator of the Farewell Head submarine cable. This will be addressed through the proposed 2019 capital project- "Condition Assessment for Submarine Cable". In 2016, line hardware failures during adverse weather contributed to poor reliability statistics. This feeder was upgraded in 2017 as part of the 2016-2017 distribution system upgrades project. No additional work is required at this time.
2	Bottom Waters, L1	7918	Poor reliability statistics in 2013 were due to mainly vegetation issues and several weather-related events. This line experienced a significant amount of tree cutting in 2013-2016. In 2015 and 2016 poor reliability statistics were driven by broken insulators. As a result of the poor performance, this feeder had a significant upgrading during the 2016-2017 Period. In 2017 poor reliability statistics were driven by tree related events. Tree cutting work has been planned for 2018 and no additional work is required at this time.
3	English Harbour, L1	7912	In 2014, poor reliability statistics were driven by several line hardware failure incidents. In 2016, reliability statistics of this feeder have been impacted by conductor galloping events. All these issues will be addressed through the 2018-2019 distribution upgrade project.
4	Barachoix, L4	7614	Overall reliability statistics on this feeder have been impacted by several broken primary conductor incidents, and other defective line hardware incidents during the 2013-2017 period. A capital project is required to complete the required work to improve the reliability performance of Barachoix, L4.
5	Happy Valley, L16	6690	 Reliability statistics were driven by a broken overhead pole incident in 2013. In 2014 equipment overload on this line caused problem. After that, some load from this line was transferred and the problem was mitigated. This feeder was upgraded as part of the 2016-2017 distribution upgrades project. No additional work is required at this time.

Rank	Feeder	СНІ	Comments
6	Roddickton, L1	6371	Poor reliability statistics were driven by several incidents of line hardware failures in 2014. This feeder was upgraded as part of the 2013-2014 distribution upgrades project. Since then reliability has generally been good. No additional work is required at this time.
7	Farewell Head, L4	5781	In 2013, poor reliability statistics were driven by a defective terminator of the Farewell Head submarine cable. This will be addressed through 2019 capital project- Condition Assessment for Submarine Cable. In 2016, primary conductor failures during adverse weather contributed to poor reliability statistics. This will be addressed through 2018-2019 distribution upgrades project (Replace primary conductor for FHD, L4). No additional work is required at this time
8	Bottom Waters, L7	4815	Poor reliability statistics were driven by several insulator failures in 2016 and 2017. Overall reliability was impacted due to broken line hardware i.e. cross arm, primary conductor, overhead transformer. A capital project is required to mitigate all the issues.
9	South Brook, L5	4799	A lightning-related event resulted in poor overall reliability statistics in 2013. In 2014 reliability was impacted by a broken pole caused by third party. In 2017, poor reliability statistics were driven by a broken pole incident and a damaged disconnect switch. This feeder will continue to be monitored to determine if it should be considered for upgrading in a future capital budget.
10	Farewell Head, L6	4702	 This feeder performed poorly in 2013 period due to broken hendrix insulator incidents. As a remedial action, problematic hendrix insulators were replaced with porcelain insulators during the 2013- 2015 Period. Since 2014, this feeder has been performing well. No additional work is required at this time.
11	Kings Point, L1	4572	Poor reliability statistics were driven by mainly tree-related events in 2013 and 2017. Tree cutting work has been scheduled for 2019 and no additional work is required at this time.
12	Hawke's Bay, L3	4269	During the 2013-2016 period, poor reliability statistics were driven by several incidents of line components failure (insulators, overhead splice, conductor, cross arms). In 2017 there was a significant broken conductor incident due to galloping. A capital project is required to address these concerns.
13	Bay D'Espoir, L1	4268	This feeder was down several times due to several tree related events during the 2013-2017 period. Vegetation issues were addressed and no additional work is required at this time.

Rank	Feeder	СНІ	Comments
14	Bottom Waters, L4	3612	Poor reliability statistics in 2014 were caused by a power transformer failure; one of the three 833 KVA transformers in Burlington substation failed and the line was down for 19.25 hours. In addition this feeder had several outages due to broken conductor and overhead connector failures in 2016. This feeder will continue to be monitored to determine if it should be considered for upgrading in a future capital budget.
15	Bear Cove, L6	3535	During 2013-2015, this feeder had numerous power outages due to unnecessary/faulty operations of reclosers caused by feeder unbalance. Work was completed in 2016 to address the unbalanced load issue. No additional work is required at this time.
16	Barachoix, L1	3428	Poor reliability statistics in 2014 were caused by a broken cross arm. The feeder performed poorly in 2016 due to several broken primary conductors. Overall reliability statistics on this feeder have been impacted by primary conductor and other line hardware issues during the 2013-2017 period. Work is required to mitigate the above issue.
17	Happy Valley, L7	3286	An equipment overload event resulted in poor overall reliability statistics in 2015. In addition, a tree contacted the line in late 2015. No work is required at this time.
18	Rocky Harbour, L2	2786	In 2013 reliability was impacted by a broken pole caused by third party. In 2017 a prolonged power outage due to a tree contacts impacted the reliability. This feeder will be addressed for danger trees during 2018-2019 distribution system upgrades project (Upgrade Rocky Hr. System).
19	L'Anse-Au- Loup, L2	2753	In 2014 poor reliability statistics were driven by primary conductor failures. This feeder had significant upgrades in 2017 as part of the 2016-2017 distribution upgrade project. No additional work is required at this time.
20	Glenbernie, L1	2553	The poor reliability statistics were driven by tree contacts in 2015 and 2017. Tree cutting work has been scheduled for 2019-2020. No additional work is required at this time.

Rank	Feeder	SAIFI	SAIDI	Feeder Score	Included in CHI based list	Comments
1	Bottom Waters, L1	3.397	20.756	12.076	Yes	See comments in CHI table.
2	Burgeo, L5	2.167	16.816	9.491	No	In 2016-2017, poor reliability statistics were driven by primary conductor failures and other line hardware failures. This feeder is located in extremely remote area. Power restoration is often delayed significantly due to limited access during adverse weather. This feeder will continue to be monitored to determine if it should be considered for upgrading in a future capital budget.
3	Farewell Head, L4	3.969	14.272	9.12	Yes	See comments in CHI table.
4	Farewell Head, L5	3.964	13.244	8.604	Yes	See comments in CHI table.
5	Farewell Head, L1	1.637	15.485	8.561	No	In 2013, poor reliability statistics were driven by a defective terminator of the Farewell Head submarine cable. This will be addressed through 2019 capital project- "Condition Assessment for Submarine Cable". In 2016, all the customers of this feeder experienced a 16 hour power outage caused by an overhead guy failure during adverse weather. Power outage was extended due to remote access. No additional work is required at this time.

Worst Performing Feeders Sorted SAIFI and SAIDI based Feeder $\mathsf{Score}^{\mathsf{5}}$

⁵ Feeder Score= (.5* SAIFI) + (.5*SAIDI)

Rank	Feeder	SAIFI	SAIDI	Feeder Score	Included in CHI based list	Comments
6	Barachoix, L5	1.5	13.45	7.475	No	This feeder is a 2.4 KV tap to Pass Island. This area is extremely remote and it has only two customers. In 2015, poor reliability statistics were driven by a defective transformer. No additional work is required at this time.
7	Bottom Waters, L7	3.732	10.927	7.33	Yes	See comments in CHI table.
8	Burgeo, L1	1.945	12.707	7.326	No	Poor reliability statistics in 2015 were due to three defective disconnect switch incidents, one defective recloser and one lightning strike. In 2017, line hardware failures contributed to poor reliability statistics. A capital project (distribution upgrades project, GBK, 2017-2018) is ongoing in this area. All the above issues will be addressed through the capital project.
9	Kings Point, L2	2.865	11.294	7.079	No	Poor reliability statistics were principally driven by multiple tree- related incidents in 2017. Tree cutting work has been scheduled for 2019. No additional work is required at this time.
10	Roddickton, L1	2.363	11.51	6.937	Yes	See comments in CHI table.
11	Main Brook, L2	2.555	11.308	6.931	No	This feeder was upgraded as part of the 2014-2015 distribution system upgrades project. Prior to the capital project, this line had a high number of deteriorated poles, and transformers that were installed when the original line was

Rank	Feeder	SAIFI	SAIDI	Feeder Score	Included in CHI based list	Comments
						constructed. In 2013 the power line was down several times due to transformer failures. During the upgrade project, most of the aged transformers were replaced and major part of the line was rebuilt with new poles and conductors. As a result, this feeder has performed well in 2016-2017. No additional work is required at this time
12	English Harbour, L1	3.827	9.752	6.79	Yes	See comments in CHI table.
13	Burgeo, L4	2.499	10.865	6.682	No	Poor reliability statistics in 2014 were due to defective recloser issues. In 2017, line hardware failures contributed to poor reliability statistics. A capital project (distribution upgrades project, GBK, 2017-2018) is ongoing in this area. All the line hardware concerns will be addressed through the capital project.
14	Farewell Head, L6	2.928	9.441	6.185	Yes	See comments in CHI table.
15	Barachoix, L4	2.913	9.425	6.169	Yes	See comments in CHI based list.
16	Bottom Waters, L3	3.181	9.13	6.155	No	Overall reliability statistics on this feeder have been impacted by several weather events, tree related incidents and broken line component issues during the 2013- 2017 period. Work is required to mitigate all the issues.
17	Kings Point, Line 1	2.263	8.351	5.307	Yes	See comments in CHI table.
18	Roddickton, L4	1.393	8.811	5.102	Yes	See comments in CHI table.

Rank	Feeder	SAIFI	SAIDI	Feeder Score	Included in CHI based list	Comments
19	Happy Valley, L16	3.62	6.556	5.088	Yes	See comments in CHI table.
20	Seal Cove Road, L2	1.622	8.448	5.035	No	Reliability statistics were driven by a broken conductor incident in 2017 due to adverse weather. The primary and neutral conductors had ice build-up and high wind caused the conductors to slap together. No additional work is required at this time.
Appendix **B**

Feeder Study Reports

1 Bottom Waters (L3, L6 and L7)

2 Bottom Waters, L3

Bottom Waters L3 is a three-phase distribution line and total 34 km in length. Communities
serviced include Shoe Cove, Tilt Cove and Round Harbour. The total number of customers in the
communities serviced is 181. This feeder also supplies power to L6 and L7 of Bottom Waters
distribution system.

- 7
- 8 Table B1 summarizes the reliability data and Figure B1 shows the reliability trends for Bottom
- 9 Waters L3 for 2013-2017 period. All the reliability indices are calculated excluding loss of supply
- 10 outages, planned outages, customer requests and major events.

Table B1: Five Year Average (2013-2017) Reliability Data for Bottom Waters L3

Location	СНІ	SAIFI	SAIDI
Bottom Waters L3	1,737	3.18	9.13
Hydro Corporate	957	1.86	3.83



Figure B1: Reliability Trends for Bottom Waters L3

11 Feeder Analysis

- 12 Overall reliability statistics on this feeder have been impacted by several weather events and
- 13 broken line component incidents during the 2013-2017 period. In addition the poor reliability
- 14 statistics are also driven by tree contacts in 2014, 2016 and 2017. Tree cutting work for this
- 15 feeder was started in 2017 and planned for completion in 2018.

From the inspection record, this line has deteriorated line components - 10 poles, 16
 transformers, and 4 cross arms. It also has a section where existing conductor is substandard.

3

The distance from the recloser, BW3-R1 (located at Bottom Waters terminal station) to the recloser, LS7-R1 (located at La Scie Substation) is approximately 18 km. This 18 km section is highly exposed to deep forest and any fault on this segment will cut power for all the customers of L3 including L6 and L7. To minimize the power outage, this long radial circuit should be sectionalized by installing another recloser in the proposed location (Figure B2). This will reduce the number of affected customers and improve the power restoration time in the event of a fault downstream of the new recloser.

11

In addition, a section of L3 near Armchair Pond is required to be rerouted to roadside for better access (Figure B3). This reroute will improve the structure visibility from the roadside during outage line patrol and will minimize power restoration time for any repair work on this section.

15

16 **Recommendations**

17 The following work is required to improve the reliability of Bottom Waters L3:

- Replace pole, insulators, transformers, cribs, crossarms, anchors and downguys;
- 19 replace any substandard or deteriorated primary conductors;
- install a three-phase recloser, and
- re-route feeder.
- 22
- 23 As a part of the preparation of the project, the engineering team will review the feeder to
- 24 identify any additional deficiencies that need to be addressed.



Figure B2: New Recloser Location, Bottom Waters, Line 3



Figure B3: Proposed Reroute for Bottom Waters, Line 3

1 Bottom Waters L7

- 2 Bottom Waters L7 is a three-phase distribution feeder and total 1.4 km in length. This feeder
- 3 serves La Scie Community and the total number of customers in the community is 435.
- 4
- 5 Table B2 summarizes the reliability data and Figure B4 shows the reliability trends for Bottom
- 6 Waters L7 for 2013-2017 period. All the reliability indices are calculated excluding loss of supply
- 7 outages, planned outages, customer requests and major events.

 Table B2: Five Year Average (2013-2017) Reliability Data for Bottom Waters L7

Location	СНІ	SAIFI	SAIDI
Bottom Waters L7	4,815	3.73	10.93
Hydro Corporate	957	1.86	3.83



Figure B4: KPI Trends for Bottom Waters L7

8 Feeder Analysis

9 Poor reliability statistics were driven by several insulator failures in 2016 and 2017. Overall
10 reliability was impacted due to broken line hardware (cross arm, primary conductor, and
11 transformer).

12

From the pole line inspection record, this line has 70 deteriorated poles and 30 rusty transformers. Inspections have also identified substandard conductor and obsolete insulators on the main trunk section of this feeder.

1 **Recommendations**

- 2 The following work is required to improve reliability performance of Bottom Waters L7:
 - Replace poles, transformers, cribs, cross arms, insulators, anchors and downguys.
 - Replace any substandard or deteriorated primary conductors.
- 5

3

4

As a part of the preparation of the project, the engineering team will review the feeder toidentify any additional deficiencies that need to be addressed.

8

9 Bottom Waters L6

Bottom Waters L6 is an approximately 4 km three-phase branch feeder extending from the main line L3. This feeder serves Brent's Cove and Harbour round communities and the total number of customers in the communities serviced is 195.

13

Although L6 is not in the twenty worst performing feeder list, several line components (8 poles, 14 transformers and 2 cross arms) have been found to be deteriorated and are required to be replaced soon. It is cost effective to complete the refurbish work for Bottom Waters L6 within this project as L6 is located in the same general geographical region. This close proximity to L3 will reduce or eliminate mobilization costs of refurbishing L6.

19

20 Barachoix (L1 and L4)

21 Barachoix L1

Barachoix L1 is a three-phase distribution feeder and total 26 km in length. Communities
serviced include Hermitage, Furby's Cove, Sandyville and Seal Cove. The total number of
customers in the communities serviced is 462.

25

Table B3 summarizes the reliability data and Figure B5 shows the reliability trends for Barachoix
L1 for 2013-2017 period. All the reliability indices are calculated excluding loss of supply
outages, planned outages, customer requests and major events.

Table B3: Five Year Average (2013-2017) Reliability Data for Barachoix L1



Figure B5: KPI Trends for Barachoix L1

1 Feeder Analysis

Poor reliability statistics in 2014 were caused by a broken cross arm. The feeder performed
poorly in 2016 due to several broken primary conductors. Overall reliability statistics on this
feeder have been impacted by primary conductor and other line hardware failure incidents
during the 2013-2017 period. Work is required to mitigate the above issues.

6

From the pole line inspection record, this line has several deteriorated line components - 90
poles, 80 cross arms, 10 cribs and 4 transformers. It has also been identified that the existing
primary conductor on numerous sections of this feeder is substandard and or deteriorated.

10

11 Recommendations

12 Based on the feeder analysis and inspections of the Barachoix L1, the following upgrade is 13 required:

- Replace poles, transformers, cribs, cross arms, anchors and downguys.
- 15 Replace any substandard or deteriorated conductor
- 16
- 17 As a part of the preparation of the project, the engineering team will review the feeder to
- 18 identify any additional deficiencies that need to be addressed.

1 Barachoix L4

- 2 Barachoix L4 is a three-phase distribution feeder and total 24 km in length. This feeder serves
- 3 Harbour Breton Community and the total number of customers in the community is 812.
- 4

Table B4 summarizes the reliability data and Figure B6 shows the reliability trends for
Barachoix, Line 4 for 2013-2017 period. All the reliability indices are calculated excluding loss of
supply outages, planned outages, customer requests and major events.

Table B4: Five Year Average (2013-2017) Reliability Data for Barchoix L4

Location	СНІ	SAIFI	SAIDI
Barachoix L4	7,614	2.91	9.43
Hydro Corporate	957	1.86	3.83



Figure B6: KPI Trends for Barachoix L4

8 Feeder Analysis

9 Overall reliability statistics on this feeder have been impacted by several broken primary

10 conductor incidents, and other defective line hardware incidents for 2013-2017 period.

11

Inspections have identified that there are numerous locations where the primary conductor is substandard or deteriorated on this feeder. It has also been identified that this line has 105 deteriorated poles and 100 decayed or damaged cross arms. There are also several deteriorated transformers and cribs on this feeder.

1 **Recommendations**

- 2 To improve the reliability performance of Barachoix L4, the following work is required:
 - Replace poles, transformers, cribs, cross arms, anchors and downguys.
 - Replace any substandard or deteriorated conductor
- 5

4

3

As a part of the preparation of the project, the engineering team will review the feeder toidentify any additional deficiencies that need to be addressed.

8

9 Hawke's Bay (L3)

10 Hawke's Bay L3

Hawke's Bay L3 is a three-phase distribution line and total 23 km in length. Communities serviced include Eddies Cove West, Port Saunders and Port au Choix. The total number of customers in the communities serviced is 971.

- 14
- 15 Table B5 summarizes the reliability data and Figure B7 shows the reliability trends Hawke's Bay
- 16 L3 for 2013-2017 period. All the reliability indices are calculated excluding loss of supply

CHI

17 outages, planned outages, customer requests and major events.

Location

 Hawke's Bay, L3
 4,269
 3.43
 4.39

 Hydro Corporate
 957
 1.86
 3.83

Table B5: Five Year Average (2013-2017) Reliability Data for Hawke's Bay, Line 3

SAIFI

SAIDI



Figure B7: KPI Trends for Hawke's Bay L3

1 Feeder Analysis

During the 2013-2016 period, poor reliability statistics were driven by several incidents of line
components failure (insulators, overhead splice, conductor, cross arms). In 2017 there was a
significant broken conductor incident due to galloping.

5

6 Inspection has identified deteriorated line components consisting of 200 poles, 11 7 transformers, 4 cribs, 40 cross arms. There are a number of locations where the existing 8 conductor or the insulators are obsolete. Due to the age and condition of the insulators, 9 conductor, and other line hardware, this feeder is becoming more prone to damage when 10 exposed to severe wind, ice and snow loading.

11

12 **Recommendations**

- 13 To improve the reliability performance of Hawke's Bay L3, the following work is required:
- Replace poles, transformers, cribs, cross arms, insulators, anchors and downguys; and
 - Replace any substandard or deteriorated conductor.
- 16

15

As a part of the preparation of the project, the engineering team will review the feeder toidentify any additional deficiencies that need to be mitigated.

9. Overhaul Diesel Units – Various

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1

Overhaul Diesel Engines

Various Sites

July 2018



1 Summary

This report presents the capital budget proposal for diesel engine overhauls that are performed on a usage-based schedule, at an interval of 20,000 operating hours. Each overhaul is required to ensure each engine is able to meet its expected life of 100,000 hours. The estimated project cost for the overhaul of ten diesel engines and four alternators is approximately \$2,511,300 with planned completion in 2019. The projection of future overhauls forecasts 45 overhauls over the 2019 to 2023 period.

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Appendices

Appendix A Diesel Engine Overhaul Five Year Plan

1 1 Introduction

2 Hydro's Diesel Engine Overhaul plan has been developed to ensure the reliability of diesel 3 engines at each of Hydro's diesel generating stations. Hydro has 24 diesel generating stations, 4 20 of which are prime power stations serving a total of approximately 4,400 customers. Prime 5 power means that diesel is the primary (or, in some cases, sole) power source. These 6 generating stations are the primary source of electricity in the community that they are located, 7 which means that if the station cannot meet the load then customer outages will occur. The 8 reliability of the prime power diesel generating stations are designed such that each station can 9 withstand a single contingency, meaning that each plant is designed to be able to provide 10 maximum load in the event of the unavailability of any single diesel unit (due to failure). While 11 the failure of a single unit will not result in customer outages, the failure of an additional unit 12 before the initially failed unit is returned to service may result in customer outages. This 13 highlights the importance of the reliability of these diesel generating stations. In addition, the 14 prime power diesel generating stations are normally the only power source for a community 15 and require major overhauls to achieve the expected service lives, while providing reliable 16 power.

17

The four generating stations that are not prime power stations are Hawke's Bay, St. Anthony, Mud Lake and Happy Valley. These stations provide emergency backup generation. Both Hawke's Bay and St. Anthony provide emergency backup to the Island Interconnected System, and Happy Valley and Mud Lake provide emergency backup to the customers served by the Happy Valley Distribution System.

23

Figure 1 is of Ramea Unit 2077 prior to its installation in the Ramea Diesel Plant.



Figure 1: Ramea Unit 2077

1 2 Project Description

2 This project is required in order to overhaul the diesel engines at various diesel generating 3 stations. Hydro's five year plan for overhauls, which can be found in Appendix A, consists of the 4 overhaul of 45 engines during the 2019-2023 five-year period. The 2019 proposed project 5 consists of overhauling ten diesel engines and four alternators. Diesel engine overhauls are 6 planned based on each engine requiring overhauls every 20,000 hours of operation. This 7 criterion is being used for diesel engine overhauls and is also the criteria recommended in 2003, 8 following a comprehensive internal maintenance review (subsequently referred to in this report 9 as the asset maintenance strategy review). Prior to this maintenance review, overhauls were 10 performed at an interval of 15,000 operating hours.

11

The planned overhaul schedule is based on an estimate of when each engine will reach 20,000 operating hours, based on its in-service or last overhaul date. A typical unit will accumulate 20,000 operating hours in 7.2 years, but this depends on individual plant utilization factors and the subsequent usage of the diesel engines in that plant. As such, this schedule is subject to change and the year for which an engine is projected to require an overhaul can vary, depending on plant conditions and the actual hours accumulated. While the specific diesel engines projected to be due for overhauls in a given year can vary, the number of engines
projected to be due for overhauls in a given year tends to be consistent.

3

An overhaul consists of replacement of specific critical parts, including pistons, liners, main 4 5 bearings, connecting rod bearings, fuel injectors, oil cooler, turbo charger, water pump, oil 6 pump, cylinder heads, fuel lines, and all necessary gaskets. Also included in an overhaul is a 7 bench top overhaul of the fuel pump and in every second overhaul the fuel lines are replaced. 8 An overhaul of the alternator is typically completed once in the unit's lifetime, at approximately 9 40,000 operating hours or when identified as required through maintenance checks. The fuel 10 pump and alternator overhauls were added to the overhaul scope in recent years as a result of a formal asset maintenance strategy review, which considered Hydro's experience, other utility 11 12 experience, other utility practice, and manufacturer recommendations. With the exception of 13 the fuel lines, the replacement parts are remanufactured parts.

14

15 The unit overhauls involved in this project includes those that are projected to become due 16 during 2019. The ten units to be overhauled in 2019 include:

- 17 Francois 588;
- 18 Little Bay Island 2058;
- 19 McCallum 2063;
- Normans Bay 584;
- Charlottetown 2089;
- Nain 576;
- Nain 2085;
- Black Tickle 579;
- Nain 591; and
- Makkovik 3033.

- 1 In addition, the following units will have their alternators overhauled:
 - McCallum 2063;
 - Nain 576;
 - Nain 2085; and
 - Black Tickle 579.
- 6

2

3

4

5

Occasionally, a unit in one of the diesel plants across Hydro's operating area experiences an
issue that necessitate an unplanned overhaul. Where appropriate, Hydro may complete such an
overhaul under this project and, if possible, defer one of the units planned for completion.

10

11 **3 Justification**

12 3.1 Existing System

Hydro's existing system of diesel generating stations consists of 24 diesel generating stations,
20 of which are prime power generating stations and four of which are emergency backup
generating stations. The number of diesel generating units at each generating station ranges
from three to six generators and the rated output of the units range from 40kW to 2,600kW.
The diesel engines across the system range in age from less than one year to 66 years of age
and currently range in operating hours from less than 288 hours to over 117,880 hours (as of
the end of 2017). The oldest engine in a prime power station is 33 years old.

Table 1 lists, for each engine in this proposal, the number of operating hours left before the engine becomes due for an overhaul and the forecasted time when that overhaul will become

23 due.

Engine	Remaining Operating Hours Before Due for Overhaul (as of December 31, 2017)	Forecasted Overdue Due Date	
Francois 588	5,388	Q3 2019	
Little Bay Islands 2058	10,699	Q4 2019	
McCallum 2063	4,387	Q3 2019	
Norman Bay 584	3,381	Q3 2018	
Charlottetown 2089	5,405	Q4 2019	
Nain 2085	12,226	Q3 2019	
Nain 576	4,379	Q2 2019	
Black Tickle 579	4,540	Q3 2019	
Nain 591	4,539	Q4 2018/Q1 2019	
Makkovik 3033	9,500	Q4 2019	

Table 1: 2019 Overhaul Forecasts

3.2 Operating Experience 1

2 An isolated diesel generation plant operates continuously because it provides the primary 3 source of electricity to communities isolated from the Province's electrical grid. A given diesel generation unit is not in service continually since the number of units in service varies based on 4 5 customer demand. Emergency backup diesel generation plants operate only in emergency 6 situations, which are rare but critical. In automated plants the engine mix is automatically 7 controlled by a control system to maximize fuel efficiency, while in a manual plant this is 8 controlled by the operator.

9

10 In all plants, the operator has the flexibility to shut down the engines for planned maintenance 11 provided there is another engine available to supply the load for that time. As a result, planned 12 outages to engines can occur without customer outages.

13

14 Table 2 provides details concerning the overhaul work completed during the previous five years

15 and the work planned for the current year.

Year	Unit
2018	
	Paradise River 324
	Paradise River 585
	Postville 2084
	Hopedale 2054
	Hopedale 590
	Charlottetown 2087
	Norman Bay 583
	St. Anthony 521 (Alternator O/H only)
	St. Anthony 522 (Alternator O/H only)
	Little Bay Islands 586
	Ramea 2047
	McCallum 589
2017	
	Grey River 2067
	Hopedale 2053
	Rigolet 2081
	St. Brendan's 2056
	St. Lewis 2080
	Ramea 2077
	Port Hope Simpson 2073
	Rigolet 2065
	Black Tickle 582
	Rigolet 2051
	St. Anthony 523 (Alternator O/H only)
	St. Anthony 525 (Alternator O/H only)
2016	
	Makkovik 2059
	Little Bay Islands 2058
	Mary's Harbour 2037
	Mary's Harbour 2083
	Mary's Harbour 2090 (Mobile Unit) (Alternator O/H ONLY)
	Nain 2085
	Postville 577
	Postville 573
	Rigolet 2051

Table 2: Overhauls Completed in Last Five Years

	St. Brendan's 578
	St. Lewis 2039
	Francois 587
	Ramea 2045
	Cartwright 2052
	Charlottetown 2088 (Mobile Unit)
	Norman Bay 581
2015	
	Cartwright Unit 2086
	Gray River Unit 2062
	Hopedale Unit 2074
	Makkovik Unit 2059
	Makkovik Unit 3033
	Port Hope Simpson Unit 2042
	St. Brendan's 2055
	William's Harbour 2057
2014	
	Charlottetown 2087
	Francois 570
	L'Anse-au-Loup 2041
	McCallum 2064
	Paradise Unit 324
	Port Hope Simpson 2043
	Port Hope Simpson 2073
	Postville Unit 2084
	Postville 573
	William's Harbour Unit 580

1 3.2.1 Reliability Performance

- 2 A consequence of not completing this project is an increase in the frequency and duration of
- 3 customer outages as a result of increases in diesel unit failures.

1	Outage Statistics
2	Loss of Supply is defined by the Canadian Electricity Association (CEA) as:
3	
4	Customer interruptions due to problems in the bulk electricity supply system such
5	as under frequency load shedding, transmission system transients, or system
6	frequency excursions. During a rotating load shedding cycle, the duration is the
7	total outage time until normal operating conditions resume, while the number of
8	customers affected is the average number of customers interrupted per rotating
9	cycle.
10	
11	For this analysis, the definition is applied to the loss of diesel generation.
12	
13	Hydro tracks all distribution system outages using industry standard indexes, SAIDI and SAIFI
14	which are explained as follows:
15	SAIDI Indicates the System Average Interruption Duration Index for customers
16	served per year, or the average length of time a customer is without power in
17	the respective distribution system per year.
18	• SAIFI Is the System Average Interruption Frequency Index per year which indicates
19	the average of sustained interruptions per customer served per year or the
20	average number of power outages a customer has experienced in the
21	respective distribution system per year.
22	
23	Table 3 lists the SAIDI loss of supply outage statistics for the prime power diesel generating
24	stations for the previous five years. Table 4 lists the SAIFI loss of supply outage statistics for the

25 same diesel generating stations for the previous five years.

System	SAIDI (Loss of Supply)				
	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Central					
Francois	0.00	0.08	0.08	0.35	0.00
Grey River	0.17	0.08	0.00	0.08	5.20
Little Bay Islands	0.25	0.25	0.58	0.25	0.33
McCallum	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.83
Ramea	0.12	0.08	0.03	0.21	0.50
St. Brendan's	6.04	0.37	0.37	0.30	0.08
Northern					
Charlottetown	0.846	1.367	0.870	1.02	0.00
L'Anse au Loup	2.033	3.567	7.240	0.93	0.23
Mary's Harbour	2.517	1.767	1.360	5.60	0.42
Norman Bay	0.167	0.167	0.070	0.00	0.00
Port Hope Simpson	0.450	4.367	1.630	3.93	0.00
St. Lewis	0.167	0.283	0.320	0.00	0.18
Labrador					
Black Tickle	1.50	0.667	4.130	7.62	2.33
Cartwright	0.499	0.583	0.960	21.37	1.00
Hopedale	9.309	10.383	7.270	5.13	0.78
Makkovik	4.027	1.883	1.620	2.78	0.35
Nain	1.334	10367	1.350	5.77	0.17
Paradise River	0.583	0.667	0.500	1.83	0.00
Postville	4.748	2.250	0.330	0.20	0.17
Rigolet	2.738	0.100	0.283	26.580	9.71

Table 3: 2013 to 2017 Outage Statistics (SAIDI Loss of Supply)

Table 4: 2013 to 2017 Outage Statistics (SAIFI Loss of Supply)

System	SAIFI (Loss of Supply)				
	2013	2014	2015	2016	2107
Central					
Francois	0.0	1.0	1.0	5.0	0.00
Grey River	2.0	1.0	0.0	1.0	3.00
Little Bay Islands	2.0	2.0	3.0	2.0	2.00
McCallum	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.00
Ramea	1.6	1.0	0.6	1.5	3.00
St. Brendan's	8.0	3.0	2.7	2.0	1.00

System		SA	IFI (Loss of Supp	oly)	
	2013	2014	2015	2016	2107
Northern					
Charlottetown	1.1	6.0	9.0	5.9	0.00
L'Anse au Loup	2.0	5.0	7.0	4.0	1.00
Mary's Harbour	0.8	4.0	2.8	14.0	2.00
Norman Bay	2.0	1.0	1.0	0.0	0.00
Port Hope Simpson	3.0	5.0	3.0	3.0	0.00
St. Lewis	1.0	2.0	4.0	0.0	2.00
Labrador					
Black Tickle	9.0	3.0	7.0	2.0	5.01
Cartwright	3.0	5.0	4.0	5.0	4.00
Hopedale	10.0	18.0	14.0	7.0	1.99
Makkovik	12.0	4.0	3.0	9.0	2.00
Nain	4.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	0.99
Paradise River	5.0	10.0	1.0	3.0	0.00
Postville	10.0	9.0	2.0	2.0	1.00
Rigolet	2.0	2.0	8.0	6.0	10.00

1 3.2.2 Safety Performance

This is a reliability-based project. If this project is not executed, there is a higher risk of diesel engine failure and diesel engine failure can result in extended customer outages, which would negatively impact reliability and public safety. In addition, diesel engines can fail catastrophically creating possible hazards for the employees in the vicinity. The risk of this occurring increases if overhauls are not completed.

7

8 3.2.3 Environmental Performance

9 This project is being justified from a reliability perspective, but if overhauls are not completed

- 10 failures could result in oil and glycol being released into the environment.
- 11

12 **3.2.4 Industry Experience**

13 Manufacturers of diesel engines will provide recommended overhaul intervals, which typically

14 are in the 15,000 hour range. Hydro adopted this philosophy for many years, but completed a

comprehensive review of its maintenance practices in 2003 and extended the overhaul period
 to 20,000 hours.

3

4 **3.2.5** Vendor Recommendations

The diesel engine manufacturers generally recommend an overhaul interval of 15,000 hours but
as a result of a review of maintenance practices and failure history it was decided to extend
Hydro's overhauls to 20,000 hours.

8

9 3.2.6 Maintenance or Support Arrangements

Generally, a routine annual inspection is performed by internal resources. The annual inspection checks the fuel, coolant, exhaust systems, and engine structure. Problems identified during the inspection are also typically corrected during the inspection. If an engine fails prematurely, the manufacturer is typically consulted to help with a failure analysis.

14

To help manage the service of the parts for diesel engines, blanket orders are created with the engine original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) or their authorized distributor. Compared to purchase orders, blanket orders allow for quicker procurement of diesel engine parts by virtue of the fact that approval is given up front and therefore isn't required for each of the multiple parts orders that are placed. Such arrangements are necessary to ensure lead times on parts are acceptable and Hydro does not have to incur the cost of stocking diesel parts in inventory.

21

22 3.2.7 Maintenance History

23 The five-year maintenance cost history for the prime power diesel engines is shown in Table 5.

Table 5: Five-Year Maintenance Cost History (\$000)

Year	Preventative	Corrective	Total
	Maintenance	Maintenance	Maintenance
2017	103.3	494.7	598.0
2016	105.3	827.0	932.3
2015	141.6	690.1	837.7
2014	85.1	805.2	890.3
2013	49.8	458.6	508.5

1 **3.2.8** Historical Information

2 Table 6 provides the five year historical diesel engine overhaul costs.

Table 6: Overhaul Diesel Engines Historical Cost

Year	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018B
Per Engine Average (Actual)	\$96 <i>,</i> 845	\$149,875	\$128,502	\$130,991	\$219,415
Number of Engines	10	8	16	12	13
Total	\$968 <i>,</i> 450	\$1,199,000	\$2,506,035	\$1,571,900	\$2,852,400

3 3.2.9 Anticipated Useful Life

4 The actual life of a diesel engine depends primarily on the operating hours of the unit and 5 overhauls are scheduled for every 20,000 operating hours to ensure continued reliability.

6

7 3.3 Development of Alternatives

8 One alternative that was considered for this overhaul project was to overhaul the engines at 9 the manufacturer-recommended interval, which is typically 15,000 operating hours. A review 10 completed in 2003 recommended changing the interval to 20,000 operating hours to improve 11 the balance between least-cost and reliability and Hydro adopted this recommendation.

12

13 **3.4 Evaluation of Alternatives**

The recommended alternative was analyzed as part of the review completed by Hydro in 2003. The review considered Hydro's experience, other utility experience, other utility practice, and manufacturer recommendations. The recommendation on diesel engine overhauls made as part of this review states that *"parts being removed from the units have sustained very little wear and the overhaul can very easily be extended to 20,000 hours."*

19

20 3.5 Economic Analysis

Economic analysis shows that the selected alternative of completing overhauls at an interval of 20,000 operating hours reduces lifetime overhaul costs by one-third compared to the 15,000 23 operating hour interval alternative. This is a result of the selected alternative having one-third less overhauls, six overhauls verses four overhauls over the life of the engine, without
 increasing the cost of an overhaul or increasing the running maintenance on the units.

3

4 4 Conclusion

5 This project is necessary in order to provide least cost, reliable electrical service to the 6 customers served by diesel generation. Overhauling diesel engines is a necessity in operating 7 this type of equipment.

8

9 4.1 Project Estimate

10 The estimate for this project is shown in Table 7.

Project Cost	2019	2020	Beyond	Total
Material Supply	1,223.0	0.0	0.0	1,223.0
Labour	477.5	0.0	0.0	477.5
Consultant	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Contract Work	179.0	0.0	0.0	179.0
Other Direct Costs	109.0	0.0	0.0	109.0
Interest and Escalation	125.1	0.0	0.0	125.1
Contingency	397.7	0.0	0.0	397.7
Total	2,511.3	0.0	0.0	2,511.3

Table 7: Project Estimate (\$000s)

11 4.2 Project Schedule

12 The anticipated project schedule is provided in Table 8.

Table 8: Project Schedule

Activity		Start Date	End Date
Planning	Schedule annual overhauls	Feb 2019	Sep 2019
Procurement	Purchase overhaul components	Mar 2019	Oct 2019
Installation	Complete overhaul	Apr 2019	Nov 2019
Commissioning	Testing after overhaul	Apr 2019	Nov 2019
Closeout	Release for service and Asset Assignment	Dec 2019	Dec 2019

Appendix A

Diesel Engine Overhaul Five Year Plan

Planned Year	Unit
2019	
	Black Tickle 579
	Nain 2085
	Nain 576
	Charlottetown 2089
	Norman Bay 584
	Francois 588
	Little Bay Islands 2058
	McCallum 2063
	Nain 591
	Makkovik 3033
2020	
	Cartwright 2036
	Charlottetown 2092
	L'anse au Loup 2012
	Mary's Harbour 2093
	Port Hope Simpson 2073
2021	
	Francois 587
	Grey River 2062
	Grey River 2067
	McCallum 2064
	Black Tickle 582
	Cartwright 2045
	Cartwright 2086
	Nain 574
	Rigolet 2081
	Mary's Harbour 2090
	Port Hope Simpson 2042
	St. Lewis 2080
2022	
	Ramea 2077
	Hopedale 2074
	Hopedale 590
	Makkovik 2029
	Makkovik 2059

Table A1: Diesel Engine Overhaul Five Year Plan

	Nain 2085
	Nain 591
	Paradise River 324
	Postville 2084
	Postville 2096
	Charlottetown 2087
	Norman Bay 581
	Port Hope Simpson 2043
2023	
	Little Bay Islands 586
	Ramea 2047
	Cartwright 2052
	Charlottetown 2034

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Wood Pole Line Management Program 2019

July 2018



1 Summary

The Wood Pole Line Management (WPLM) program is a condition-based program that uses Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) principles and strategies.¹ Under the program, transmission line inspection data of each year is analyzed and appropriate recommendations made for necessary refurbishment and/or replacement of line components, including poles/structures, hardware, and conductors in the subsequent year. The inspection data and any refurbishment and/or replacement of assets are recorded in a centralized database for future analysis and tracking.

9

10 The program is aimed at early detection and treatment of deteriorating wood poles and line 11 components before the integrity of a structure is jeopardized. If the deterioration of the 12 structure or components is not detected early enough then the reduced integrity of the 13 structure can affect the reliability of the line and the system as a whole. It could also lead to 14 increased failure costs and, potentially, customer interruptions. Safety issues and hazards for 15 Hydro personnel and for the general public could also result from issues with weakened 16 structure integrity.

17

18 The project is estimated to cost approximately \$2,467,000 with a planned completed in 2019.

¹ Reliability centered maintenance (RCM) is a corporate-level maintenance strategy that is implemented to optimize the maintenance program of a company or facility.
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Appendices

Appendix A WPLM Inspection Schedule 2018-2023 (with Average Age of Transmission Lines and Estimates Pole Rejection Rates)

1 **1 Introduction**

Hydro maintains approximately 2,500 km of wood pole transmission lines operating at voltages
of 69, 138, and 230 kV. These lines consist of approximately 26,000 poles of varying ages, with
the maximum age being 53 years. As of 2018, approximately 95% of the transmission pole
assets are more than 20 years old and about 55% of these poles are at least 40 years old.

6

7 As wood poles age, their preservative retention levels decrease and the poles become 8 increasingly subjected to deterioration by different agents, including fungi and insects. Wood poles must be regularly inspected and treated in-situ² to proactively identify and assess any 9 10 deterioration. Prior to 2003, Hydro's pole inspection and maintenance practices followed the 11 traditional utility approach of sounding inspections only. In 1998, Hydro began to collect core 12 samples on selected poles to test for preservative retention levels and pole decay. The results 13 of early tests raised concerns regarding the general preservative retention levels in the poles. 14 This testing confirmed that there were poles in Hydro's system that had a preservative level 15 below that required to maintain the required design criteria. During this period, certain poles 16 were replaced because the preservative level had lowered to the point that decay had 17 advanced and the pole was no longer structurally sound. These inspections and the analysis of the data confirmed that a more rigorous wood pole line management program was required. 18 19 Figure 1 illustrates typical wood pole inspection techniques. Figure 2 shows typical wood pole 20 inspection results.

² Latin meaning "in place".



Figure 1: WPLM Inspection Techniques, Clockwise from Bottom Left: 1) Typical Field Data Collector; 2) Cavity Measuring; 3) Climbing Inspection; 4) Destructive Testing at MUN



Figure 2: Sample Wood Pole Inspection Results

- 1 Hydro first initiated the Wood Pole Line Management (WPLM) program as a pilot study in 2003.
- 2 It was determined that the program should continue as a long-term asset management and life

extension program. The program was presented to the Board of Commissioners of Public
 Utilities (the Board) in October 2004 as part of Hydro's 2005 Capital Budget Application and was
 entitled *"Replace Wood Poles – Transmission"*. The proposal was supported in the application
 by Hydro's internal report titled *"Wood Pole Line Management Using RCM Principles"* by Asim
 Haldar, PhD, P. Eng.

6

7 The Board found that:

8 This approach (by Hydro) is a more strategic method of managing wood poles 9 and conductors and associated equipment and is persuaded that the new WPLM 10 Program, based on RCM principles, will lead to an extension of the life of the 11 assets, as well as a more reliable method of determining the residual life of each 12 asset. One of the obvious benefits of RCM will be to defer the replacement of 13 these assets thereby resulting in a direct benefit to the ratepayers.

14

The Board approved the project submitted in the 2005 Capital Budget in Order No. P.U. 53(2004). As part of its annual Capital Budget Application process, Hydro committed to provide the Board with an update of the program work that includes both a progress summary of the work completed as well as a forecast of the future program objectives. Hydro has reviewed the program and has included an update in Appendix C of the *"2019-2023 Capital Plan"* (Volume 1)

21 2 Project Description

The WPLM program is a condition-based program that uses the basic principles and strategies of reliability centered maintenance. Under the program, line inspection data is analyzed each year and appropriate recommendations are made for necessary refurbishment or replacement of deteriorated line components (poles, structures, hardware, conductor, etc.) in the subsequent year. The inspection data and any refurbishment or replacement of assets is recorded in a centralized database for analysis and future tracking. Hydro may inspect and find an item that should be replaced in the current year, as opposed to waiting and scheduling

- replacement in a subsequent year. This will be managed within the existing budget and will only
 be implemented if the component is deemed not able to last another year.
- 3

The program is aimed at early detection and rehabilitation or replacement of the wood poles and components before the integrity of the structures is jeopardized. If the deterioration of the structures is not detected early enough, then the reliability of the structures will affect the reliability of the line and the system as a whole. It may also create safety issues and hazards for Hydro personnel and for the general public.

9

10 The WPLM program is based on a ten year inspection cycle. To provide the quantitative 11 benefits on the improvement of transmission line reliability, sufficient long term data derived 12 from two full inspection cycles will be required to provide adequate statistical evidence. The 13 second WPLM inspection cycle is scheduled to be completed by 2023. In the absence of this long term data, an analysis of recent ice storms, such as in March 2008 and March 2010, can 14 15 provide an indication of how the transmission lines are performing. On March 18-19, 2008, there was a severe ice storm on the Avalon Peninsula. Hydro's test site at Hawke Hill recorded 16 17 more than 25 mm of radial glaze ice which exceeds the design load of the wood poles on the 18 Avalon Peninsula. There were no reported failures because the poles which were not 19 structurally sound had already been replaced during the first WPLM inspection cycle between 20 2003 and 2007. This was again supported during the ice storm of March 2010, in which there 21 were no failures of Hydro's wood pole assets on the Avalon Peninsula. This supports Hydro's 22 request to pursue the continued proactive condition-based management program.

23

24 **3 Justification**

The WPLM program detects deteriorated poles and other line components early to avoid safety hazards and to identify poles that are at early stages of decay to ensure that corrective measures can be taken to extend the average life of these poles. This is a least cost strategy in the long term through the deferring of rebuilding lines and avoiding forced outages.

1 3.1 Existing System

As stated previously, Hydro maintains approximately 2,500 km of wood pole transmission lines
operating at voltages of 69, 138 and 230 kV. These lines consist of approximately 26,000
transmission size poles of varying ages.

5

6 3.2 Operating Experience

7 The WPLM inspection schedule is generally built on the strategy of focusing on older lines first 8 and working toward newer lines. The exact lines and the number of poles, to be included in 9 the program are reviewed on an annual basis and may be modified based on the following 10 criteria:

11 • Age;

- 12 priority (radial or redundant); and
- 13 known problems.
- 14

15 **3.2.1** Historical Expenditures

16 The five-year historical cost information for the WPLM program as well as the budget for 2018 17 is provided in Table 1. No units or cost per unit is available since the work is not defined into 18 individual units, such as a line or structure number, as the actual work completed is variable and is dependent on the actual condition of the asset. For example, in most cases the work 19 20 completed on any one structure is not related to the work on the next structure (i.e., one 21 structure may require a pole replacement and the next structure may need a cross arm or an insulator replacement). The same is true for a breakdown by individual transmission line, 22 23 where the cost will be affected by the configuration and voltage of the line, its age and 24 geographical location.

Year	Budget	Actuals
2018B	3,532.9	-
2017	2,404.1	3,234.7
2016	2,919.0	3,180.0
2015	2,830.6	3,058.5
2014	2,564.2	2,496.8
2013	2,466.7	2,380.1

Table 1: Historical Wood Pole Line Management Program Expenditures (\$000s)

1 3.2.2 Historical Replacement Information

- 2 Table 2 provides the annual statistics for pole and pole component replacement for the five
- 3 years prior to implementation of the WPLM program and for the years since implementation of
- 4 the program.

Table 2: Annual Statistics of Pole and Pole Component Replacement

Year	Poles	Cross Arms	Knee Bracing	Cross Bracing	Comments
2017	31	32	36	76	
2016	38	39	28	23	
2015	50	14	15	5	
2014	57	11	10	6	
2013	34	8	88	8	
2012	32	14	4	4	
2011	53	19	80	22	
2010	60	20	45	58	
2009	81	12	14	25	
2008	93	27	27	25	
2007	97	31	11	19	
2006	142	30	18	21	
2005	98	47	43	58	
2004	51	13	12	22	Start of WPLM
2003	31	29	13	55	
2002	126	53	6	61	
2001	21	16	2	2	
2000	44	30	21	30	
1999	135	7	20	2	
Total	1,243	420	457	446	

Year	Poles	Cross Arms	Knee Bracing	Cross Bracing	Comments
1999-2003	357	135	62	150	5 years before WPLM
2004-2017	917	317	431	372	14 years since WPLM

1 3.2.3 Anticipated Useful Life

The anticipated useful life of a wood pole transmission line not subject to inspection or maintenance is approximately 40 years. Hydro has implemented a WPLM program, with the mandate to thoroughly inspect, treat, and refurbish the transmission structures prior to any serious failure on the line. Through this type of proper inspection and maintenance the life of a transmission line could be extended by ten years or more.

7

8 Extension of the life of the transmission line is evidenced when considering Hydro's current 9 system. The anticipated useful life of a wood pole transmission line not subject to inspection or 10 maintenance is approximately 40 years. Hydro currently has 22 wood pole transmission lines that have surpassed this anticipated useful life. Of these lines, 18 are over the age of 45 years, 11 12 with the oldest wood pole line having been installed 53 years ago in 1965. This life extension can be attributed to the inspection, treatment, and refurbishment that Hydro has been 13 14 conducting on its transmission lines. For details, refer to Appendix C of the "2019-2023 Capital Plan" (Volume 1). 15

16

17 3.2.4 Review of 2017 WPLM Program

18 The first objective of the 2017 program was to inspect, test and treat 2,363 poles and 19 associated line components.

20

Table 3 summarizes the inspection accomplishments for 2017. In the spring of 2017, planned inspections on TL 219 were deferred to 2018 to inspect and treat TL 203 in 2017.

Regions	Line Name	Year In Service	Voltage Level	Planned Number of Poles to Inspect	Actual Number of Poles Inspected	Percent Complete
Eastern	TL 203	1965	230 kV	0	431	-
	TL 212	1966	138 kV	59	69	117%
	TL 219	1990	138 kV	350	0	0%
Central	TL 220	1970	69 kV	111	109	98%
	TL 251	1981	69 kV	291	178	61%
	TL 252	1981	69 kV	200	199	99%
Western	TL 250	1987	138 kV	356	368	103%
Northern	TL 241	1983	138 kV	240	240	100%
	TL 227	1970	69 kV	195	195	100%
	TL 261	1996	69 kV	261	259	99%
Labrador	TL 240	1976	138 kV	300	294	98%
Totals				2,363	2,342	99%

Table 3: 2017 Inspections Completed

- 1 Another objective of the 2017 program was the refurbishment of defective components
- 2 identified in inspections. A summary of the work completed in 2017 is given in Table 4.

Component	Region					Total
	Eastern	Central	Western	Northern	Labrador	
Poles	20	9	1	1	1	32
Cross arms	15	11	0	0	6	32
Cross bracing	5	71	0	0	0	76
Knee bracing	20	16	0	0	0	36
Foundations	0	0	1	3	0	4
Miscellaneous	30	15	7	0	0	52
(Insulators, hardware, etc.)						

Table 4: Summary of 2017 Refurbishment

The total expenditure of \$3.2 million was approximately \$831,000 or 34.5% over the budget estimate of \$2.4 million. This can be partially attributed to an unforeseen quantity of refurbishment work required on L1301 (TL 240) and TL 232. Critically damaged cross arms and a critical pole were identified during helicopter patrols on L1301, and these items were refurbished when the line was de-energized in November 2017. On TL 232, an unforeseen number of critically deteriorated cross braces were identified and replaced. Prior to the 2016 inspection program, it was estimated that three poles would require replacement on TL 232 in 2017. However, upon completion of the 2016 inspections, it was determined that seven poles and seventy-one sets of cross bracing required replacement. The cost of this refurbishment work was approximately \$650,000

7

8 3.2.5 Update of 2018 WPLM Program

9 The proposed inspection and treatment work for 2018 is summarized in Table 5. This work will

10 be executed between mid-April and October 2018.

Region	Line No.	Year Built	Age of Line	Target Number of Poles to Inspect
Eastern	TL 219	1990	28	598
Central	TL 220	1970	48	235
	TL 223	1966	52	175
	TL 252	1981	37	202
	TL 253	1982	36	192
Western	TL 225	1970	48	46
Northern	TL 239	1982	36	352
	TL 241	1983	35	198
	TL 256	1995	23	249
Labrador	TL 240	1976	42	500
Totals				2,747

Table 5: 2018 Inspection Plan

As a result of the 2017 inspection program, a refurbishment program will occur in the spring and summer months of 2018 and continue into the fall. This will include the replacement of approximately 59 poles, 22 cross arms, 11 sets of cross bracing, 6 sets of knee bracing, and other components.

- 15
- 16 A list of the refurbishment work to be completed in 2018 is provided in Table 6.

Component		Region				
	Eastern	Central	Western	Northern		
Poles	17	31	8	3	59	
Cross arms	16	5	1	0	22	
Cross bracing	10	0	0	1	11	
Knee bracing	6	0	0	0	6	
Foundations	8	0	2	2	12	
Miscellaneous	47	4	47	25	123	
(Insulators, hardware, etc.)						

Table 6: 2018 Refurbishment Plan

1 3.3 Development of Alternatives

There are no alternatives for undertaking the activities outlined in this program. In 2005, the Board found that this approach was justified and prudent and approved the expenditures as submitted in the 2005 Capital Budget in Board Order No. P.U. 53(2004).

5

This current submission to the Board provides an update of the program work, which includes
both a progress report of the work completed as well as a forecast of the future program
objectives.

9

10 4 Conclusion

11 In conclusion, the major objectives for the 2017 program were achieved.

12

13 **4.1 Project Estimate**

The WPLM project estimate shown in Table 7 includes the complete inspection of the stated lines, including the visual inspection supported by inspecting each pole using non-destructive evaluation tools and full treatment of the pole as required. The project estimate for 2020 and beyond will be established in future Capital Budget Applications based on the annual inspection results. To establish a projected cost of refurbishment or replacement, it is assumed that a percentage of those poles inspected will also be rejected according to the IOWA curves (Appendix A) depending on their age and group.³ Poles rejected in the field will be analyzed with respect to reliability issues, and if rejected after structural analysis, a recommendation to refurbish or replace will be made.

6

7 Using the average age of the poles being inspected along with the 2012 IOWA curve, the 8 anticipated pole replacement rate is calculated and this is used to develop the future 9 refurbishment program. A schedule of the pole inspections from 2018 to 2023 is provided in 10 Appendix A of this proposal. The table also provides the average age and anticipated pole 11 rejection rate for each year.

Project Cost	2019	2020	Beyond	Total
Material Supply	295.2	0.0	0.0	295.2
Labour	1,471.0	0.0	0.0	1,471.0
Consultant	99.6	0.0	0.0	99.6
Contract Work	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other Direct Costs	73.8	0.0	0.0	73.8
Interest and Escalation	139.5	0.0	0.0	139.5
Contingency	387.9	0.0	0.0	387.9
Total	2,467.0	0.0	0.0	2,467.0

Table 7: Project Estimate (\$000)

12 4.2 Project Schedule

13 The annual project schedule involves many transmission lines and is dependent on the annual

14 work load and availability of outages. It will be managed to commence as soon as system

15 conditions allow. The schedule is determined during the spring of each year.

³ Iowa curves display functional failures or retirements of asset classes and were developed in a study at the University of Iowa. Each curve represents a probability distribution and has a series of attributes. The curves help make realistic forecasts of the remaining useful life of groups of assets.

Appendix A

WPLM Inspection Schedule 2018-2023 (with Average Age of Transmission Lines and Estimates Pole Rejection Rates)

Year	Age of Lines	No. of Poles Inspected	Estimated Approximate Pole Rejection Rate	No. of Poles Rejected
2018	34.0	2,747	0.8%	23
2019	36.6	2,655	2.17%	58
2020	41.6	2,641	1.9%	49
2021	38.1	2,659	3.4%	92
2022	42.6	2,701	7.2%	194
2023	47.3	2,406	3.6%	87

Table A1: WPLM Inspection Schedule and Expected Pole Rejection Rates (Summary)



Figure A1: IOWA Curve

1 For detailed IOWA curves refer to Appendix C of the *"2019-2023 Capital Plan"* (Volume 1).

11. Additions for Load - Isolated Generation Systems

Electrical	

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ADLAND & LUN

Electrical	а
Mechanical	
Civil	
Protection & Control	
Transmission & Distribution	÷.
Telecontrol	
System Planning	

Additions for Load Growth – Isolated Systems

Makkovik

July 2018



1 Summary

The peak demand and energy use in the isolated community of Makkovik is growing and the most recent forecast has indicated that the winter fuel requirements in Makkovik will exceed the available fuel storage in 2020. To ensure that there is enough fuel storage to contain the required amount of fuel for the winter of 2020, Hydro is proposing a two-year project to replace two existing 68,000 L horizontal fuel tanks that are approaching the end of their useful life with one 400,000 L vertical tank. This alternative is the least cost of two alternatives considered in a cumulative present worth analysis.

- 9
- 10 The project is estimated to cost approximately \$2,182,500 with a planned completion in 2020.

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1 **1 Introduction**

As new customers are added to distribution systems and as existing customers use more electrical power, both the peak demand and energy requirements of communities grow. To support additional peak demand and energy requirements, Hydro must at times upgrade and add new infrastructure to ensure continued reliable power.

6

7 In isolated communities, the electrical power is provided through the combustion of diesel fuel.

8 As the energy usage of the community increases so will the amount of fuel consumed by the

- 9 diesel plant.
- 10

Due to the freeze-up of the ocean in winter, Makkovik is not able to be resupplied with fuel for part of the year. In Makkovik, energy usage is growing and the winter fuel requirement forecast has indicated that the available bulk fuel storage is not adequate to supply the required ninemonth winter fuel storage beyond 2020. This poses a risk to the ability to supply the community load for the full winter period. If the fuel supply on hand was to be depleted over the winter before tanker delivery became available, the plant would require expensive emergency fuel delivery to prevent running out of fuel.

18

19 2 Project Description

To increase the amount of bulk fuel storage in Makkovik, Hydro is proposing to replace two existing 68,190 L horizontal fuel tanks that are approaching the end of their useful life with one 400,000 L vertical tank.

23

24 **3** Justification

This project is justified on the requirement to meet the growing electricity needs of Hydro'scustomers in Makkovik.

1 3.1 Existing System

The Makkovik Diesel Generating Station consists of three diesel generating units with a combined capacity of 1,650 kW¹ and a firm capacity of 1,015 kW. The facility is the sole source of electrical power for the community of Makkovik and supplies electrical energy to approximately 234 customers on a continual basis².

6

7 The existing bulk fuel storage in Makkovik consists of 1,078,380 liters, comprised of two 68,190
8 L horizontal tanks and three 314,000 L vertical tanks.

9

10 The two horizontal tanks are approaching the end of their useful life

11

12 **3.2 Operating Experience**

13 An internal tank inspection of all fuel tanks in Makkovik was completed in October 2017. The 14 inspection results indicated that the horizontal fuel tanks have weld corrosion on the interior of 15 the tank and the inspector recommended repairing the welds before returning the tanks to ser-16 vice. Internal expertise along with third-party consultation determined that there was a low risk 17 of a tank failure within the next two years and that the risk did not warrant a supplemental 18 Capital Budget Application. Instead, it was decided to continue using these tanks and, given the 19 additional issue regarding installed fuel capacity, propose to replace them in 2019-2020 as part 20 of the 2019 Capital Budget Application. It should be noted that these fuel tanks cannot be field 21 repaired because they would lose the ULC certification according to GAP regulations.

22

23 3.3 Historic Load Information

24 Makkovik is a winter peaking system that has historically experienced steady growth in peak

25 load and electricity sales.

¹ By the end of 2018 the firm capacity for Makkovik will be 1,130 kW. Please refer to Hydro's 2018 Capital Budget Application (Revision 3), Volume 2, Tab 15, for more information.

² Customer count is based on 2017 Rural Sales Ledger.

- 1 Since 2012, there have been Conservation and Demand Management (CDM) programs in Mak-
- 2 kovik every second year. It is estimated that these programs saved a total of 162 MWh or
- 3 46,400 L of fuel annually, resulting in a decrease in required winter fuel storage of 34,800 L.
- 4
- 5 Figure 1 shows the historical load and gross energy use in Makkovik.



Figure 1: Makkovik Historical Load

6 **3.4 Forecast Customer Growth**

- 7 Hydro annually projects the peak winter fuel requirements for each isolated system. The Winter
- 8 Fuel Requirement Forecast for Makkovik is presented in Table 1.

Year	Fuel Forecast (9 Months)(L)	Deficit (L)
2017	1,048,200	
2018	1,060,600	
2019	1,075,400	
2020	1,086,500	8,120
2021	1,094,100	15,720
2022	1,105,700	27,320
2023	1,119,000	40,620
2024	1,132,400	54,020
2025	1,146,000	67,620
2026	1,159,800	81,420
2027	1,169,700	91,320
2028	1,178,500	100,120
2029	1,187,300	108,920
2030	1,196,200	117,820
2031	1,205,200	126,820
2032	1,214,200	135,820
2033	1,223,300	144,920
2034	1,232,500	154,120
2035	1,241,800	163,420
2036	1,251,100	172,720

Table 1: Makkovik Winter Fuel Requirements

1 The Winter Fuel Requirement Forecast is used to determine the required amount of fuel stor-

2 age that must be available at a diesel plant to ensure there will be enough capacity available to

3 store the fuel required for the winter season.

4

5 **3.5 Analysis**

- 6 Hydro maintains long-term bulk fuel storage at its remote diesel plants in Labrador and has es-
- 7 tablished a criterion that sufficient fuel shall be stored on site, such that the energy

1 requirements of the system can be met for nine consecutive months.³ This criterion ensures the

2 plant will continue to support the load during the winter months when fuel delivery is not pos-

- 3 sible or impractical.
- 4

5 As can be seen in the forecast in Table 1, the present bulk fuel storage in Makkovik is not ade-

6 quate to supply the required nine month winter fuel storage beyond 2020.

7

8 **3.6 Development of Alternatives**

9 To increase the amount of fuel storage available at the diesel plant in Makkovik, two alterna-10 tives were considered. Hydro also investigated delaying the need for additional fuel storage 11 through additional conservation and demand management programs.

12

13 **3.6.1** Alternative 1

The first alternative involves replacing the two existing 68,190 L horizontal tanks that are approaching the end of their useful life with one new 400,000 L vertical tank in 2020, including modifications to the dyke and fuel piping systems. This alternative will provide total fuel storage of over 1,300,000 L and will meet the forecasted needs of Makkovik beyond the 20-year forecast.

19

20 3.6.2 Alternative 2

- 21 The second alternative involves installing one new 45,000 L tank in 2020, replacing the two ex-
- 22 isting 68,190 L tanks with four 45,000 L tanks in 2024, and adding two more 45,000 L tanks in
- both 2027 and in 2032. This alternative includes a yard extension to fit the additional tanks.

³ This 9 month criterion is considered conservative for some diesel plants, which allows for some flexibility. Typically, from last fill up in early November to ice breaking up in mid-June, the 7-7.5 months winter season causes Makkovik to be inaccessible by ocean. However, occasionally the ice breaking up can be up to a month later. As well, the fuel required can vary due to changing engine efficiencies that could result from the most efficient diesel unit breaking down, an extra cold winter, or an unexpected load increase. Therefore, the 9 month criterion is used to account for the possibility of these variances.

1 3.6.3 Conservation and Demand Management (CDM)

Additional CDM may delay the requirement for additional fuel storage in Makkovik by one or
two years. However, there is currently a general service customer investigating conversion from
oil fired to electric heat, which would further increase the winter fuel storage requirement⁴ in
Makkovik. Hydro plans to reserve the saving from CDM to offset the energy growth associated
with this proposed conversion.

7

8 3.7 Economic Evaluation of Alternatives

- 9 A cumulative net present value analysis was completed to determine which alternative was the
- 10 least cost preferred alternative. This analysis included the up front capital, future required capi-
- 11 tal, and operations and maintenance costs. The results of the analysis are shown in Table 2.

	Alternative Comparison Cumulative Net Present Value To the Year 2018					
Alt	ernatives	Cumulative Net Pre- sent Value (CPW)	CPW Difference between Alter- native and Least Cost Alterna- tive			
1	New Vertical Tank Option	1,455,174	0			
2	45,000 L Tanks Option	1,592,692	137,518			

Table 2: Additions for Load Growth (Isolated) – Makkovik Fuel Storage Increase

- 12 Table 2 shows that Alternative 1 has the least cumulative net present value.
- 13

14 **4** Conclusion

- 15 In Makkovik, the existing amount of fuel storage is not adequate to support the future energy
- 16 needs of the community. The forecasted winter fuel requirements are expected to exceed the
- 17 existing amount of storage in 2020. Therefore, to maintain reliable electricity supply, fuel stor-

⁴ Hydro estimates that another two years of CDM (including a street light LED replacement project) could allow a potential savings of 119 MWh a year. If the customer in Makkovik proposing to switch from oil heat to electric heat does so, the energy usage in the community would increase by more than the 119 MWh.

- 1 age capacity must be increased by 2020. To increase the capacity, Hydro is proposing to replace
- 2 two 68,190 L fuel tanks that are approaching the end of their useful life with a new 400,000 L
- 3 vertical fuel tank, which is the alternative with lease cumulative net present value.
- 4

5 4.1 Project Estimate

6 The estimate for this project is shown in Table 3.

Project Cost	2019	2020	Beyond	Total
Material Supply	45.0	0.0	0.0	45.0
Labour	139.0	54.3	0.0	193.3
Consultant	177.5	37.5	0.0	215.0
Contract Work	1,047.9	110.1	0.0	1,158.0
Other Direct Costs	25.4	9.3	0.0	34.7
Interest and Escalation	88.8	118.5	0.0	207.3
Contingency	0.0	329.2	0.0	329.2
Total	1,523.6	658.9	0.0	2,182.5

Table 3: Project Estimate (\$000)

7 4.2 Project Schedule

8 The anticipated project schedule is shown in Table 4.

Table 4: Project Schedule

Activity		Start Date	End Date
Planning	Project Start-Up, Scope Statement, Schedule	Jan 2019	Jan 2019
Design	Engage Consultant	Jan 2019	Feb 2019
	Detailed Engineering Design	Feb 2019	April 2019
Procurement	Procure Plate Steel	Apr 2019	Jun 2019
Construction	Field Fabricate Tank	Jul 2019	Oct 2019
	Apply Exterior Coating System	Jul 2020	Aug 2020
Commissioning	Commission Tank & Return to Service	-	Oct 2019
	Final Inspection and Acceptance of Exterior Coating	-	Aug 2020
Closeout	Certificate of Completion, Interest Cut-Off, PIR	-	Oct 2020

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Electrical
Mechanical
Civil
Protection & Control
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System Planning

Diesel Plant Fire Protection

Black Tickle

July 2018

Revised October 2018



1 Summary

2 Hydro owns and operates 25 diesel powered generation plants. Most are located in remote 3 coastal areas of Newfoundland and Labrador and are not staffed 24 hours per day. There have 4 been six serious fires at several of these plants resulting in the loss of equipment and facilities. 5 Starting in 2014, Hydro has had multi-year program-like projects to install automatic fire protection systems in diesel generating plants. Details were presented most recently in the 6 7 2018 Capital Budget Application in Diesel Plant Fire Protection, Volume II, Tab 29. To date 8 installations have been completed in three plants. In 2018, automatic fire protection will be 9 installed in the Postville Diesel Generating Station.

10

In the 2019, Hydro proposes the continuation of the program in Black Tickle Plant. Engineering
will start in 2019 for the 2020 installation of automatic fire suppression in the Black Tickle
Generating Station. The estimated cost of this project is \$1,917,400.

14

15 It is anticipated that Hydro will submit other proposals to the Board in subsequent years to 16 have automatic fire suppression installed under other proposed projects to be completed at 17 remote diesel plants.

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1 **1 Introduction**

In 21 communities, Hydro's diesel plants are the only source of electric power as the
communities are isolated from the interconnected electrical grid. Out of 21 diesel plants 17
plants do not have fire suppression system. Continuous operation of the generating units, or
their availability in the case of standby plants, is critical to each community.

6

7 There have been six serious fires at these plants resulting in the loss of equipment and facilities. 8 Starting in 2014, Hydro has had multi-year program-like projects to install automatic fire 9 protection systems in diesel generating plants. Details of the program were presented in the 2014 Capital Budget Application in the Install Fire Protection System proposal (Volume II, Tab 10 11 22). To date installations have been completed in three plants. In 2017, automated fire protection was installed in Nain Diesel Generating Station. In 2018, Hydro is installing 12 13 automated fire protection in the Postville Diesel Generation Plant. In 2019, Hydro proposes the 14 continuation of the program with installation of an automated fire protection system in Black 15 Tickle (Figure 1).



Figure 1: Black Tickle – Diesel Generating Plant

1 2 Project Description

The project will install a water mist fire protection system at the Black Tickle Generating Station. The system sprays water and nitrogen, which produces a blanket of atomized water particles that absorb heat and smother the fire. This system will be used in the diesel generator main hall area (Figure 2) and other interior spaces requiring fire protection including the transformer room and the lube and coolant storage room.



Figure 2: Black Tickle – Diesel Generators in Powerhouse

7 The scope of work includes design, procurement, installation, and commissioning of the new 8 equipment. A new storage shelter for nitrogen cylinders, water cylinders and associated 9 equipment will be supplied and installed outside the powerhouse, which includes required 10 foundations, electrical work and ventilation.
The majority of the work, including detailed design, will be completed by the external
 contractor supplying the systems, with support from Hydro personnel.

3

4 3 Justification

5 This project is justified by the requirement to protect critical assets at the diesel plant in Black6 Tickle from fire.

7

8 **3.1 Existing System**

9 The diesel plant at Black Tickle is not staffed 24 hours per day and does not have a fire 10 protection system. The plant is equipped with a fire detection system that consists of heat 11 detectors, manual pull stations, fire alarm annunciation control panels, audible alarms, and 12 auto dialers. When a fire is detected, the fire alarm system will alarm and the auto dialer will 13 attempt to contact the shift operator or Energy Control Center (ECC) in St. John's. In addition, 14 the control panel, which interfaces with the plant's operating equipment, is activated to shut 15 down all ventilation systems and on-line generators. The plant is also equipped with a number of portable fire extinguishers. If there is a fire, extinguishing the fire is either done by plant 16 17 personnel or by the local volunteer fire department.

18

19 3.2 Operating Experience

20 Major outages that were the result of fires in diesel plants include:

- Fire in Rencontre East, on September 2, 2002, when the plant was destroyed and
 resulted in a power outage of 42.5 hours;
- Fire in the Nain diesel plant that occurred on September 7, 2008, resulted in a power outage of 35.5 Hours. In addition, a second major outage occurred at Nain diesel plant on November 19, 2008, due to a fault in the temporary bus work used to interconnect the temporary mobile diesels to the main diesel plant. This outage lasted 29.5 hours for 50% of the customers and 52 hours for the remaining customers; and
- Fire in Black Tickle, on March 14, 2012, when the engine hall was damaged resulting in a
 power outage of 40 hours.

1 3.3 Development of Alternatives

2 There are no viable alternatives to this project. The powerhouse does not have adequate space
3 to install fire walls between the diesel generators.

4

5 When the gas turbine operates in generation mode, at least one of the engines has to run 6 continuously for the generator to produce power. However, when the generator runs in 7 synchronous condensing mode only one engine is required to bring the generator up to the 8 proper speed. At that point, the generator can operate without the engine, which is then shut 9 down.

- 10
- 11 []
- 12

13 **4 Conclusion**

The Black Tickle plant has no automatic fire protection systems to permit early intervention in the event of a fire. As a continuation of Hydro's Fire Protection projects, this project will address the risk of damage resulting from a fire by installing automatic fire protection systems in the Black Tickle diesel generator plant main hall area and other interior spaces requiring fire protection.

19

20 4.1 Project Estimate

21 The estimate for this project is shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Project Estimate (\$000)

Project Cost	2019	2020	Beyond	Total
Material Supply	0.0	20.0	0.0	20.0
Labour	87.8	75.0	0.0	162.8
Consultant	56.0	64.0	0.0	120.0
Contract Work	168.9	923.0	0.0	1091.9
Other Direct Costs	42.4	25.0	0.0	67.4
Interest and Escalation	22.1	140.8	0.0	162.9
Contingency	0.0	292.4	0.0	292.4
Total	377.2	1,540.2	0.0	1,917.4

1 **5 Project Schedule**

2 The anticipated schedule for this project is provided in Table 2.

Activity		Start Date	End Date
Planning	Open Project	Jan 2019	Jan 2019
Tendering	Issue and evaluate request for proposal's (RFP)	Feb 2019	Apr 2019
Design	Site Visit Prepare conceptual designs	May 2019	Jun 2019
	Contract Awards Prepare detailed design and shop drawings	Jun 2019	Jul 2019
Installation	Installation of Storage Facility for Nitrogen Cylinders	Jul 2019	Sep 2019
Procurement	Supply fire protection equipment	Jul 2019	Sep 2019
Installation	Install fire protection equipment	Jul 2020	Aug 2020
Commissioning	Perform testing and commissioning of fire protection systems	Aug 2020	Sep 2020
Closeout	Prepare closeout package	Nov 2020	Nov 2020

Table 2: Project Schedule

3 6 Future Plans

At present, 17 of Hydro's 21 diesel plants do not have a fire suppression system. It is
anticipated that Hydro will submit proposals in subsequent years to have automated fire
protection systems installed at additional remote diesel plants.

13. Replace Vehicles and Aerial Devices - Hydro System (2019-2020) - Various



Replace Vehicles and Aerial Devices

Various Sites (2019-2020)

July 2018



1 Summary

- 2 This project provides for the replacement of light-duty and heavy-duty vehicles that meet the3 established replacement criteria.
- 4
- 5 Hydro operates in many diverse locations across the Province and it is critical that employees
- 6 are provided with safe and reliable equipment in order to provide economical and reliable
- 7 electricity.
- 8
- 9 The project is estimated to cost approximately \$1,843,000 with planned completion in 2020.

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Appendices

Appendix A Diesel Engine Overhaul Five Year Plan

1 **1 Introduction**

Hydro operates a fleet of vehicles comprised of approximately 270 light-duty vehicles (cars,
pick-ups and vans) and 65 heavy-duty trucks (aerial devices¹, material handlers and boom
trucks).

5

6 The vehicle fleet is strategically distributed across Hydro's operating areas throughout the
7 Province and is utilized on a daily basis to support staff engaged in the maintenance and repair
8 of the electrical system.

9

10 The Transportation section of Hydro maintains a close liaison with other Canadian Utilities 11 through participation on the Canadian Utility Fleet Council and has established vehicle 12 replacement guidelines, which consider the operating regime for the vehicles, as well as 13 average replacement criteria used by other Canadian utilities.

14

15 2 Project Description

This project proposes the replacement of 27 light-duty vehicles and five heavy-duty vehicles in accordance with the established replacement criteria for vehicle age and kilometers (km) as follows in Table 1. Table 2 shows the replacement criteria of three other electric utilities as Hydro surveyed in 2014.

Table 1: Replacement Criteria - Hydro

5-7 years or > 150,000 km and Condition/Maintenance Cost
6-8 years or > 200,000 km and Condition/Maintenance Cost
7-9 years or > 200,000 km and Condition/Maintenance Cost

¹ An aerial device or elevated work platform, also known as a 'cherry picker' or 'bucket truck', is a mechanical device used to provide temporary access for people or equipment to inaccessible areas, usually at height.

Utility #1	
Light-duty vehicles	5 years or 200,000 km
Heavy-duty vehicles:	8 years or 300,000 km
Utility #2	
Light-duty vehicles	5-6 years or 200,000 km
Heavy-duty vehicles:	
Class 3, 4, 5 and 6	8 years or 300,000 km
Class 7 and 8	10 years or 300,000 km
Utility #3	
Light-duty vehicles	5 years or 150,000 km
Heavy-duty vehicles	10 years or 250,000 km

Table 2: Replacement Criteria – Other Utilities

Occasionally, a unit in one of the diesel plants across Hydro's operating area experiences an
 issue that necessitate an unplanned overhaul. Where appropriate, Hydro may complete such an
 overhaul under this project and, if possible, defer one of the units planned for completion.

4

5 3 Justification

Hydro operates in many diverse locations across the Province and it is critical that employees
are provided with safe and reliable equipment in order to provide economical and reliable
electricity.

9

10 3.1 Existing System

11 This project proposes the replacement of 27 light-duty vehicles and five heavy-duty vehicles in

12 accordance with the established replacement criteria for vehicle age and kilometers. All

13 vehicles that meet the criteria are being replaced.

1 3.1.1 Operating Regime

As this project relates to the replacement of vehicles and aerial devices, there is no relevant data related to operating regime. Typically, the units do not move from region to region so that they can provide reliable service in the assigned areas. However, a unit may be relocated to another area if operational commitments demand it.

6

7 3.1.2 Age of System or Equipment

8 This project is being justified from a reliability perspective, but if overhauls are not completed9 failures could result in oil and glycol being released into the environment.

10

11 **3.1.3 Operating Experience**

Failure to replace units in accordance with the replacement policy will lead to increasing maintenance costs and less reliable vehicles. Hydro employees maintain the electrical system A pours a day, 7 days a week and require dependable and safe vehicles for their work. As vehicles age, they experience increasing downtime, which could negatively affect response times for emergency outages or planned maintenance.

17

18 **3.1.4 Industry Experience**

Vehicle replacement criteria across the Canadian Utility Industry vary depending on location, exposure to harsh environmental conditions, and the severity of the service hours for the vehicle. While some variances exist, vehicle replacement criteria in other utilities are generally consistent with the replacement criteria utilized by Hydro (please see Section 2.0).

Hydro's Transportation section maintains a database of the vehicle fleet, which tracks individual
unit history including acquisition date, kilometers, and maintenance history. The Fleet Specialist
updates this information on an ongoing basis and uses current data to determine annual vehicle
replacements.

27

Prior to the preparation of the capital budget proposal, a review of the latest version of thedatabase is performed to select the units that meet the replacement criteria for age or

- 1 kilometers, and to verify those that should be included in the capital budget proposal based on
- 2 their maintenance history or ongoing maintenance issues.
- 3

4 **3.1.5** Maintenance History

5 Please see Appendix A for the life to date maintenance costs for vehicles being replaced under6 this proposal.

7

8 **3.1.6** Historical Information

- 9 Table 3 provides the five-year purchase history for vehicle and aerial device, as well as the
- 10 budgets for 2017 and 2018.

Voor	Units	Purchased	Budget	Actuals
fear	Vehicles	Aerial Devices	(\$000)	(\$000)
2018-2019B	27	7	2,421	-
2017-2018B	43	3	2,400	-
2016	37	3	1,978	1,977
2015	40	4	2,602	2,602
2014	32	9	2,900	2,815

Table 3: Vehicle and Aerial Device Purchases

11 4 Conclusion

- 12 This project provides for the replacement of light-duty and heavy-duty vehicles that are
- 13 approaching the end of their useful lives and are no longer dependable.

14

15 4.1 Project Estimate

16 The estimate for this project is shown in Table 4.

Project Cost	2019	2020	Beyond	Total
Material Supply	1,194.5	479.9	0.0	1,674.0
Labour	7.0	0.5	0.0	7.5
Consultant	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Contract Work	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other Direct Costs	2.0	1.0	0.0	3.0
Interest and Escalation	44.6	29.3	0.0	73.9
Contingency	0.0	84.2	0.0	84.2
Total	1,248.1	594.9	0.0	1,843.0

Table 4: Project Estimate (\$000)

1 4.2 Project Schedule

2 This project is scheduled to be completed by December 31, 2020.

Appendix A

Replace Vehicles and Aerial Devices Hydro System (2019)

	llnit	Ago at	Projected	a)	Ś		Life to Date
Туре	Number	Age at	kms	Age	ž	Condition	Maintenance
	Number	retirement	KIIIS				Cost
Car	V1339	7.9	168976	Х	Х		\$12,100
Car	V1340	7.7	136265	Х		Body Condition	\$11,428
Car	V1351	7.0	177466	Х	Х		\$12,630
Car	V1355	6.1	168473	Х	Х		\$10,868
Car	V1356	6.1	164543	Х	Х		\$10,440
Car	V1357	6.1	168696	Х	Х		\$9,527
Mini Van	V1358	5.9	179715	Х	Х		\$8,362
Pick Up	V2715	9.0	176992	Х	Х		\$13,451
Pick Up	V2756	7.9	178809	Х	Х		\$9,174
Pick Up	V2775	7.0	170927	Х	Х		\$10,244
Pick Up	V2785	7.0	162422	Х	Х		\$33,889
Pick Up	V2796	6.8	171791	Х	Х		\$18,770
Pick Up	V2800	6.2	188051	Х	Х		\$9,934
Pick Up	V2801	6.2	180188	Х	Х		\$9,361
Pick Up	V2815	5.2	232946	Х	Х	Hi mileage	\$7,350
Pick Up	V2816	5.2	196485	Х	Х	Hi mileage	\$7,193
Pick Up	V2817	5.1	176689	Х	Х		\$7,169
Pick Up	V2818	5.1	173876	Х	Х		\$15,027
Pick Up	V2821	5.0	219377		Х	Hi mileage	\$1,252
Pick Up	V2823	4.9	288957		Х	Hi mileage	\$11,614
Pick Up	V2824	4.9	185912		Х	Hi mileage	\$8,234
Pick Up	V2826	4.9	190727		Х	Hi mileage	\$3,874
Pick Up	V2834	4.9	207536		Х	Hi mileage	\$10,693
SUV	V2814	5.2	170700	Х	Х		\$7,559
Van	V2809	5.7	185051	Х	Х		\$6,607
Van	V2838	4.9	228830		Х	Hi mileage	\$13,383
Van	V2841	4.9	192258		Х	Hi mileage	\$8,271
Dump Truck	V4485	15.7	140079	Х		Rusty	\$124,594
Boom Truck	V4521	10.0	92207	Х		Hi Engine Hours	\$58,795
Material	V4528	8.7	207441	Х	Х	Hi Engine Hours	\$107,532
Handler							
Material	V4529	8.7	253739	Х	Х	Hi Engine Hours	\$162,036
Handler							
Aerial Device	V4539	6.3	205546	Х	Х	Hi Engine Hours	\$75,951

Table A1: Diesel Engine Overhaul Five Year Plan

14. Upgrade Telecontrol Facilities - Gull Pond Hill and Bay d'Espoir Hill

	DPROF	ESSION	V.F.	
CONT	Newf and L	ouncland abredor		
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Electrical	
Mechanical	
Civil	
Protection & Control	
Transmission & Distribution	
Telecontrol	
System Planning	

Upgrade Telecontrol Facilities

Gull Pond Hill and Bay d'Espoir Hill

July 2018



1 Summary

The telecontrol facilities at Bay d'Espoir Hill and Gull Pond Hill, located near the Bay d'Espoir Hydroelectric Generation Plant, are essential for effective and continued communications and SCADA control of the Island Interconnected System. Both sites include a microwave shelter that houses the communications equipment and a backup generator and enclosure that provides power to the communications equipment in the event of a power outage on the distribution system.

8

9 Both microwave shelters are between 35 and 40 years old and are in a deteriorated condition.

10 To provide continued weather protection to the communications equipment, refurbishments

11 are required to the shell and foundation of each shelter.

12

This report outlines a proposed project to refurbish the microwave shelters at the Bay d'Espoir
Hill and Gull Pond Hill telecommunications sites to ensure continued reliability of
communications and SCADA control.

16

17 This estimated project cost is approximately \$673,900 with planned completion in 2020.

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1 **1 Introduction**

The Bay d'Espoir Hill (BDH) and Gull Pond Hill (GPH) telecontrol sites are repeater¹ sites and are vital in the provision of secure and reliable telecommunications for the operation of the Island Interconnected System (IIS). Hydro employees identified the condition of the building during regular site visits. These site visits prompted Hydro to make an assessment of the telecontrol facilities.

7

8 This report outlines a proposed project to refurbish the existing microwave shelters at the Bay
9 d'Espoir Hill and Gull Pond Hill sites.

10

11 2 Project Description

12 This two year project proposes to refurbish the shelters at Gull Pond Hill and Bay d'Espoir Hill.

- 13 The scope of the work includes:
- Replace the siding, wall sheathing and insulation, roof ice guard, and door;
- Replace the deteriorated concrete foundations with new concrete;
- Install new porch and entrance steps and platform;
- Bury the ground rods and ground grid; and
- Sand blast and treat the building metal floor frame to prevent further deterioration.
- 19 •

20 **3 Justification**

- 21 The project is justified on the requirement to refurbish deteriorated infrastructure in order to
- 22 ensure reliable operation of Hydro's microwave system, which is used to control and protect
- 23 Hydro's electrical system.

¹ A repeater is an electronic device in a communication channel that increases the power of a signal and retransmits it, allowing it to travel further.

1 3.1 Existing System

The Bay d'Espoir Hill and Gull Pond Hill telecommunications sites are located near Bay d'Espoir. These sites are microwave hubs in Hydro's communications system and are links between Hydro's Energy Control Centre (ECC) and the generating facilities at Bay d'Espoir, Upper Salmon and Granite Canal. They provide System Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) control of the Hydro generating facilities and teleprotection of the 230kV transmission lines.

7

8 The equipment at these sites transmits operational data from the generating sites to the ECC 9 over the microwave system. The ECC uses the microwave system to remotely control that 10 equipment. Examples of microware communication are commands for opening and closing a 11 circuit breaker; providing generation telemetry; and, monitoring generating frequency data to 12 the ECC. The link to the ECC also includes communication traffic such as telephone, email and 13 video conferencing. These shelters protect microwave equipment from water, ice and wind 14 damage. Refer to Figure 1 for the site locations on the SCADA system connection map.



Figure 1: Portion of SCADA System Connection Map

- 1 The shelters are metal clad wooden structures anchored to concrete foundations. After the
- 2 shelters were constructed, small porches were attached to provide storage and protect the
- 3 main door.
- 4
- 5 Figure 2 and Figure 3 are images of the site locations.



Figure 2: Gull Pond Hill Telecommunications Site



Figure 3: Bay d'Espoir Hill Telecommunications Site

1 **3.2 Operating Experience**

The telecommunications shelters at Bay d'Espoir Hill and Gull Pond Hill were constructed in the late 1970's. The buildings are between 35 and 40 years old and have not had a significant upgrade since they were built. A condition assessment was completed in 2014 and a follow up site visit was completed in May 2018. The following deficiencies were identified:

- Siding and roof protection are beyond its useful life and show signs of dents, damage
 and water infiltration (see Figures 4, 5, 6, and 7 for Gull Pond Hill and Figures 8A and 8B
 for Bay d'Espoir Hill).
- 9 Cracks in foundation (see Figures 9A and 9B for Gull Pond Hill and Figures 10A & 10B for
 10 Bay d'Espoir Hill).
- Porch separating from building (see Figures 11A and 11B for Gull Pond Hill and Figures
 12A and 12B for Bay d'Espoir Hill).
- Ground rods and wire above yard surface (see Figures 13 for Gull Pond Hill and Figures
 14 14A and 14B for Bay d'Espoir Hill).
- Building metal frame shows signs of rust and deterioration (see Figures 15A and 15B for
 Gull Pond Hill).
- 17
- 18 Figure 4 to Figure 15 illustrate the deteriorated state of the buildings.



Figure 4: Gull Pond Hill – exterior metal siding – weathered, damaged, and separating from building



Figure 5: Gull Pond Hill – Temporary patching of metal roof to help prevent water entry



Figure 6: Gull Pond Hill – Damaged siding and exposed sheeting



Figure 7: Gull Pond Hill – Exterior Door



Figure 8A and 8B: Bay d'Espoir Hill – Deteriorated siding and rusted metal roof



Figure 9A and 9B: Gull Pond Hill: Cracked and deteriorated building foundations



Figure 10A and 10B: Bay d'Espoir Hill – cracked and deteriorated building foundations



Figure 11A and 11B: Gull Pond Hill – porch separating from main shelter



Figure 12A and 12B: Bay d'Espoir Hill – porch separating from main building


Figure 13: Gull Pond Hill – ground rod and wire above surface



Figure 14A and 14B: Bay d'Espoir Hill – ground rods and wire migrating above the surface



Figure 15A and 15B: Bay d'Espoir Hill – building metal floor frame rusting

1 3.2.1 Siding, Wall sheathing and Insulation, Roof Ice Guard, and Door

2 At both sites, the siding and door are original to the buildings and are beyond their useful lives 3 and show signs of deterioration. Based on experience from similar sites, water has filtered 4 through the siding and damaged the wood sheathing and insulation. Water infiltrating into the 5 building structures will continue to deteriorate the buildings. The roof ice guard protects the 6 building's roof from ice falling off the telecommunication tower. The ice collects during the 7 winter months and falls on the building roof during the warm periods. The roof ice guard is to 8 be replaced due to the amount of damage that has occurred throughout the years with this 9 falling ice.

10

11 3.2.2 Concrete Foundations

Both buildings concrete foundations have cracks that allow water to penetrate the concrete making them susceptible to freeze/thaw cycles resulting in structural damage to the foundations. Continuing foundation deterioration jeopardizes the function of the internal equipment if the foundation fails.

16

17 3.2.3 Porch Structure

18 The porch foundations are inadequate and the porch structure is settling as a result of an 19 inadequate porch foundation. As shown in the included images, this settlement is causing the 20 metal siding to separate and allow water to penetrate the siding.

21

22 **3.2.4** Ground Rods and Ground Grid

To ensure the protection of equipment and the safety of personal, especially during lightning conditions, an extensive ground grid was installed at both sites in the late 1990s. Due to the natural settling of the ground and the freeze thaw cycles, this ground grid has started to protruded above the surface of the yard at many locations and presents a safety hazard to personal working at the sites. This project will allow the site yard to be excavated and the grounding and re-installed as per Hydro's specifications.

1 3.2.5 Building Metal Floor Frame

The telecommunications buildings at both sites are a prefabricated structure mounted on a steel floor frame. This steel frame is integral to the structural integrity of the building. At the Bay d'Espoir Hill site, the frame is showing severe rusting and requires refurbishment before the frame deteriorates to a point of failure. This project will allow for the refurbishment of the steel frame to prolong the life of the existing building. The Gull Pond Hill site does not exhibit the same deterioration as the Bay d'Espoir Hill site, most likely due to the fact that the site is further inland than the Bay d'Espoir Hill site and is not affected by salt contamination.

9

10 3.3 Anticipated Useful Life

- 11 The anticipated useful lives of the shelter components after refurbishment are:
- Metal siding 15 to 20 years;
- Concrete foundations 20 years; and
- Metal roof with ice shield 15 to 20 years.
- 15

16 **3.4 Alternative Analysis**

An alternative to refurbishment of the shelters is their replacement. The cost to replace the
two shelters is approximately \$1.5M compared to refurbishing them at a cost of \$673,900.
Replacement has been deemed a non-viable alternative.

20

21

22 4 Conclusion

23 The telecontrol facilities at Bay d'Espoir Hill and Gull Pond Hill are required for communications

- 24 and SCADA control for the Island Interconnected System.
- 25
- 26 The shelters at these sites are between 35 and 40 years old and are in a deteriorated condition.
- 27 To provide continued weather protection to the communications equipment, refurbishments
- are required to the shell and foundation of each shelter. The estimated project cost to refurbish
- these sites is approximately \$673,900.

1 4.1 Project Estimate

2 The estimate for this project is shown in Table 1.

Project Cost	2019	2020	Beyond	Total
Material Supply	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Labour	43.0	78.1	0.0	121.1
Consultant	45.0	99.0	0.0	144.0
Contract Work	0.0	240.0	0.0	240.0
Other Direct Costs	2.4	7.0	0.0	9.4
Interest and Escalation	5.9	50.6	0.0	56.5
Contingency	0.0	102.9	0.0	102.9
Total	96.3	577.6	0.0	673.9

Table 1: Project Estimate (\$000)

3 4.2 Project Schedule

4 The anticipated project schedule is provided in Table 2.

Table 2: Project Schedule

Activity		Start Date	End Date
Planning	Planning: Design transmittal, Project schedule,	Jan 2019	Mar 2019
	etc.		
Design	Site visit	Apr 2019	Apr 2019
	Develop design	May 2019	Nov 2019
	Develop tender documents	Nov 2019	Feb 2020
Procurement	Tender/award construction contract	Feb 2020	May 2020
Construction	Construction Bay d'Espoir Hill and Gull Pond Hill	Jun 2020	Sep 2020
Commissioning	Final inspection and acceptance	Sep 2020	Sep 2020
Closeout	Project closeout	Oct 2020	Nov 2020